The Bitget incident is raising a bigger question than just how much was lost: should a decentralized network ever stop to protect users from a specific exploit? THORChain’s decision not to freeze the attacker’s wallets is consistent with its design. The network doesn’t have a selective freeze mechanism, and halting the entire protocol would affect every user, not just the attacker. That makes the situation pretty complicated. On one side, stopping the network could slow the movement of stolen funds. On the other, doing so would go against the censorship-resistant model that decentralized infrastructure is built around. What I find interesting is that THORChain reportedly halted for five weeks after its own exploit earlier this year, so the debate isn’t simply about whether stopping is technically possible. It’s about when that extreme measure is justified. Personally, I think this is one of those uncomfortable trade-offs crypto still hasn’t fully solved. Permissionless infrastructure means fewer people can intervene when something goes wrong. That’s part of the value — but also part of the risk. The bigger question for me isn’t whether THORChain should have frozen the funds. It’s whether decentralized protocols can remain credibly neutral while still giving users meaningful protection when millions are stolen.