密讯

特朗普亮出抉择底牌：警告克制与对伊开放并行

特朗普在福克斯新闻的短暂露面，为当前充满变数的宏观市场注入了一剂强烈的不确定性催化剂。他在镜头前抛出的信号并非单向度的，而是将地缘政治的尖锐张力与外交接触的微妙可能性强行并置。一方面，他直言自己正处于“抉择阶段”，并警告对方“最好保持克制”；另一方面，他又表示对于会见伊朗总统“大体上保持开放态度”。这种看似矛盾的话语体系，实际上精准投射了当前国际秩序重构过程中权力博弈的真实状态。在美联储刚刚结束加息周期、全球流动性边际收紧的宏观背景下，来自最大经济体的任何地缘政治波动，都不再仅仅是新闻头条，而是迅速穿透至风险资产定价逻辑的核心变量。特朗普的言论刻意回避了具体的政策路径或时间表，转而通过制造一种“未来可能会发生大事”的悬念，迫使市场参与者重新评估尾部风险的概率分布。这种不确定性直接冲击了那些基于稳定预期构建的资产估值模型，使得原本依赖于低波动率环境的金融工具面临重新定价的压力，市场情绪因此从单纯的宏观数据驱动，转向了对地缘政治黑天鹅事件的高度敏感。

从事实层面拆解，核心信息点集中在特朗普对伊朗关系的双重定性上。他明确表达了两个维度的态度：一是防御性的威慑，即强调“正处于抉择阶段，他们最好保持克制”；二是外交性的试探，即“对于会见伊朗总统，大体上保持开放态度”。这两句话均出自特朗普之口，通过福克斯新闻这一渠道发布。值得注意的是，他并未提及具体的制裁措施、军事部署或谈判细节，而是将焦点锁定在“克制”与“开放”这两个抽象概念上。与此同时，另一条来自彭博的消息背景显示，美联储本月早些时候为抑制通胀而进行了加息操作。这一货币政策动作确立了当前宏观环境的基调：紧缩周期虽接近尾声，但高利率环境对资产估值的压制效应依然存在。在此背景下，特朗普的言论并非孤立存在，而是与美联储的紧缩立场形成了宏观层面的共振。此外，虽然特朗普的科技顾问Michael Kratsios提到AI领袖无需某人放慢模型开发节奏，但这属于科技产业内部的技术路线讨论，与当前地缘政治快讯无直接逻辑关联，仅作为背景线索存在，不应被解读为政府对科技行业的直接干预信号。

这种地缘政治信号与货币政策紧缩的叠加，对风险偏好产生了显著的抑制作用。当决策者强调“抉择”与“克制”时，市场解读往往倾向于认为冲突升级的风险并未消除，反而因缺乏明确的外交突破而变得更加不可预测。对于定价而言，这意味着避险资产的需求可能阶段性上升，而高贝塔值的风险资产则面临估值折价。特别是那些对地缘政治敏感的行业，如能源、航运以及部分依赖中东供应链的科技硬件板块，其股价波动率可能放大。然而，由于特朗普同时保留了“开放态度”，这也为潜在的缓和情景留下了想象空间，导致市场在悲观与乐观之间反复横跳，难以形成单边趋势。这种震荡格局增加了交易成本，迫使机构投资者调整仓位结构，从追求绝对收益转向注重相对价值和流动性管理。在缺乏具体政策落地细节的情况下，任何基于单一新闻标题的激进押注都显得缺乏根基，市场更倾向于等待更明确的指引，如官方外交声明或具体的制裁/解除制裁清单。

接下来需要密切关注几个关键指标和口径的变化。首先，是伊朗方面的官方回应及其后续动作，特别是是否会出现针对美国利益或盟友的实质性挑衅行为，这将直接验证特朗普所言“抉择阶段”的具体指向。其次，需观察美国国务院及国防部是否发布配套的官方声明，以澄清“开放态度”的具体边界和前提条件，避免市场因解读分歧而产生剧烈波动。再者，美联储官员在后续会议中的表态将至关重要，特别是关于通胀预期和利率路径的指引，这将决定在外部冲击下，货币政策是否会进一步收紧以对冲风险，还是会保持观望以支持经济稳定。最后，全球主要央行的反应也不容忽视，特别是欧洲央行和英国央行是否会因避险情绪升温而调整其量化紧缩的节奏。在这些宏观变量明确之前，市场将维持高波动、低方向性的特征，投资者应重点关注那些具备强现金流、低杠杆且业务地域分散的防御性资产，以应对潜在的地缘政治黑天鹅事件。

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Houthi direct attack on Riyadh: the U.S. issues an upgraded warning; Saudi Arabia urgently seeks help

The military confrontation between Yemen’s Houthi forces and Saudi Arabia is crossing traditional boundaries, evolving into a geopolitical crisis that is affecting global energy supply chains. As the Houthis carry out direct strikes on Saudi Arabia’s core energy facilities and on the capital, Riyadh, and as the situation in the Strait of Mandeb rapidly deteriorates, the global energy transport system is falling into an unprecedented “double-straight-jaw” predicament. This pressure is not only about the physical blocking of routes; it is also reflected in the exponential surge in shipping costs and the structural loosening of allied defense systems. The current situation is no longer confined to a localized conflict in the Middle East—it is directly undermining the stability of the international crude oil pricing mechanism and global logistics networks, forcing major oil producers and consumers to re-evaluate their energy security strategies.

According to newly disclosed facts, the intensity of the conflict escalated significantly on the 19th. On that day, Yemen’s Houthis issued a statement confirming that they launched two military actions against “sensitive targets” in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, as well as facilities of Saudi Aramco located in Yanbu (延布). They reportedly used large numbers of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. Shortly afterward, U.S. embassies across multiple countries in the Middle East issued a security alert, warning that the military conflict could “quickly escalate,” and urging citizens to remain highly vigilant and be prepared for travel disruptions. Faced with this grave threat, Saudi Arabia—rarely—urgently requested air-defense support from France, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, and Egypt to defend against missile and drone attacks. According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia is seeking help from multiple parties because its main allies and weapon supplier, the United States, is deeply involved in the war with Iran, and interception stockpiles have fallen sharply, leaving it in a “too busy to care” state. Reports even indicate that, to avoid an interruption in oil supplies, Saudi Arabia made a support request to Israel—a country it has not yet established diplomatic ties with.

Meanwhile, in last week’s raids, the Houthis seized territory near the Red Sea’s strategic chokepoint, the Strait of Mandeb, and took control of the entire Red Sea coastline in Yemen, bringing this critical waterway within their firing range. Earlier, the East-West crude pipeline that Saudi Arabia had relied on since March was shut down due to drone attacks, causing its two major export routes—the alternative route via the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea export route—to come under pressure one after another, putting energy exports in a situation of being attacked from both front and back.

This series of events has produced a dramatic transmission effect across the global shipping market. VLCC (very large crude carriers) freight rates have surged to near-epic levels. Data from the Baltic Exchange shows that on September 18, the VLCC benchmark route TD3C’s daily rate had jumped to $1.241 million. Shipping broker Gibson said this level is “unprecedented.” Currently, for a cargo of crude oil shipping from Houston to Asia, the freight cost is about $26 per barrel, and the total freight for a single ship can reach as much as $52 million—roughly one quarter of the WTI crude oil futures price. Saad Rahim, chief economist at Trafigura Group, one of the world’s largest commodity traders, said bluntly at the Bloomberg commodities investor forum that the cost of shipping crude oil to the rest of the world has never been this high. The soaring freight rates are forcing global refiners to abandon far-flung sources and instead scramble for nearer supplies. Tight available shipping capacity has spread beyond VLCCs to smaller and mid-sized vessels. In the Atlantic market, the West Africa-to-China route (TD15) has an average round-trip TCE of about $527,000 per day, while the U.S. Gulf-to-China route (TD22) averages about $400,000 per day. Although the market has self-correcting mechanisms, the ultra-high freight rates have shifted some demand to Suezmax tankers, and rising oil prices may curb purchasing willingness. Still, in the short term, disruptions remain the dominant force, providing strong support to the freight market.

In addition, Ahmed Nagi, a senior analyst at the International Crisis Group, noted that the speed of the Houthis’ offensive shocked multiple parties. Anti-Houthi forces’ units reportedly nearly fell apart at the front as they advanced. Some units reportedly fled in a domino-like manner after believing false retreat orders or thinking that retreating troops had better intelligence. There have even been cases of up to 60,000 soldiers fleeing in disorder—highlighting the Houthis’ significant advantages in tactical infiltration and psychological warfare.

The core implication of the current situation is that traditional allied defense systems are showing cracks, while geopolitical risk has essentially transformed into economic costs. The “Mecca Joint Defense Agreement” signed in August—on which Saudi Arabia was placing great hopes—states that an attack on any one of Saudi Arabia, Turkey, or Pakistan will be treated as an attack on all three. However, as of the 19th, Turkey’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan had only said that Turkey would honor its commitments and could provide military-technology assistance. Pakistan’s military spokesman, Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, said the country would “defend Saudi Arabia’s security diplomatically and through substantive action,” but both countries have not presented specific military support plans. Analysts point out that the agreement is still awaiting formal approval by the three countries, that its terms have no legal binding effect for now, and that the three countries differ in military capabilities and strategic interests—making it highly uncertain how political commitments can be translated into actual military coordination. Fidan also emphasized that for Saudi Arabia, being drawn into the U.S.-Iran conflict is “unacceptable.” U.S. officials said that the U.S. Central Command already has working groups strengthening intelligence sharing with Saudi forces and providing planning support, but the wording is noticeably more restrained than a direct military intervention. This dispersion and uncertainty of defensive resources makes Saudi Arabia appear isolated with no effective help in responding to the Houthis’ ongoing threats.

For the global market, the surge in energy transportation costs is not only squeezing refinery profits; it may also transmit through the supply chain to push up prices of end-consumer goods. Italy has planned to dispatch up to four vessels to the Strait of Mandeb to ensure navigation safety, but amid unresolved geopolitical turmoil, loosened allied frameworks, and persistently high shipping costs, the global energy trade landscape is facing a profound reconfiguration. Any expectation that the conflict can be rapidly quelled through short-term diplomatic measures looks overly optimistic. Market participants need to be fully prepared for a long period of high volatility and high-cost conditions.

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CapCut’s September 20th transformation into an all-scenario intelligent creation platform: AI takes over repetitive tasks, freeing creators

On September 20, CapCut held the “AI New Creation Press Conference,” officially announcing that its strategic focus is shifting from a single video editing tool to a full-scenario intelligent creation platform. The core logic of this launch is clear: by leveraging AI to take over generation, organization, and repetitive operations, it frees creators from cumbersome technical workflows so they can focus more on content expression, style control, and final decisions. This shift is designed to address pain points such as frequent switching of tools for professional creators, high barriers for mobile users to create, and inefficient production of marketing assets for merchants. CapCut also aims to build an end-to-end intelligent ecosystem covering everything from beginners to professionals, and from personal records to commercial marketing.

On the product architecture side, CapCut Pro introduced a one-stop creative workspace called “CapCut Hub,” built from an infinite canvas and a multi-track editor. This feature allows users to start from a one-sentence description, a reference video, or a document, then organize their ideas on the canvas and generate a script. It can also call on AI platforms such as Jimu and Xiaoying (Xiao Yunque) to generate images, video, and audio assets, after which users can move directly into the multi-track editor for fine-tuning—completely changing the old workflow of repeatedly importing and exporting between different tools. In addition, the intelligent creative Agent “CapCut Assistant” can handle repetitive tasks such as organizing assets, trimming narration, correcting subtitle errors, and video packaging. It also supports user-defined Skills to fit specific workflows. Over the past year, CapCut Pro has rolled out features including multi-timeline support, mixed media layering, local backup for drafts, planar tracking, AI ultra-clear enhancement, and secondary color grading, while continually deepening collaboration with industry partners. For example, the Dolby Vision feature launched two years ago ensures that HDR color and brightness details are preserved throughout import and export processes. In the future, the two sides will also collaborate on more professional audio features with stronger spatial and immersive effects. In terms of device compatibility, CapCut supports tablets and foldable-screen phones, and has optimized the experience on the HarmonyOS platform. The “Tap to Share” feature enables phone assets to be sent directly to the computer-side asset library, improving cross-device creation fluidity.

For mobile users and broader audiences, the CapCut app launched an AI creation assistant called “Xiaoming.” As the mobile version of CapCut Assistant, “Xiaoming” integrates capabilities including an AI creation assistant, a multi-track editing assistant, and marketing expertise. Users simply describe their needs in natural language, and “Xiaoming” can automatically call on AI generation abilities to produce images, video, text, and music. Combined with today’s popular music, transitions, and expression styles, it generates a first draft that can still be adjusted. It not only understands trending topics, but can also learn users’ preferences for assets and their preferred rhythm to co-create a distinctive style. For merchant scenarios, “Xiaoming” becomes an AI marketing specialist. After merchants upload product images and specify the publishing platform, the system can extract key selling points, plan the content expression based on the target audience and consumption scenarios, and generate corresponding marketing assets. At the press conference, Douyin creator Hu Chujing demonstrated how she uses “Xiaoming” to process travel vlogs and point-of-view narration videos. She said the tool helps her handle tedious, energy-draining editing tasks like “cutting-and-packaging,” so she can spend more time on the content itself—while the final choice of what to show still remains with the creator.

In building the creator ecosystem, CapCut announced a new “same-model (template-style) creation” paradigm. The upgraded templates are no longer just fixed replacements for a completed clip. Instead, users can adjust the content and storyline in templates using natural language, and add or replace assets—enabling more personalized expression on top of existing creative foundations. As AI dramas, advertisements, and other content formats continue to develop, CapCut will also advance professional content and AI Skill building. This will allow professional creators with mature workflows to turn their experience into reusable capabilities that other users can access. In terms of incentive policies, CapCut invests around 150 million RMB each year to reward creators, providing exposure and revenue support for high-quality works. For template authors, CapCut launched a “Template Author AI Assistant,” offering services such as creative inspiration, template diagnostics, and customer support Q&A. For beginners, it upgraded the beginner template tasks, clearly defining paths to accumulate production, earnings, and feedback—and allows users to complete template creation and publishing directly with the help of an AI assistant. In addition, CapCut also initiated a “CapCut Creation Partners” program, inviting creators to co-create content and gain more incentives, resources, and growth support.

According to data, over the past year, 67.68 million users created and exported their first作品 (first work) using CapCut; 1.21 million CapCut creators started from zero followers and found their first batch of viewers; 3.26 million Douyin creators with tens of thousands of followers used CapCut for content creation; meanwhile, CapCut served 1.66 million small and medium-sized merchants, helping them enhance product visibility. To support creators’ dual needs in the AI era—for both AI generation and video editing—CapCut simultaneously launched a new subscription option, “AI Ultra membership,” incorporating AI creation points and CapCut SVIP professional editing benefits into a single subscription system. CapCut says that AI is bringing new possibilities to creation, but different creators and scenarios require different tools. CapCut will not offer just one answer; instead, it hopes to support each creator’s needs through different products and capabilities, building an all-scenario intelligent creation platform that covers everyone—from beginners to professionals.

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The US Refuses Saudi Arabia, Secretly Meets the Houthis: Why Does the Guardian of the Middle East Only Seek Self-Preservation?

The strategic relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia is undergoing a profound structural break. Its key marker is not a single diplomatic spat, but the substantive failure of the security commitment mechanism. For years, the security architecture in the Gulf has been built on an implicit logic of “protection in exchange for loyalty.” As the region’s dominant power, the US provides a security umbrella in return for political support and economic interests. However, a series of recent events shows that this one-way reliance is being dismantled. When Houthi forces launched attacks on sensitive targets in Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh, and on Aramco oil facilities, Washington did not respond by quickly stepping in for retaliation. Instead, it adopted a colder, more pragmatic approach: holding secret meetings with the Houthis in Oman. The core agenda was to ensure shipping through the Strait of Hormuz remains uninterrupted and to maintain a localized ceasefire. The message conveyed by this diplomatic move was unmistakable: under the US priority principle, the boundaries of US interests have been clearly drawn. As long as US forces are not directly threatened and the Strait of Hormuz is not completely sealed off, the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis is treated as an internal matter for Riyadh—rather than an obligation the US must shoulder.

This practice of isolating the risks to allies from the circle of US core interests signals that the US is retreating from its “guardian” role to that of a “spectator” in the Middle East security framework.

Looking back at the details of recent interactions, the trust fracture between the US and Saudi Arabia has long ceased to be a problem caused overnight. In May, the “Free Plan” proposed by the Trump administration was not discussed with Saudi Arabia in advance, prompting Riyadh’s angry refusal to allow US troops to use Saudi airspace. Even under pressure from the White House, the move was halted within 48 hours. After the Houthi attacks, Saudi Arabia called the US twice to request airstrikes assistance—both times the requests were denied. The US logic chain was extremely tight: avoid directly getting entangled in a military conflict with the Houthis; prevent the fighting from spreading to US bases; and maintain the basic order of Red Sea shipping by restricting the Houthis’ attack scope (only targeting non-Saudi vessels). This “disentanglement” strategy exposes the US’s increasingly strained military resources and waning political will in the Middle East.

What is even more striking is that information—unconfirmed but highly indicative—shows the UAE has deployed the FK-2000 air defense system to Bahrain to protect the command headquarters of the US Fifth Fleet. Satellite imagery confirms Bahrain has deployed such systems, and Wikipedia notes that these assets were originally for the UAE’s own use and have now been temporarily diverted for “firefighting.” This detail is highly symbolic: when Iran’s missile and drone consumption war has brought US Middle East air-defense ammunition inventories close to depletion, and faced with the stark cost asymmetry between low-cost Iranian drones and expensive Patriot interceptors, the US has no choice but to rely on allied equipment to fill the defensive gap. This is not just a matter of face—it is a direct reflection of real capability. The US can no longer unilaterally sustain the entire Gulf security and defense system.

In response to the shrinking security commitments, Saudi Arabia did not fall into passivity. Instead, it quickly launched a diversified security hedging strategy aimed at breaking away from absolute reliance on a single external power. First, in terms of acquiring high-end equipment, Saudi Arabia received approval to purchase F-35 fighter jets. Although this variant has been severely “degraded” and cannot fully integrate into the US military’s combat system, it still represents an important step in modernizing the Saudi Air Force. Second, Saudi Arabia actively promotes regional security autonomy: it has formed a Red Sea security coalition made up of 14 countries and signed the Mecca Accord, bringing in Turkey and Pakistan as potential security partners. Turkey is preparing to provide military assistance, and Pakistan has also signaled support—indicating that Saudi Arabia has begun building a regional security network independent of the United States. More crucially, Saudi Arabia is accelerating the introduction of drone technology from China, especially cooperative production lines for the Wing Loong-3 drone. Compared with the long timeline in which F-35s are expected to be first deployed around 2030 and to form full combat capability by 2035, Wing Loong-series drones can become combat-ready within 1 to 2 years. In particular, after the incident in which Saudi F-15 jets were shot down, Riyadh urgently added an order for 20 Wing Loong-10B drones, demanding faster deliveries and prioritizing deployment toward Yemen to replace manned aircraft for high-risk missions. At the same time, the localization project for onboard anti-radiation targeting pods was started early, aiming to rapidly enhance Saudi Arabia’s own system-level combat capabilities.

These measures are not simply a “de-Americanization,” because Saudi Arabia’s defense system is still built on an American-style equipment framework. A more accurate interpretation is “de-single-binding for security,” meaning that through multiple approaches, the country’s national security during the push toward the 2030 vision will no longer be subject to the political fluctuations of a single ally.

The latest security alert issued by the US Department of State on September 19 advises American citizens in the Middle East to remain highly vigilant, while advising citizens of other regions to travel cautiously. While this does not reach the extreme level of the February evacuation of citizens, the risk level is clearly higher than the assessment when embassy staff were allowed to return to work in August. This confirms the US government’s prediction that the conflict between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis would continue to escalate. It is worth noting that the causes of this conflict are complex. Saudi Arabia accuses the Houthis of violating airspace agreements while attending the funeral of Hameini and assisting Yemeni government forces in bombing Sana’a International Airport. At the UN General Assembly, Saudi Arabia did not name Iran in criticizing the provision of high-end weapons to the Houthis, but within its “performance” there is an implied dissatisfaction with the US’s failure to fulfill security commitments. Saudi Arabia understands that war cannot solve its security anxiety, and the US no longer has the capacity to provide protection unilaterally. Therefore, Riyadh’s choice returns to rationality: unable to rely on external strong protection, it will build a more resilient security architecture through technology imports, regional cooperation, and improvements in self-defense capabilities. This shift is not only a pragmatic safeguard for Saudi Arabia’s 2030 vision, but also a microcosm of how the Middle East geopolitical landscape is evolving from “US-centeredness” to “multipolar, security-driven autonomy.” The US “guardian” halo in the Middle East is fading; in its place is a new reality in which allies fight their own battles and seek security diversification.

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Houthi missiles press toward Riyadh, Saudi Arabia urgently seeks support from the “Four Countries”

In the early hours of September 19, the night sky over Riyadh was torn apart by air-raid sirens. The sound marked a fundamental shift in the nature of the Red Sea crisis. In the past few months, the conflict had mainly taken the form of Saudi air force unilateral strikes on targets inside Yemen, with the Houthi forces absorbing pressure on home soil. Now, however, the front line has extended deep into Saudi territory. The Houthis, through a coordinated combination of missiles and drones, are directly threatening Saudi Arabia’s capital and the lifeblood of its energy supply. This leap from “border skirmishes” to “deep deterrence” not only breaks the regional security balance, but also forces Saudi Arabia into unprecedented passivity on both diplomatic and military fronts. At the same time, the urgent intervention of European countries—especially Italy—shows that the conflict has gone beyond the realm of geopolitics and directly affects the nerve endings of the global energy supply chain.

The Houthi forces’ recent military actions are highly strategic. Their core logic is to convert control over land into leverage at sea, thereby applying comprehensive pressure on Saudi Arabia. On the land front, the Houthis push south along the Red Sea coastline, claiming that within a short period they have newly controlled roughly 5,400 square kilometers of territory, including key points around the Bab al-Mandab Strait such as Mokha, Zubab, and the island of Perim. This development is not merely an expansion of territory; it is aimed at seizing the firepower projection capability at the entrance to the Red Sea. On the sea and energy front, Saudi Arabia has long relied on east-west oil pipelines to cross about 1,200 kilometers, transporting crude oil from its eastern oil fields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu in order to avoid the risks of the Strait of Hormuz. However, the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities in Yanbu mean that this “backdoor” alternative route is also exposed to risk. Even more alarming is that the Houthis’ strike range is gradually extending from the Gizan and Najran border areas all the way to Ta’if and Yanbu, and then to Riyadh. This outward-to-inward penetration upgrades the security threat from a border problem into an energy crisis, ultimately evolving into a political-security issue for the capital. On that basis, the Houthis transform military gains into political demands, bringing Gizan, Najran, and Asir back into the territorial agenda—trying to force Saudi Arabia to pay higher costs on security, economic, and even territorial matters through battlefield advantages.

Facing pressure from multiple directions, Saudi Arabia launched a “four-pronged request for aid” strategy, but each route is confronted with real difficulties. The first route is the United States. Saudi Crown Prince Salman had sought direct military intervention from the Trump administration. But Washington only agreed to provide intelligence sharing and target-identification support, refused to take part in combat directly, and continued engagement with Oman and the Houthis. This “help in defense but not in fighting” stance reflects Washington’s reluctance to fall back into the quagmire of the Yemen war. Although it has raised regional risk alert levels and Trump even ended a trip to Camp David early to return to the White House, the limits of its military commitments are clear. The second route seeks support from traditional partners. The Pakistan military stated it would “spare no effort” to defend Saudi Arabia, especially regarding security for Mecca and Medina. France, the UK, Egypt, and Turkey also expressed willingness to provide support in terms of air defense or military needs. However, providing equipment and intelligence is fundamentally different from directly dispatching troops. What Saudi Arabia truly lacks is ground forces willing to jointly bear the costs of war. The third route is highly dramatic: Saudi Arabia is discussing intelligence and air-defense cooperation with Israel through the U.S. Central Command channel. This move is not intended to push for normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations, but rather stems from immediate security needs. Against the backdrop of frequent Houthi missile launches, Saudi Arabia urgently needs technical support from experience-rich missile-defense capabilities. Safety pressure forces Riyadh to reassess political costs. The fourth route is seeking Chinese mediation. Saudi Arabia asked Beijing for help—not to carry out military strikes, but to use China’s communication channels with Iran to prevent the conflict from spilling over. Wang Yi, in talks with Iranian Foreign Minister Aragchi, clearly emphasized that China does not want tensions to expand into Yemen and the Red Sea. This reflects the essential difference between the two lines of assistance from China and the United States: the United States provides hard-power defense systems, while China provides a soft-power communication bridge. Together, they form a complete puzzle for Saudi Arabia to respond to the crisis.

The evolution of the situation has triggered a chain reaction in global energy markets, with Europe becoming the most directly pressured party. Italy’s defense minister Crosetto has asked the navy to prepare for operations in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and is considering deploying up to four vessels to strengthen escort. Its core motivation is to protect the country’s economic interests. Saudi Aramco has notified some of its long-term European customers that it will not be able to supply crude oil as originally contracted in October. This comes as European Economic Community members, in June this year, imported an average of about 577,000 barrels of crude oil per day from Saudi Arabia. As the east-west oil pipeline routes are hit and Red Sea exports are obstructed, European refineries are forced to reprocure on the international market, driving up freight rates, insurance costs, and crude oil procurement expenses across the board, which are ultimately passed on to corporate and consumer bills. This shows that the conflict is no longer a matter confined to the region—it is a systemic risk to the global supply chain. If the Strait of Hormuz continues to be blocked and the Bab al-Mandab situation worsens for the long term, the resulting resonance—tankers taking detours, surging insurance premiums, and higher transportation costs in Asia—will mean the world market will collectively bear the bill for this war. At present, the United States, Pakistan, China, Israel, and European countries are all trying to find their own positions, but there is a lack of a unified coordination mechanism. Saudi Arabia faces not only gaps in air defense, but also double squeeze from diplomatic isolation and an energy supply cutoff. Meanwhile, by controlling the choke point of the Red Sea, the Houthis have successfully turned a local conflict into a global economic lever, forcing all parties into difficult trade-offs between security and interests.

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Do you still scroll the public square on weekends?
Or do you just lie flat, and wait until Monday to deal with it?
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If Trump Returns to the White House, “America First” Will Be Taken to an Extreme, Threatening Global Governance

A dramatic swing in U.S. political winds is pushing global markets and policymakers into a crossroads full of uncertainty. If Donald Trump again takes the White House, the core logic of his policy agenda will clearly point to the extreme version of “America First.” This would not only mean a fundamental reshaping of the domestic regulatory environment, but also an unprecedented shock to international multilateral cooperation frameworks. From withdrawing from climate commitments, to an aggressive shift in energy policy, to erecting high trade barriers—if these measures are implemented, they would completely break the balance that global governance has maintained over the past several decades. For observers, this is no longer merely a continuation of U.S. domestic affairs, but a systemic storm that could reshape global supply chains, the energy landscape, and geopolitical relationships.

In the environmental and energy domains, the scale of policy rollback far exceeds conventional expectations. According to multiple sources, Trump’s team plans to sign executive orders early in his term to formally pull the United States out of the Paris Agreement again. This is not a one-off case. The Trump administration in 2017 had initiated similar procedures, but this time the accompanying executive approach would be even more thorough. Reports indicate that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) headquarters and all its employees could be moved out of Washington, D.C. Since its establishment in 1970, the EPA has served as a core institution for federal environmental regulation, and its presence in the capital symbolizes the central role of environmental protection in national politics. Moving it out would, in essence, amount to an “institutional marginalization” operation at the administrative level, aimed at weakening the federal government’s role in climate governance. At the same time, energy development would be loosened. Trump intends to reexamine national monuments and public lands designated as permanent protected areas, allowing energy companies to expand the scope of drilling and extraction. This sharply contrasts with the Biden administration’s decision in January this year to pause approvals for new liquefied natural gas (LNG) export projects. Trump’s goal is to restart these approvals to align with the demands of key swing-state voters such as those in Pennsylvania—where the state depends on abundant natural gas resources and related jobs. This policy shift from “deregulation” to “promoting development” directly addresses longstanding domestic debates over energy security and economic competitiveness. Supporters view it as a way to unlock potential and reduce reliance on foreign sources, while opponents warn it would damage ecosystems and intensify the climate crisis.

Trade and tariff policy constitute another shockwave, with a key figure being former U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer. Reports say Trump has invited this hardliner—known as the “tariff designer”—to return to a senior government role. Lighthizer supports imposing a 10% tariff on all imported goods and an additional 60% tariff on Chinese goods. The logic behind this proposal is not traditional bargaining leverage, but an effort to address the United States’ long-standing “structural trade deficit,” elevating it to the level of national security and global influence. This view has sparked intense controversy in international trade circles. Research by the Peterson Institute for International Economics estimates that if the plan were fully implemented, the United States could lose hundreds of thousands of jobs, and ordinary households’ annual cost of living would increase by thousands of dollars. Although Lighthizer is convinced that countries will eventually accept a “better trading system” based on interest calculations, the real-world obstacles are substantial. Germany’s employers’ association warns that transatlantic relations could be harmed, and Japanese business groups have also expressed concerns. Comprehensive tariffs could not only raise domestic prices, but also accelerate the global supply-chain reshuffling, forcing companies to disperse production to avoid political risks—thereby profoundly changing the globalization division-of-labor network built over the past several decades.

Immigration has become the most intense flashpoint in domestic political divisions. In recent interviews, Trump has stated clearly that he will push forward large-scale expulsions of illegal immigrants “at any cost,” citing hardline narratives such as “drug lords destroying the country.” However, multiple studies show that immigrants’ crime rates are not higher than those of native-born residents and may even be lower in some categories—facts often overshadowed by emotional political narratives. Institutions such as the American Civil Liberties Union have warned that mass deportations could involve racial profiling, violations of due process, and a humanitarian crisis leading to family separations. Deeper conflicts lie in the standoff between federal and local authorities. Some states and cities—led in part by Democrats—have announced they will continue to provide sanctuary and refuse to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement agencies. This tug-of-war between law and administration would not only consume enormous administrative resources, but could also hit agriculture, construction, and the service industry, which rely on immigrant labor—thereby affecting the stability of the U.S. labor market.

Behind this cluster of policy developments is a worldview shift—from multilateral cooperation to unilateral action, and from global governance to national priority. For the world, if the United States were again to withdraw from climate agreements, it would weaken the effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. It could also be viewed by some developing countries as an excuse to slow climate action, while affecting international financing mechanisms such as the Green Climate Fund. In the trade arena, tariff barriers would force global supply chains to reorganize faster, export-oriented industries would face a blow, and consumers would bear higher costs. In immigration, border tensions could intensify and affect relations between the United States and Latin American countries. Even though the balancing act in Congress, judicial review, and resistance from state governments would introduce multiple variables for policy implementation, the direction is already clear. In the coming months, the world will closely watch how these issues move from campaign promises to concrete executive orders—because it is not only about the United States’ internal trajectory, but also about what will shape global cooperation prospects and the risk boundaries in key areas such as climate, trade, and immigration. In a time full of uncertainty, understanding these structural changes has become essential coursework for all parties to develop strategies.

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The U.S.-Iran Deadlock Starts to Unwind as Oil Prices Break Above $100 and Then Fall

The geopolitical pendulum of the Middle East swings violently again, with market sentiment flipping rapidly between panic and expectations. Recently, as the U.S.-Iran conflict entered a war-of-exhaustion phase, international oil prices briefly surged past the psychological barrier of $100 per barrel, triggering global inflation jitters. However, the latest diplomatic developments suggest the deadlock is showing signs of loosening. According to information provided by an Iranian source cited by China Media Group (CMG), Qatar and Pakistan—acting as mediators—have sent signals to Tehran that Washington is prepared to restart negotiations and reach an agreement, and that it is taking a serious approach to moving this process forward. The market quickly picked up on the news, and international oil prices promptly fell.

For a Middle East situation that has long been under extreme pressure, this is not only a diplomatic breather, but also a re-pricing of the geopolitical risk premium.

Looking back at the evolution of this round of conflict, the core issue has always revolved around the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding.” Previously, the U.S. showed a cold attitude toward the memorandum and launched repeated military strikes against Iran. In response, Iran blocked the Strait of Hormuz and carried out retaliatory actions against U.S. targets. Meanwhile, Yemen’s Houthi forces significantly escalated their offensives in the Red Sea and within Saudi territory; on September 19, even thick smoke appeared at the airport in Riyadh, and the security situation deteriorated rapidly.

This “multi-front warfare” scenario has sharply increased pressure on all sides. On September 19, Rezaei, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, confirmed in an interview with Al Jazeera that Iran is holding consultations with Pakistan and Qatar. Qatar has passed Iran’s “conditions” to the U.S., and Iran is currently waiting for a response from the Trump administration. These conditions include ending the war on all fronts, releasing frozen funds, and ending the maritime blockade. Notably, despite the tension, Iran has not announced withdrawing from the Non-Proliferation Treaty; Rezaei emphasized that the decision depends on Washington’s actions. This stance of “fighting and negotiating at the same time” reflects that both sides are still making room for a final political resolution.

From a deeper logic standpoint, what is bringing both sides back to the negotiating table is not simply goodwill, but an unbearable reality-cost. First comes the exhaustion of fiscal and military resources. The U.S. military disclosed to Congress that, as of September 3, military actions targeting Iran had already resulted in at least $45.1 billion in spending, roughly equivalent to more than 300 billion yuan RMB. This hefty bill does not yet include hidden costs such as allied losses, personnel casualties, and damage to credibility. Even more severe is the depletion of U.S. ammunition—especially air defense missiles—more than half of which were consumed during months of exchanges, and there have even been cases where some missiles failed to intercept targets because the U.S. was reluctant to use them.

Second is economic blowback. The surge in oil prices directly hits Americans’ day-to-day living standards, especially households that rely on gasoline-powered cars. In the U.S. political context, high oil prices are a major enemy of the ruling party. If the Republicans lose in the midterm elections, policy room for the latter half of the Trump administration will be significantly squeezed. Finally, there is the risk of the conflict spiraling endlessly. The intense confrontation between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia puts the U.S. in a dilemma of being pulled into a larger-scale regional war. As Saudi Arabia is a U.S. ally, its homeland security is threatened, forcing Washington to reassess the depth and breadth of its involvement.

Under the triple pressure of “can’t afford to fight, can’t afford to drag it on, can’t afford to lose,” negotiations become the only viable exit.

During this process, the role of third-party mediators is crucial. As traditional mediators, Pakistan and Qatar shuttle back and forth between the two sides, working to build a bridge for communication. In addition, China’s diplomatic moves also deserve attention. Three days ago, Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi visited China. During his meeting with Wang Yi, Wang clearly encouraged Iran and the U.S. to remain rational and restrained, return to the “Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding” as soon as possible, and rebuild the negotiation mechanism. This diplomatic strategy of “moving step by step” rather than “raising the blade,” provides a buffer for the stalemated situation.

On the eve of the United Nations General Assembly, the U.S. did not issue a visa for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to travel to the United States, yet it allowed Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to enter. This seemingly contradictory move actually reveals Washington’s delicate balancing act between maintaining the authority of hegemony and seeking diplomatic off-ramps.

Looking ahead, U.S.-Iran relations will most likely continue to show a tug-of-war pattern of “fighting and talking together.” Historical turning points rarely happen overnight; they often move slowly forward through repeated testing. For observers, judging where things are headed can’t rely only on the sound of gunfire—it must also focus on three hard indicators: the ledger, oil prices, and votes. The process of oil prices rising from $70 to $100 and then falling again clearly reflects market expectations about changes in the intensity of future conflict. Although signs of easing are emerging, the Middle East’s defining feature—“peace exists between two wars”—has not changed. Regional powers such as Saudi Arabia have been severely damaged by the fighting, U.S. domestic political pressure continues to build, and Iran’s domestic economy is also in dire shape. Therefore, no side has the capacity to sustain high-intensity confrontation for the long term. In this context, cautious optimism is the more rational attitude.

We should recognize that peace is not the default setting of the world; it is a dynamic balance reached by all sides under calculations of their interests and survival pressures. In a global backdrop where instability is intensifying, staying clear-headed about potential risks and understanding the economic and political ledgers behind geopolitics is far more valuable than simply venting emotions. Ultimately, no matter how winding the negotiation process may be, returning to rationality and controlling the scale of conflict remains the common choice most aligned with each side’s own interests.

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Iran “borrows” Qatar to pass negotiation conditions to the U.S., awaiting a response from Trump

The geopolitical balance in the Persian Gulf is undergoing a subtle shift, and the activity of diplomatic channels is beginning to offset the uncertainty brought by military deterrence. In a market environment where the risk premium tied to energy supply-chain disruption remains stubbornly elevated, Tehran is trying to convert vague security demands into a concrete diplomatic agenda. This strategy adjustment marks a transition in the conflict-resolution pathway—from purely adversarial brinkmanship to a phase where negotiating “chips” are quantified in exchange. The signal released by the Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Mojen Rezaei, on the 19th via Qatar’s Al Jazeera TV, is not only a response to the current stalemate, but also a key move by Iran in seeking balance between military pressure and diplomatic openings. This action introduces a critical variable: whether the path to de-escalation is being made specific. For global energy markets, this is not only a tactical adjustment in Iran’s policy toward the U.S., but also a recalibration of the persistence of the “war premium” and the exit mechanism—forcing investors to reassess the weight of geopolitical risk in asset pricing.

According to Rezaei’s statements on the 19th during an interview with Qatar’s Al Jazeera, the core facts are clear and specific. He explicitly pointed out that Qatar, acting as a mediator, has conveyed the negotiation conditions proposed by Iran to the U.S., and Iran is currently waiting for a response from U.S. President Donald Trump. Rezaei laid out three key conditions in detail: first, the U.S. must end all hostilities against Iran; second, freeze Iranian assets must be unfrozen; third, the maritime blockade must end. He also confirmed that Iran continues to hold discussions with Qatar and Pakistan—the mediators—and reiterated that Qatar has officially passed the above negotiation conditions to the U.S. This chain of facts indicates that the talks are not confined to intentions, but have entered a stage of exchanging specific terms. Qatar plays a pivotal role as the key information bridge, while Pakistan’s involvement adds a further layer of diversification to the mediation effort. Notably, Rezaei listed “ending all hostilities,” “unfreezing assets,” and “ending the maritime blockade” as prerequisites in parallel, which implies that Iran is not making concessions on core interests. Instead, it is trying to lock in established benefits through diplomatic means while providing steps to cool down the situation.

The impact of this diplomatic development on global macro pricing and risk appetite is far-reaching and multi-dimensional. First, on the energy pricing front: if the U.S. shows openness to these three conditions, the fade-out of the geopolitical risk premium in the Persian Gulf would likely become the baseline scenario. The war-risk premium implicit in oil prices largely stems from expectations of a blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and disruptions to Iranian oil exports. Rezaei’s condition to “end the maritime blockade” directly targets the security of energy transport corridors. Once negotiations make substantive progress, market fears of supply disruptions would be significantly alleviated, which could trigger downward pressure on oil prices and reduce the energy component’s weight in global inflation expectations. Second, regarding risk appetite: easing tensions in the Middle East can help increase the appeal of global risk assets. Previously, due to geopolitical uncertainty, capital flowed into safe havens (such as gold, the U.S. dollar, and U.S. Treasuries). If Iran and the U.S. reach some form of a ceasefire or an assets-unfreezing agreement via the Qatar channel, that risk-avoidance sentiment could reverse, with funds potentially rotating from defensive sectors back into growth segments that are more sensitive to geopolitics or into emerging markets. However, it is essential to recognize that the conditions proposed by Rezaei are highly rigid—especially “unfreezing assets” and “ending all hostilities,” which involve the U.S. core sanctions architecture and military deployments. The duration of this diplomatic window will depend on how the Trump administration responds. If the U.S. rejects the proposal or offers “equivalent” but more stringent conditions, the risk of negotiations collapsing remains. At that point, geopolitical premiums could be further amplified by a “failed expectation,” driving up market volatility.

Next, markets and policy-makers need to closely monitor several key indicators and wording to verify whether this diplomatic signal reflects real progress. The top focus is the official response from Trump and his team to the three conditions raised by Rezaei. Whether the U.S. State Department or the White House acknowledges receipt of these conditions, and whether its response includes specific language such as “lifting part of sanctions” or “pausing military actions,” will be a direct basis for judging the sincerity of the negotiations. Second, observe how the roles of Qatar and Pakistan evolve in subsequent consultations. If the mediator begins shuttling frequently between Tehran and Washington, or if there are signs of contact between representatives in unofficial settings, it would indicate that the negotiations have entered deeper waters. In addition, the actual implementation of the maritime blockade is an important window to watch. If there are adjustments in U.S. Navy deployments in the Persian Gulf, or if Iranian oil exports show loosening under the sanctions framework, these physical changes would carry more persuasive power than verbal statements. Finally, monitor Iran’s domestic political dynamics. As Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Rezaei’s remarks represent a certain compromise between hardliners and pragmatists. But if hardliners in Iran backlash, or if hawks in the U.S. apply pressure, the diplomatic process could stall. Investors should closely watch any micro-adjustments in how the U.S. enforces Iran sanctions, as well as real-time data on military activities in the Persian Gulf region. Even slight signs of easing could become catalysts for a shift in market sentiment. Throughout this process, avoid overbetting based on a single statement; instead, treat it as an important adjustment factor in the pricing of geopolitical risk and conduct an integrated assessment with information from multiple sources.

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When will the ECB act—December? Tactical games under unmet inflation targets and geopolitical risks

The internal monetary-policy debate at the European Central Bank is shifting from macro-level interpretations of economic data down to the tactical game of specific timing. In recent weeks, market expectations for the October policy meeting have swung back and forth repeatedly. The central dilemma is this: with inflation not yet fully having fallen back into the target range, and with geopolitical risks still posing a potential shock to energy prices, should policymakers maintain a “data-dependent” wait-and-see stance—or tighten policy space earlier to anchor long-term inflation expectations? This uncertainty affects not only the pricing logic for euro-denominated assets, but also directly influences the flow of global risk-averse capital. When decision-makers emphasize striking a balance between “caution” and “not rushing,” they are effectively telling the market that the policy reaction function is becoming more nonlinear: a deviation in any single dimension of data is not enough to trigger immediate action unless that deviation is sufficiently persistent and disruptive.

Based on the key information provided in the material, the ECB’s core considerations currently center on a trade-off between two extreme scenarios. On one hand, if there are doubts about the inflation outlook at the ECB level, the most prudent strategy is to wait until December to take action. This choice of timing is not arbitrary—it suggests that policymakers favor a longer observation window to verify the durability of the inflation decline, thereby avoiding misjudgments driven by data noise. On the other hand, the material clearly states that if inflation were to surge, it cannot be ruled out that the ECB might hike again in October. This indicates that October is not a completely closed policy window, but rather a conditional trigger point. Moreover, the material repeatedly emphasizes that the central bank must remain vigilant about the inflation situation, while at the same time explicitly warning against acting too hastily. Although these statements seem contradictory, together they reveal a key feature of the current policy framework: vigilance is reflected in how sensitive policymakers are to risk signals, while not rushing is reflected in the prudence of execution. In other words, unless inflation data shows an out-of-control surge, December is viewed as the better decision point, while an October hike is only the last resort to address extreme risks.

The impact of this policy stance on asset pricing and risk appetite is subtle yet far-reaching. First, for the euro exchange rate, the marginal shift in the probability of an October rate hike will be a key driver of short-term volatility. If markets interpret this as “waiting until December,” it means short-term interest-rate differential expectations may stabilize; the euro could lose the additional support it would otherwise gain from a warming rate-hike outlook, and instead rely more on the relative strength of fundamentals. Conversely, if markets worry that “inflation surging” could trigger an emergency hike in October, the euro may see a pulse-like rise—but such gains are often accompanied by a repricing of recession risk, because an emergency hike usually signals a more severe overheating of the economy or supply disruption. Second, for the bond market, this “vigilant but not rushed” tone implies that the yield curve’s shape will remain steepened or will stay in high-level range-bound volatility: short-end yields will be more affected by policy expectations, while long-end yields will reflect greater concern about the stickiness of long-term inflation. Investors need to be alert that policy uncertainty will increase trading costs, making directional bets based on a single data point extremely risky. By sector, rate-sensitive growth tech stocks and real estate will bear greater valuation pressure, because any rumors about an October hike could push up the discount rate; meanwhile, defensive sectors such as utilities and high-dividend stocks may gain a relative advantage amid risk-averse sentiment. However, since the material does not provide specific sector data, we cannot assert that any particular sector will inevitably benefit or be harmed. What can be confirmed is that volatility in policy expectations will amplify structural differentiation within the market.

The next focus should be on several key indicators and changes in definitions to test how the above policy logic is evolving. First, closely monitor the euro-area Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) month-on-month and year-on-year data, especially the spread between core inflation and energy inflation. If core inflation unexpectedly rebounds, it will directly support the “inflation surging” scenario assumption, thereby raising the probability of an October hike; conversely, if energy prices fall and bring overall inflation down, the “wait until December” logic will be further strengthened. Second, pay attention to how ECB officials specifically interpret the term “vigilant” in their public remarks. Is the emphasis on vigilance toward supply-side shocks, or on vigilance toward demand-side overheating? These two forms of vigilance correspond to very different policy response speeds. The former may lean toward tolerating temporary high inflation to protect the real economy, while the latter could trigger a faster tightening reaction. In addition, the resilience of labor-market data is another key variable. If the job market remains overheated, the risk of a wage-price spiral may force the central bank to reassess the “not rushing” baseline. Finally, watch for updated economic forecasts or similar documents ahead of the December meeting, particularly the predicted inflation path. If official forecasts show inflation dropping quickly in early 2024, the rationale for staying put in October will be greatly strengthened; but if forecasts indicate that inflation will remain above target throughout 2024, the necessity of taking action in October to establish credibility will rise significantly. Investors should avoid being misled by noise in single-day data, and instead place these data points within the overall “vigilant but not rushed” strategy framework for comprehensive assessment—any isolated interpretation that deviates from this framework may lead to a misread of policy direction.

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