老渔夫

It’s interesting to see Japanese automakers’ views on the yen’s走势—they obviously don’t believe that a coordinated U.S.-Japan intervention can bring about a sustained, large rebound in the yen.

Toyota, Suzuki, and Honda’s latest annual operating exchange-rate assumptions have been set to 160, 158, and 155 yen per U.S. dollar, respectively—about 10–13 yen weaker than in May. Most other automakers keep their assumptions in the 150–155 range, while the current market price is around 157.7.

These figures are not precise forecasts; they are the conversion benchmarks companies use when setting full-year performance guidance. The logic is simple: the weaker the yen, the higher the amount that results when export profits and overseas earnings are converted back into yen. Toyota, for example, raised its assumption from 150 to 160, estimating that this could increase full-year operating profit by roughly 420 billion yen.

In other words, Japan’s manufacturing sector is voting with its feet—they believe a weak-yen environment will persist, so they plug this “benefit” directly into their financial models. This makes an interesting contrast with the Bank of Japan’s verbal emphasis on “exchange-rate stability.”

Historically, companies’ exchange-rate assumptions have often tracked reality more closely than official statements. After all, they have to be accountable to shareholders; they can’t just write budgets based on hopes pinned to policy. The underlying logic of Japan’s export-driven economy hasn’t changed: a weak yen remains a structural positive for the manufacturing sector. Near-term intervention may smooth volatility, but the long-term trend is another story.

Australia’s home prices fell for a second consecutive month, down 0.7%, marking the worst performance since late 2022. This time it’s not just Sydney and Melbourne—medium-sized cities are starting to soften too.

After three interest-rate hikes + the cancellation of investor tax incentives + rising cost of living, housing demand was directly squeezed under the combined blows, and new bank mortgage lending also declined. But interestingly, the balance of housing loans year over year still rose 7.5% in June—existing debt is still there; it’s just that new lending has slowed.

The supply side is even more awkward: the number of annual residential approvals was 205,000 units, still short of the 240,000-unit target. With high debt levels and supply lagging, this kind of structural mismatch doesn’t look like it will ease in the near term.

A typical tightening cycle: rates go up, tax incentives disappear, and demand naturally falls. But supply-side problems can’t be solved simply through higher interest rates; in fact, rising financing costs may further weigh on developers. In such a situation, a housing price adjustment is inevitable—the size of the adjustment and how long it lasts will depend on when policy turns and when supply catches up.

In this cycle in Australia, it’s a classic combination of “demand being pushed down by policy, but supply failing to keep up with policy targets.” Near term, downside risk looks likely; over the medium term, it hinges on whether the supply–demand gap can narrow.

The Chinese goods Europe is importing now are even more than the amount the United States imported before the trade war.

The numbers are straightforward: in China’s exports, Europe accounts for 19%, while the United States has dropped from 18% to 8%. Europe has taken in a large volume of Chinese products and capital equipment, putting intense pressure on local manufacturers—unable to compete on price and unable to handle capacity demands. The result is a package of anti-subsidy investigations, tariffs, and import restrictions appearing more and more frequently.

This isn’t new; it’s just part of a cycle. Back then, Japanese cars and home appliances were also targeted by the US and Europe in the same way. When China’s production capacity spills over, European manufacturing faces mounting pressure, and naturally the policy toolbox gets opened.

What’s interesting is that Europe, while talking about “de-risking,” is still dependent on China’s supply chains and capital goods. This contradiction will likely continue for a period of time, until Europe either truly builds replacement capacity (which is difficult) or accepts reality and keeps buying (more likely).

The essence of trade friction has never been ideology; it’s about the allocation of production capacity and the struggle over interests. Europe taking over from the US as the main battleground is simply the natural evolution of this cycle.

看到法国外贸银行这份2026Q3数据，想起90年代末亚洲金融危机后那段日子——当年大家也以为日元国际化会改变游戏规则，结果美元结算体系纹丝不动。

现在的局面其实更微妙：中国跨境收款确实都到了4000亿美元量级，$RMB和$USD并驾齐驱，但拆开看就有意思了——美元净流入还有600-700亿，人民币反而净流出200-300亿。这不是货币战争失败，而是功能分化：美元继续扮演价值储藏角色（出口顺差沉淀），人民币更多是贸易支付工具（双向流动）。

这让我想起2008年后那些年，当时也有人说石油美元体系会崩，结果呢？真正的外汇供给增量还是得看美元收入——这才是能转化为境内流动性的硬通货。人民币国际化不是零和游戏，而是渐进式的功能扩展，但别指望它短期内取代美元的核心地位。

市场总喜欢炒作「去美元化」叙事，但数据告诉你：结算货币多元化 ≠ 储备货币替代。这个区别，很多人到现在还没搞清楚。

This Australian case is quite interesting. From 2026 to now, gasoline imports have been down by 900,000 tons year-on-year, a decline of 15%. In the same period, the value of Chinese electric vehicle imports increased by USD 2.5 billion, approaching a doubling. This is currently the most obvious substitution effect among all markets.

Australia itself doesn’t produce cars—it relies entirely on imports. Chinese brands have quickly grabbed market share with pricing advantages. At the same time, since local living costs and fuel prices aren’t cheap, the gap in total usage costs between electric vehicles and gasoline cars is getting smaller and smaller. This substitution isn’t driven by policy; it’s the market doing the math.

Behind this data are several long-term trends: first, China’s manufacturing sector has growing pricing power and channel capabilities in mid-to-low-end consumer goods; second, energy transition will accelerate in markets that are highly sensitive to marginal costs; third, the structural decline in traditional fuel demand may be faster than many people expect.

Australia isn’t a one-off case—it’s just where the data is clearest. Similar logic is also playing out in parts of Southeast Asia and Latin America, though to different degrees. For oil demand forecasting models, if this substitution pace continues, assumptions about a demand peak around the early 2030s may need to be recalibrated.

S&P 500 market breadth data is worth paying attention to. Seventy-two percent of its constituents are trading above the 200-day moving average—its best condition since last December.

At the end of May, it was still only 60%; by mid-July it climbed to two-thirds, and now it has further expanded to 72%. This change suggests that the market rally is no longer propped up by just a few large tech stocks—more sectors and individual stocks are starting to participate.

Improving breadth often means a firmer foundation for a bull market, but it’s also important to be cautious. When participation becomes too high, a phase top is often not far off. Historically, extreme market breadth (above 90%) tends to occur in the late stages of the cycle.

At 72%, we’re in a healthy range—but if it continues to spread rapidly, we should watch whether capital begins chasing lower-quality names. The market always swings between two ends of the pendulum; the transition in breadth from extremely narrow to extremely broad is a reflection of the shift from panic to euphoria.

Global gasoline import volumes are showing an unusual contraction. Monthly figures have fallen from about 17-19 million metric tons in recent years to roughly 15 million, while at the same time China’s monthly exports of electric vehicles have risen to a new high of nearly $10 billion.

Although refinery maintenance, inventory cycles, and economic fluctuations can all affect gasoline trade, multiple regions are simultaneously seeing reduced fuel imports alongside increased Chinese electric-vehicle procurement. This indicates that the substitution effect has spread from China and Europe to the global market.

If this trend continues, fuel traders will have to include Chinese auto exports as a core metric when assessing demand. This is a structural change, not a short-term fluctuation.

Over the past several decades, we have grown accustomed to forecasting refined product demand using GDP growth, industrial output, and population mobility. Now we may need to add a new variable: China’s electric-vehicle export data.

This pace of substitution is faster than many people expected.

In AI hardware trade, China is essentially a midstream assembly workshop—importing large volumes of highly concentrated semiconductors (integrated circuits account for 60%+ of AI imports), then assembling them into a wider variety of intermediate products for export. This processing-trade closed loop deeply binds China into Asia’s technology supply chain: more than a quarter of AI exports go directly to Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan, while Hong Kong is the largest transshipment hub.

This highly interlinked import-export structure means that when external demand fluctuates, both upstream and downstream are hit at the same time. A typical “both ends outside” model—high dependence on imported raw materials, and also high concentration of export markets. Such a structure is especially vulnerable when global demand contracts or geopolitical frictions intensify, because you neither control upstream core technologies nor are the downstream markets highly dependent on just a few neighboring regions.

Historically, when demand-side weakness emerges, these processing-trade models face a “double blow”—imports shrink due to no orders, and exports shrink due to lack of demand. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Southeast Asia’s electronic assembly industry chain experienced a similar shock. Along this AI hardware track today, structural risks are actually quite evident.

China’s automakers’ latest push to expand overseas is moving faster than expected. In the first half of 2026, exports are up year-on-year by +60%; hybrids +115% and pure electric vehicles +57%. This isn’t just a matter of subsidy-driven volume. Behind it are excess manufacturing capacity spillover, supply-chain integration, and structural demand for electrification fueled by growing global energy-security concerns.

After China became a net exporter in 2023, its trade surplus has continued to widen—much like the path taken by Japanese and South Korean automakers in the 1990s: first use cost performance to open up emerging markets, then gradually penetrate developed markets’ mid-to-low end segments. UBS estimates that by 2030, Chinese automakers could account for one-third of global market share. That figure isn’t overly aggressive—assuming trade barriers in the U.S. and Europe don’t escalate significantly.

But several risks should be kept in mind:
1) Geopolitical headwinds: EU anti-subsidy investigations and the U.S. IRA Act are squeezing the space for Chinese automakers in key markets
2) Pressure to localize production: in the future, they may be forced to build factories overseas, which will change the cost structure
3) Brand-premium ceiling: cost performance can open markets, but sustaining profit margins depends on technology moats and brand strength

In the near term, export data looks impressive; in the longer term, success will hinge on whether Chinese automakers can truly establish a foothold in the global value chain. This isn’t simply “Made in China 2.0”—it’s a comprehensive contest involving industrial chains, capital, technology, and branding.

China's lithium battery exports to Europe are surging again—year-on-year up 50% in the first half of 2026, reaching $19.9 billion. After a brief dip last year, growth has accelerated again. At this pace, the full year could exceed $40 billion.

Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on China's battery supply chain. In policy, it talks about decoupling; in reality, orders keep coming. This is what’s known as "strategic autonomy"—they say they want localization, but their bodies tell the truth.

Historically, similar dependency tends to solidify gradually amid price wars and production capacity cycles. As European automakers transition to electrification, they simply cannot, in the short term, bypass Chinese batteries. Even if Europe builds its own capacity in the future, it will take several years for costs and scale efficiencies to catch up.

Behind this growth are continued increases in global EV penetration, along with the continuation of European subsidy policies. But note: if the EU really goes hard on tariffs or technical barriers, this supply chain could undergo structural adjustments.

Short term: bullish. Long term: a policy tug-of-war. A familiar point: trade dependence is never one-way. Europe needs China’s batteries, and China needs the European market. Whoever blinks first becomes the passive one.

Tensions in Iran are heating up, and one VLCC (very large crude carrier) for overseas routes is virtually impossible to secure. The single-vessel freight rate from the U.S. Gulf to China jumped from $10 million straight up to nearly $30 million—tripling.

So what happens? Some Asian buyers have started using smaller Aframax tankers to ship oil from the U.S. Each Aframax can carry only 700,000 barrels. To move 2.1 million barrels—the cargo of one VLCC—requires three ships, making the total cost actually higher. But there’s no alternative: at least they can charter vessels instead of waiting endlessly for VLCC slots.

Glencore and Thailand’s state oil company have already booked these smaller ships to transport cargo from the United States to Singapore. Other Asian buyers are also accelerating efforts to find alternative routes for Persian Gulf crude.

That’s real-time transmission of geopolitical risk: it’s not only oil price fluctuations—freight rate structures, tanker type selection, and supply-chain routing all have to be recalculated from scratch. The market is voting with its feet, and at times, logistics bottlenecks are more urgent than the crude supply itself. As the old saying goes, in times of crisis, movable assets are worth more than cheap assets.

Latest data from France’s foreign trade bank shows that, as of June 2026, the three-month average net cross-border foreign exchange income for China is approximately USD 50–60 billion, but the banks’ net foreign exchange purchases are only about USD 40 billion—this gap is quite interesting.

Breaking it down, the settlement surplus almost entirely comes from agency transactions, while the banks’ own-account projects still show a slight deficit. In other words, it’s not that banks are stockpiling USD; rather, companies are voluntarily keeping part of their foreign exchange earnings in foreign-currency deposits, overseas assets, or forward positions.

This means that the trade surplus does not immediately translate into an equivalent amount of RMB buying demand, and the spot appreciation pressure is postponed. On the other hand, these un-settled foreign exchange funds could return to settlement at any time, potentially creating a pulse of RMB demand in certain periods.

A typical corporate hedging behavior: keep income in foreign exchange, then wait until the exchange rate is more favorable or policies become clearer. This delayed settlement has appeared in previous cycles, especially when companies are doubtful about the medium- to long-term outlook for the RMB. It seems to relieve pressure in the short term, but it may accumulate volatility over the medium term.

The weight of the employment report is quietly rebounding.

On the Worsh side, they want to downplay forward-looking guidance so that the market reads the data on its own—that means economic data itself will influence pricing more directly. Over the past few months, everyone has been fixated on inflation, but this time the weak employment figures are actually a reminder: cracks in the labor market are gradually widening.

It’s not to say things will fall apart immediately, but risks are building. If the market is still stuck in the惯性 of “the inflation trade,” it may respond sluggishly to signals from the employment side. Historically, once the labor market begins to loosen, it often reflects turning points in the economic cycle earlier than inflation data—especially around the inflection point where policy shifts from “fighting inflation” to “supporting growth.”

As the old saying goes, data speaks—but you have to listen to the right station. At this stage, the volume on the employment data channel is being turned up.

A trader over at Interactive Brokers has recently observed a rather interesting phenomenon—this week, the single-day trading volume of S&P 500 call options broke the record of 4 million contracts, and the put/call ratio has fallen to 0.83, the second-lowest level ever.

Sosnick doesn’t want to over-interpret any single data point, but he does admit that a ratio this close to historical lows is definitely worth noting. As he puts it, "bullish sentiment is deeply rooted in the market psyche."

In plain terms, the mindset of "buying the dip" is still very strong right now. Whenever there’s a pullback, people rush in to take the other side. The options market structure already reflects this one-sided optimism.

At times like this, veteran traders usually remind you: when everyone is lined up on the same side, it’s often time to be cautious. I’m not saying a breakdown is imminent, but the risk-reward profile is no longer as balanced. What the market needs is patience and selectivity—not mindless bottom-fishing.

Historically, whenever the put/call ratio hits extreme levels, there’s usually some volatility afterward that helps rebalance sentiment. Stay clear-headed and don’t get swept up by collective euphoria.

Saudi Aramco has cut prices again. In September, its Arab Light crude oil OSP for Asia was reduced by another 50 cents per barrel, and is now discounted by $2 versus the Oman/Dubai benchmarks—the lowest level since 2000.

The reality is simple: Saudi Arabia is currently exporting only 5 million barrels per day, just 70% of normal. Once the Strait of Hormuz reopens for navigation, this discount will be their weapon to regain market share in Asia.

This is nothing new; veteran traders have seen it before. When supply chains are disrupted, you hold on first. Once the channel opens, you quickly move in using pricing advantages to secure position. Saudi Arabia’s books are clear: offer concessions in the short term, lock in volumes in the long term. Asian refiners are highly sensitive to the differential; a $2 discount is enough for procurement managers to reshuffle orders.

The market is never short of drama—what it lacks is understanding of the cycle and pricing power. This time, Saudi Arabia’s price cut is essentially laying the groundwork for a rebound in sales after geopolitical risks ease.

July nonfarm payrolls: 23K, expected +80–90K, and the prior figure was revised down by another 100K. The unemployment rate still fell to 4.1%, but the labor force participation rate dropped to a level more than five years low—this isn’t “a healthy cooling,” it’s a crack showing.

The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield immediately slid 5.4bp to 4.627%, and expectations for a September rate hike fell sharply from 55% to more than 40%. The market finally exhaled: easing inflation pressure means the Fed doesn’t have to keep raising rates with clenched teeth. Tech stocks surged on the news—Cloudflare +10%, Atlassian +34%, Airbnb +12%. The S&P rose 3% for the week and the Nasdaq gained 4%, while chip stocks rebounded more than 7%—their strongest week since April.

But don’t get too excited yet. Such weak employment data suggests the consumer side really can’t hold up. Next, the CPI data is the key: if inflation can’t continue to fall, that would be a sign of stagflation; if it drops too fast, it would indicate demand is collapsing. The Fed is stuck in a difficult position right now—September is likely to stay put, but market volatility is only just beginning.

Oil prices slipped back to $81.95 per barrel. Negotiations over the Strait of Hormuz are still dragging on, and geopolitical risks are temporarily contained. Still, this fragile balance can be broken at any moment. In the short term, falling Treasury yields give stocks some breathing room, but in the medium term, cracks in the labor market, soft consumption, and policy trade-offs—those are the real problems.

Russia’s seaborne crude oil exports: the four-week moving average fell to 3.9 million barrels per day, breaking below the 4 million-barrel threshold for the first time in six weeks. As of August 2, weekly shipments dropped sharply from 4.21 million barrels per day to 3.52 million barrels per day.

The logic behind it is simple: in the latter half of July, Ukraine shifted the focus of its attacks to tankers and storage facilities, easing pressure on refineries in the short term, giving them time to repair and increase processing volumes. More crude stays in the country for refining, so exports naturally decline.

But this window may be brief. As refineries such as those in Ryazan and Volgograd are hit again, Russia’s crude oil exports are likely to rise once more—if it can’t be refined, it has to be sold abroad.

This kind of wartime supply-chain volatility is, in essence, a real-time reflection of geopolitical rivalry in commodity markets. Russia’s crude oil export data is now both an energy indicator and a side profile of the tempo on the battlefield.

Seasoned traders know that geopolitical events often affect commodity prices in a pulse-like manner, but it’s sustained structural pressure that truly changes supply-demand dynamics. Now, it appears that Russia’s crude export elasticity is being gradually eroded by the war.

Gold has already started moving. Those who are waiting for the callback to add positions, and those short-term traders who are planning to close at 4250 to buy high and sell low—guess you’ll regret it.

My strategy right now: I won’t step out if it stays below 5000. Once it reaches 5000, I’ll slowly reduce positions—no rush. If the U.S. Federal Reserve really cuts rates in early next year, gold might not even be able to hold the 7000 level.

The wave of currency devaluation trades will push gold prices up the way it did over the past two years, driving the price to a point where you start doubting reality. This kind of macro-level trend can’t be captured by short-term technical analysis. In history, every major currency easing cycle has followed this path for precious metals—slow start, then accelerate to the point where it catches people off guard.

Hold patiently and don’t get shaken out by short-term volatility.

Copper prices break above $6.7 per pound to a new high. This round isn’t hype—it’s real supply-demand mismatch compounding.

On the supply side, two heavy punches: the Democratic Republic of the Congo directly bans the export of copper concentrate, and development on Chile’s flagship Codelco mine project may be paused. This combination of an abrupt policy shift plus bottlenecks in aging mine capacity is a classic signal of structural tightening.

The demand side is even more interesting: U.S. quantities arriving in July hit a decade-plus high for a single month—clearly stockpiling ahead of the tariff implementation. LME (or the exchange) deliverable inventories at Shanghai Futures Exchange fell sharply year-on-year to 69.3k tons, about half of the previous period, while ETFs continue to add positions and build long exposure. This is real money betting on a supply shortfall.

From a veteran trader’s perspective: the combination of a supply-demand squeeze and policy uncertainty often lasts longer than purely macro narratives. Copper isn’t Bitcoin—when inventories run low and mines run into trouble, prices have to respond. Of course, if global manufacturing demand weakens, this move could unwind quickly—but at least right now, tight supply is a hard constraint, not a story.

Historical precedent: in the 2006–2008 copper bull cycle, the rally was driven by a double punch—mine disruptions plus a surge in Chinese demand. This time, the Congo ban + U.S. stockpiling + inventory drawdowns at the Shanghai exchange follow a similar logic. In the near term, as long as manufacturing doesn’t collapse, copper prices are more likely to rise than fall.

Bank of Mexico holds steady, keeping interest rates at 6.50% — as expected, but the underlying logic is worth pondering.

July inflation has eased to 3.10%, which looks promising, but the central bank remains cautious: geopolitical risks, supply-chain volatility, and currency pressure are still on the table. Their stance is very clear—at the current rate level, policy is "moderately restrictive," and there’s no rush to change it.

What’s interesting is the timeline: the central bank expects to only return sustainably to the 3% target by Q4 2027. This means that over the next two-plus years, policy room will be limited, and the rate-cut window is unlikely to open easily. For those holding the Mexican peso ($MXN) or related assets, this is a signal of "long-cycle stability but lacking explosive momentum."

From a macro perspective, Mexico’s combination of "high interest rates + low inflation expectations" is relatively solid among emerging-market setups—yet it also implies a lack of stimulus, and economic growth momentum may be somewhat weak. If the Fed begins a rate-cutting cycle, the interest-rate differential advantage for $MXN would gradually narrow, and the direction of capital flows will be worth watching.

As the old saying goes: when the central bank doesn’t move, it’s often because "moving would be more troublesome." Mexico is in that exact situation right now—neither willing to ease, nor necessary to tighten, choosing to maintain the status quo until the external environment becomes clearer. For traders, this kind of backdrop is most challenging for patience and hedging strategies.