I finally understand why @Enter_Elysium has been so slow to buy back tokens, and is willing to endure the criticism of being centralized.
Elysium had previously promised multiple times that buybacks would be automated and systematic—that is, 50% of sequencer revenue would be used to buy back $KNTQ tokens.
So far, over 900 $HYPE have been accumulated as buyback ammo, but the buyback has yet to begin.
The reason is that the price of $HYPE used for buybacks is currently on the rise, while $KNTQ has been falling nonstop.
The Elysium team has no ulterior motive—they just want to buy a little more $KNTQ.
Buying back and burning $KNTQ could be considered the biggest selling point of the HyperEVM Layer 2 chain @Enter_Elysium launched by the Kinetiq team, but so far, only 1,675 $KNTQ tokens, worth about $408, have been bought back and burned.
The original promise was to use 50% of sequencer revenue to buy back and burn $KNTQ. So far, 856 tokens $HYPE worth about $58K have been accumulated as buyback funds.
One week after the Elysium mainnet launch, a total of 0 tokens $HYPE from sequencer revenue have been used to buy back $KNTQ.
The silver lining this time for Lighter is that the market maker was hacked, rather than there being a protocol-level vulnerability. But the potential high-severity risks of Lighter as a ZK Rollup Layer 2 chain have received far too little attention.
@Lighter_xyz was classified by ETHBEAT as a Stage 0 appchain, the lowest security level, because Lighter has a privileged multisig organization that can carry out emergency upgrades with zero delay using a 4/7 multisig;
If a hacker gained control of four keys in the multisig, they could upgrade critical contracts such as ZKLighter with malicious code and directly drain funds on-chain.
Because there is zero delay, users theoretically have no time to react and no forced-exit window.
An hour ago, on-chain data suggested that Lighter may have been exploited for 10.39 million USDC.
Lighter posted a statement denying that the protocol itself had been hacked. However, the following on-chain facts have been confirmed so far: 1/ The attack address was created about four hours ago and initially received only around $10,000 worth of funds via cross-chain bridges such as Relay; 2/ The address successfully called Lighter’s ZKLighter contract to withdraw 10.39 million USDC; 3/ Immediately after the withdrawal, it swapped most of the USDC for ETH via CoW Protocol and split the funds across multiple new addresses.
An hour ago, on-chain data suggested that Lighter may have been exploited for 10.39 million USDC.
Lighter posted a statement denying that the protocol itself had been hacked. However, the following on-chain facts have been confirmed so far: 1/ The attack address was created about four hours ago and initially received only around $10,000 worth of funds via cross-chain bridges such as Relay; 2/ The address successfully called Lighter’s ZKLighter contract to withdraw 10.39 million USDC; 3/ Immediately after the withdrawal, it swapped most of the USDC for ETH via CoW Protocol and split the funds across multiple new addresses.
Among the top 10 public chains by DeFi TVL, Robinhood Chain has seen the smallest TVL decline over the past month.
The reason isn’t that speculative tokens like on-chain memecoins have fallen less. Rather, under Robinhood’s high-yield deposit policy, stablecoins are more inclined to park their funds on RHC—and are more “resilient” to declines.
On one side are on-chain trenches awash in blood; on the other, a happy haven for stablecoin yield. Where should RHC go from here?
Buying back and burning $KNTQ could be considered the biggest selling point of the HyperEVM Layer 2 chain @Enter_Elysium launched by the Kinetiq team, but so far, only 1,675 $KNTQ tokens, worth about $408, have been bought back and burned.
The original promise was to use 50% of sequencer revenue to buy back and burn $KNTQ. So far, 856 tokens $HYPE worth about $58K have been accumulated as buyback funds.
One week after the Elysium mainnet launch, a total of 0 tokens $HYPE from sequencer revenue have been used to buy back $KNTQ.
The high-performance public blockchain @initia, born in this market cycle and hailed as a beacon of Korean crypto, has suffered 2 hacking incidents in three weeks.
According to the official announcement, the Initia team decided to halt the chain after coordinating with validators. No specific restart time has been announced yet.
The governance token $INIT has seen some markedly counterintuitive price movements: after the second hack, its price quickly doubled, then plunged by half; the first hack also triggered a paradoxical price reaction, with the price briefly falling before quickly rebounding by about 15%.
After all that, the price ended up right back where it started.
A turbulent time for public blockchains: L2 chains are shutting down one after another, while L1 chains are being hacked frequently.
Another L1 chain, @initia, was just attacked by hackers and has halted block production.
The hackers exploited a bug related to MoveVM on Initia L1 to mint tokens without limit, then drained the liquidity of real reserves on the Ethereum side through a cross-chain bridge.
So far, the hackers have drained $2.6 million in liquidity from assets bridged to and from Initia.
Initia has a total TVL of just $5.8 million across its entire chain, meaning the hackers have indirectly drained nearly half of the chain's liquidity.
WTF. On the second day after the mainnet went live, the founder was already putting down the competition, taking shots at three chains at once: RHC, BSC, and Base.
How much of a superiority complex and how little social awareness does it take to come up with this?
As a chain built on the Arbitrum Orbit tech stack, @Arbitrum’s official X account seems quite reluctant to promote @Enter_Elysium.
As of now, Arbitrum’s official X account hasn’t published a single decent introductory post about Elysium. Even when Elysium just announced its mainnet launch on X, Arbitrum didn’t quote-tweet it.
For another Arbitrum Orbit chain, RHC, Arbitrum has been much more proactive in promoting it—so much so that it started heavily promoting it during the testnet phase.
I’m not sure what the specific reason is. Maybe I’m reading too much into it.
As a chain built on the Arbitrum Orbit tech stack, @Arbitrum’s official X account seems quite reluctant to promote @Enter_Elysium.
As of now, Arbitrum’s official X account hasn’t published a single decent introductory post about Elysium. Even when Elysium just announced its mainnet launch on X, Arbitrum didn’t quote-tweet it.
For another Arbitrum Orbit chain, RHC, Arbitrum has been much more proactive in promoting it—so much so that it started heavily promoting it during the testnet phase.
I’m not sure what the specific reason is. Maybe I’m reading too much into it.
The wave of public blockchain shutdowns has reached the Polkadot ecosystem.
@AcalaNetwork, one of the first parachains in the Polkadot ecosystem, and its sister chain Karura have publicly announced on X that they will shut down their networks through proposals.
The Acala chain’s genesis block officially launched on December 18, 2021. It has now been running smoothly for nearly five years, making the shutdown announcement all the more poignant.
Moonbeam/Moonriver shut down earlier, and now it’s Acala/Karura’s turn. The entire Polkadot ecosystem is in tatters.
A textbook rug pull: After TGE, Berachain's former star project @puffpaw manipulated its price, sacrificing the entire project just to profit on Polymarket.
After issuing its governance token $VAPE, the team controlled about 97% of the supply and used very little liquidity to pump the token's price to a $300-400M FDV, before quickly dumping it.
All that for a chance to make $10,000 on a prediction market.
Before the public mainnet has even launched, HyperEVM Layer 2 chain @Enter_Elysium has been accused of centralized behavior that may be maliciously extracting value from users.
The controversy quickly blew up, with community members muted on Telegram for raising questions and founder @0xOmnia blocking them.
Here’s a quick rundown of how the situation unfolded: It began when someone in the Elysium builder group reported that a privileged address (0xD27392F3c657De75916fB1676855BfB56d6DeC8C) was running an MEV bot through a private node and capturing substantial profits on the launchpad;
The team initially acknowledged this and said it had revoked the relevant RPC permissions. But the address’s malicious MEV activity continued, and the team then changed its explanation, saying the transactions followed the normal path through HyperEVM’s Delayed Inbox and did not abuse sequencer permissions;
On top of that, Elysium’s questionable response was to mute users who kept asking about the MEV issue, while the founder’s X account also blocked people who questioned the matter.
Setting aside conspiracy theories about whether these privileged MEV bots are being operated by Elysium insiders, the team’s attitude and actions toward those raising questions are quite unusual.
With just one day to go before the public mainnet launch, instead of fixing the problem at this critical moment, they’re going after the people who raised it.
Fun fact: Hyperliquid's priority fees hit an all-time high in a single day, while also reaching an all-time high as a share of total revenue.
On November 5, priority fees hit a daily record, burning $550,000 worth of $HYPE ; On November 6, priority fees also reached a record share of total revenue, exceeding 10% to reach 13.4%.
This ATH was a classic event-driven spike. Extreme volatility amid a sharp drop in U.S. stocks amplified competition for queue priority, driving a surge in priority fee payments.
Solana and Arbitrum have long been at odds, and the rift was already seeded when Robinhood chose Arbitrum over Solana.
Yesterday, core team members from both sides publicly traded barbs on X, which was already pretty ugly. But that doesn’t seem to have stopped Solana from trying to poach talent in a way that makes it look bad.
@solana ecosystem figurehead and @Helius founder @mert left a rather ill-timed comment under a post by Robinhood co-founder @vladtenev, saying that Helius specializes in helping EVM chains and companies migrate to Solana. Wasn’t the implication that RHC should leave @arbitrum and migrate to Solana?
I think bringing this kind of poaching out into the open makes them look a little bad. So far, though, neither Vlad nor the Arbitrum side has responded.
People from the Arbitrum and Solana teams are openly fighting on X, all because Solana’s official account shilled a new product developed in-house.
Solana Labs, led by @toly, jumped in and built a mobile trading app, @leapxyz. The move has been criticized as an attempt to take business away from existing trading protocols in the Solana ecosystem.
Arbitrum core team member @CocoraEth mocked the move: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to compete directly with them, they should choose Arbitrum.
Solana Foundation Head of Product @vibhu didn’t hold back, firing back with a sarcastic jab: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to have any users, they should choose Arbitrum.
Things have now descended into chaos, with Solana heavyweights including @rajgokal and @toly joining the online feud.
People from the Arbitrum and Solana teams are openly fighting on X, all because Solana’s official account shilled a new product developed in-house.
Solana Labs, led by @toly, jumped in and built a mobile trading app, @leapxyz. The move has been criticized as an attempt to take business away from existing trading protocols in the Solana ecosystem.
Arbitrum core team member @CocoraEth mocked the move: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to compete directly with them, they should choose Arbitrum.
Solana Foundation Head of Product @vibhu didn’t hold back, firing back with a sarcastic jab: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to have any users, they should choose Arbitrum.
Things have now descended into chaos, with Solana heavyweights including @rajgokal and @toly joining the online feud.
Fun fact: Polygon seems significantly more efficient than Arbitrum at returning hackers’ stolen funds to Binance.
As is widely known, in the Binance hack: Arbitrum froze and forcibly transferred the hacker’s stolen funds (74,559,805 ARB and 8,425 ETH) to an intermediary wallet; Polygon froze 70.49 million $POL at the hacker’s address and proposed recovering the funds via a hard fork.
To recover funds on Arbitrum, Binance would have to wait at least 7 weeks, and a full DAO vote must pass before they can be released;
whereas recovering funds on Polygon would take as little as 1–2 weeks, and could be done once the hard fork is activated on mainnet.
A classic case of L2s being far more centralized than L1s: Arbitrum and Polygon’s actions in response to the Binance hack.
Arbitrum acted first and asked questions later, while Polygon was willing but unable to do much.
The former urgently activated its privileged powers to freeze the hacker’s address and forcibly transfer the assets, all in one go;
The latter could only freeze the hacker’s address and was unable to forcibly transfer the stolen funds;
To recover the 70.49 million $POL, Polygon can only hard-fork by submitting a proposal. Once the proposal passes, the state can be modified to recover the funds.
A classic case of L2s being far more centralized than L1s: Arbitrum and Polygon’s actions in response to the Binance hack.
Arbitrum acted first and asked questions later, while Polygon was willing but unable to do much.
The former urgently activated its privileged powers to freeze the hacker’s address and forcibly transfer the assets, all in one go;
The latter could only freeze the hacker’s address and was unable to forcibly transfer the stolen funds;
To recover the 70.49 million $POL , Polygon can only hard-fork by submitting a proposal. Once the proposal passes, the state can be modified to recover the funds.
barring any surprises, Scroll will become the next top-tier L2 chain to shut down.
The latest proposal has gone live on Scroll’s official DAO forum: pivot from a permissionless, general-purpose L2 public chain to a permissioned network dedicated to private AI, and migrate $SCR to Ethereum mainnet.
Put plainly, maintaining a ZK Rollup L2 chain costs the team too much. They’re afraid they’ll be criticized if they shut it down outright, so they can only pivot to a private chain to cut costs during the transition.
According to data from @growthepie_eth, Scroll’s average daily on-chain net profit is around a few dozen dollars. On-chain costs mainly include proof generation, L1 data publication, and verification, and do not include off-chain operating costs.
Add in off-chain costs, and there’s no doubt that operating the Scroll chain is unprofitable.