dyorswap

🚨 FAKE NETWORK EXPLOIT TARGETS $DYORSWAP AS TREASURY STEPS IN FOR COMPENSATIONS ⚠️

Institutional-grade security breach alert: $DYORSWAP confirmed a malicious spoofing vector where attackers spoofed the legitimate GIWA Chain ID (9134) to lure user liquidity into a fake bridge architecture. 🔍 Professional forensic security teams are currently mapping the fund flows across on-chain RPC endpoints and malicious bridge contracts.

In a swift effort to protect ecosystem integrity, the protocol is deploying treasury reserves to compensate verified victim addresses once on-chain auditing concludes. 🛡️ This event underscores why structural validation of contract addresses and RPC inputs remains paramount before bridging capital across multi-chain environments.

💬 How will this exploit impact user trust across emerging cross-chain bridge infrastructure? 👇

⚠️ Not financial advice. Always manage your risk. 🛡️

🏷️ #DYORSWAP #CryptoSecurity #OnChain #DeFi

🛡️ 🔍

DYORSWAP said in a statement that the “GIWA mainnet 9134 incident” was not an attack on its own contract. Instead, someone impersonated GIWA’s chain ID (9134) to set up a fake chain and a counterfeit bridge with an OP Stack-like structure, luring users in—however, the GIWA mainnet was not actually live at the time.

On-chain actions don’t really look like simple coincidence. After the fake bridge went live for 39 blocks, deposits totaling 0.4 ETH across three transactions were credited in the same second. Then, over time, 1,335 addresses deposited about 767.65 ETH into it, with roughly 766.25 ETH moved out shortly after. The timing feels like the setup was prepared in advance to wait for victims to bite.


DYORSWAP’s current position is that its own contract was not at fault, and responsibility lies with the impersonated fake network. That characterization is not without merit. But with 1,335 addresses and 767 ETH being consolidated and drained in such a short period, the scale and tempo are hard to explain away as anything other than an organized phishing and diversion—not just “users accidentally clicked the wrong chain.”


DYORSWAP previously provided a compensation policy version: for cross-chain amounts under 5 ETH, eligible addresses receive 40% reimbursement; for addresses over 5 ETH, each case is reviewed individually. Now it says “over 200 ETH has already been compensated.” Most likely, it’s first paying out the smaller-amount users, while the larger holders are still under review. The remaining gap to the full 767 ETH is still far from closed.

The core purpose of paying first is to prevent users’ emotions from spiraling and to avoid a trust collapse like a bank run. This approach is understandable. But the most important question is whether the deployment parties and the flow of funds can be traced afterwards, and how the remaining shortfall will be covered. That—more than anything—determines whether this incident can truly be considered “over.”


The above is only subjective analysis and does not constitute investment advice.
#Bitget黑客转移8300万美元被盗XRP #DYORSWAP

Scam to steal $2 million ETH via a fake GIWA network to deceive DYORSWAP

- The scammer stole more than $2 million in ETH through a fake GIWA network.
- DYORSWAP confirmed it has reimbursed over 200 ETH to affected users.
- GIWA (developed by Dunamu, the operator of Upbit) warns that the official mainnet has not yet been released.
- Users need to stay vigilant against fake projects and verify information before trading.

#BinanceSquare #CryptoNews #ETH #GIWA #DYORSWAP ScamAlert

$eth $giwa

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Source: CoinTelegraph