The $DUSK loophole nobody’s talking about.
So I’m sitting there watching ACE dump 12% in an hour brutal, right? and I’m scrolling through Dusk docs trying to distract myself. And then I see it. Something that made me forget about my PNL entirely.
Dusk uses ElGamal homomorphic encryption for Phoenix notes. Settlement layer aggregates encrypted transactions to verify supply. Regulatory decryption keys exist for “authorized audits”. Sounds great on paper.
Here’s the kicker.
Homomorphic subtraction lets you do Enc(S_total) Enc(B_target) = Enc(S_total - B_target). Mathematically valid. No decryption needed.
Now imagine a malicious auditor with that regulatory key. They decrypt the aggregate difference not your individual ciphertext. Result? S_total - B_target in plaintext. Since total supply is public, they solve for B_target instantly.
Your balance. Exposed. Without your consent. Without a court order. Without triggering a single on-chain alarm.
The protocol’s “selective visibility” claim? Completely bypassed. “Privacy by design”? Turns into “surveillance-ready.” Every institutional whale holding large confidential positions on Dusk just became visible to whoever holds that key.
And here’s the real gut punch: this isn’t a hack. It’s working exactly as designed. The compliance feature is the backdoor.
I’m not saying Dusk is broken. But if you’re holding serious bags in Phoenix notes, you need to ask yourself: who holds that regulatory key? And do you really trust them?
$DUSK love the tech, but this one keeps me up at night. 🌙
Not financial advice. Just a trader who reads too many whitepapers.$PORTAL #dusk @Dusk
So I’m sitting there watching ACE dump 12% in an hour brutal, right? and I’m scrolling through Dusk docs trying to distract myself. And then I see it. Something that made me forget about my PNL entirely.
Dusk uses ElGamal homomorphic encryption for Phoenix notes. Settlement layer aggregates encrypted transactions to verify supply. Regulatory decryption keys exist for “authorized audits”. Sounds great on paper.
Here’s the kicker.
Homomorphic subtraction lets you do Enc(S_total) Enc(B_target) = Enc(S_total - B_target). Mathematically valid. No decryption needed.
Now imagine a malicious auditor with that regulatory key. They decrypt the aggregate difference not your individual ciphertext. Result? S_total - B_target in plaintext. Since total supply is public, they solve for B_target instantly.
Your balance. Exposed. Without your consent. Without a court order. Without triggering a single on-chain alarm.
The protocol’s “selective visibility” claim? Completely bypassed. “Privacy by design”? Turns into “surveillance-ready.” Every institutional whale holding large confidential positions on Dusk just became visible to whoever holds that key.
And here’s the real gut punch: this isn’t a hack. It’s working exactly as designed. The compliance feature is the backdoor.
I’m not saying Dusk is broken. But if you’re holding serious bags in Phoenix notes, you need to ask yourself: who holds that regulatory key? And do you really trust them?
$DUSK love the tech, but this one keeps me up at night. 🌙
Not financial advice. Just a trader who reads too many whitepapers.$PORTAL #dusk @Dusk
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