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Độc chiếm bảng tăng giá 2 hôm nay rồi, sập được chưa ??????
$MarsCoin $KOMA
$MarsCoin $KOMA
42 GiB, 22 MiB, 354 seconds, 175 milliseconds: I wrote those four numbers on a piece of paper, closed the Trustless Bitcoin Vaults (TBV) documentation from @BabylonLabs_io, and stopped reading.
Something about them didn’t make sense. Why would a protocol that doesn’t even have Bitcoin to protect yet spend so much effort upfront?
Intuitively, the hardest part should begin after BTC is locked. That’s when real collateral exists, real economic risk appears, and every security guarantee actually matters. If building a Vault required tens of gigabytes of memory and hundreds of seconds of preparation before any of that, my first conclusion was straightforward:
TBV was optimizing the wrong problem.
I was wrong.
The documentation forced me to reverse my thinking.
The first thing TBV protects isn’t Bitcoin.
At least, not directly.
The first thing it eliminates is the protocol’s freedom to make new decisions.
Once BTC becomes collateral, almost nothing important is left to improvise. Peg-out, liquidation, self-claim, and every execution path have already been committed through the pre-signed transaction graph. TBV deliberately concentrates complexity at the beginning so it never has to introduce new trust assumptions later.
Only then did those four numbers become meaningful. Roughly 42 GiB of memory and nearly 354 seconds of preparation are not the cost of creating a Vault. They are the cost of creating a Vault whose future behavior has already been committed. When Babylon and UC Berkeley reduced that process to roughly 22 MiB and under 175 milliseconds, they didn’t make TBV more trustless.
They made it dramatically cheaper to preserve the exact same trust model. That was the moment I understood why the hardest part of TBV happens before a Vault even exists. Because in a trustless architecture, the most dangerous moment is not after Bitcoin has been locked. It’s the last moment when the protocol still has the freedom to change its own future.
@BabylonLabs_io $GRVT $BABY #baby
Something about them didn’t make sense. Why would a protocol that doesn’t even have Bitcoin to protect yet spend so much effort upfront?
Intuitively, the hardest part should begin after BTC is locked. That’s when real collateral exists, real economic risk appears, and every security guarantee actually matters. If building a Vault required tens of gigabytes of memory and hundreds of seconds of preparation before any of that, my first conclusion was straightforward:
TBV was optimizing the wrong problem.
I was wrong.
The documentation forced me to reverse my thinking.
The first thing TBV protects isn’t Bitcoin.
At least, not directly.
The first thing it eliminates is the protocol’s freedom to make new decisions.
Once BTC becomes collateral, almost nothing important is left to improvise. Peg-out, liquidation, self-claim, and every execution path have already been committed through the pre-signed transaction graph. TBV deliberately concentrates complexity at the beginning so it never has to introduce new trust assumptions later.
Only then did those four numbers become meaningful. Roughly 42 GiB of memory and nearly 354 seconds of preparation are not the cost of creating a Vault. They are the cost of creating a Vault whose future behavior has already been committed. When Babylon and UC Berkeley reduced that process to roughly 22 MiB and under 175 milliseconds, they didn’t make TBV more trustless.
They made it dramatically cheaper to preserve the exact same trust model. That was the moment I understood why the hardest part of TBV happens before a Vault even exists. Because in a trustless architecture, the most dangerous moment is not after Bitcoin has been locked. It’s the last moment when the protocol still has the freedom to change its own future.
@BabylonLabs_io $GRVT $BABY #baby
Từ 4.4$ về 0.1$ và lên 0.3$, còn hàng Binance Wallet Prime (Pre-TGE Prime Sale) ngày nào $MMT
Quay hoài quay mãi cũng chỉ vào cái Pool 10k$, chưa được độ lần nào, sao nhiều người quay trúng 9-14$ giòn thế nhỉ?
$AKE $GRVT
$AKE $GRVT
Vẫn kịch bản cũ như $LAB , Con $BANK này sấp mặt sau khi x lần, sắp chia 10 trong 3-4 ngày rồi
$BANK
$BANK
Thấy mọi người làm air bị vesting, thế mà token đâu ra xả lắm thế, thấy giảm và giảm thôi $GRVT
Bán hết $GRVT chưa mọi người. Đây là con gì mà tăng ác quá nhỉ $MarsCoin , không thấy air cho alpha
Verificado
10 - 10 - 108 - 432, At first, these numbers annoyed me. They looked like arbitrary limits scattered across the Trustless Bitcoin Vaults (TBV) design. 10 Vaults. 10 HTLC outputs. 108 blocks. 432 blocks. More constraints. More waiting. More rules.
My first instinct was simple. Why does the protocol keep restricting itself?
Then I realized I was asking the wrong question. The real question is: After Bitcoin is locked, what should the protocol still be allowed to decide?
Everything suddenly aligned. 10 Vaults and 10 HTLC outputs bound the execution paths before a Vault even exists. 108 and 432 blocks bound how long uncertainty is allowed to survive. Different parameters. The same architectural principle.
Babylon is not sacrificing flexibility by accident. It is deliberately removing discretion. The pre-signed transaction graph makes that possible. Once peg-in is complete, the protocol is no longer expected to improvise. It is expected to execute commitments that were already made before BTC became collateral.
That is almost the opposite of how many DeFi systems evolve. They grow by accepting more states and resolving more exceptions over time. TBV grows by eliminating states before they can ever exist.
By the end, I stopped seeing 10, 10, 108, and 432 as configuration values. I saw them as four different ways of answering the same question. The safest decision is often the one the protocol never has to make.
@BabylonLabs_io $AKE $LAB $BABY #baby
My first instinct was simple. Why does the protocol keep restricting itself?
Then I realized I was asking the wrong question. The real question is: After Bitcoin is locked, what should the protocol still be allowed to decide?
Everything suddenly aligned. 10 Vaults and 10 HTLC outputs bound the execution paths before a Vault even exists. 108 and 432 blocks bound how long uncertainty is allowed to survive. Different parameters. The same architectural principle.
Babylon is not sacrificing flexibility by accident. It is deliberately removing discretion. The pre-signed transaction graph makes that possible. Once peg-in is complete, the protocol is no longer expected to improvise. It is expected to execute commitments that were already made before BTC became collateral.
That is almost the opposite of how many DeFi systems evolve. They grow by accepting more states and resolving more exceptions over time. TBV grows by eliminating states before they can ever exist.
By the end, I stopped seeing 10, 10, 108, and 432 as configuration values. I saw them as four different ways of answering the same question. The safest decision is often the one the protocol never has to make.
@BabylonLabs_io $AKE $LAB $BABY #baby
Lại thêm tin gì nhữa đây, thị trường ảm đạm có khác, hết tin xấu này tới tin xấu nọ. Còn gì nữa tới liền nào 😴😴
Binance News
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Russia Places Telegram Founder Pavel Durov on International Wanted List
Russian authorities have placed Telegram founder Pavel Durov on an international wanted list as they escalate a criminal case accusing him of facilitating terrorist activity. According to Cointelegraph, Russia’s Federal Security Service said on Wednesday that it charged Durov with facilitating terrorist activity and issued an international warrant for his arrest, according to local news agency Interfax. The FSB alleged that Telegram failed to remove channels, chats and bots used by Ukrainian intelligence services, terrorist groups and extremist organizations to coordinate attacks, recruit operatives and carry out cyber fraud. The case marks a further step in the dispute between Russian authorities and the messaging platform’s founder, who has previously denied that the investigation reflects legitimate law enforcement concerns.
A dishonest actor is not afraid of being inspected. What they fear most is not knowing where the inspection will happen.
That was the first thought that came to mind when I encountered the numbers 307–301–6 in the BABE mechanism behind Trustless Bitcoin Vaults (TBV) by @BabylonLabs_io. I understood the numbers. What I didn’t understand was why a protocol would intentionally create so much extra work.
During peg-in, BABE generates 307 garbled circuit instances. Through a cut-and-choose protocol, 301 instances are opened to verify how the circuits were created, while only the remaining 6 are actually used.
At first, that looked terribly inefficient. Nearly 98% of the circuits never contribute to the final computation. If only six are needed, why not generate six from the start? Because that only works if the circuit generator already knows which six will survive. BABE removes exactly that advantage.
All 307 instances must be created before the protocol randomly selects 301 for inspection. The verifier is not simply checking the final result, but the integrity of the generation process itself. Since no one knows in advance which circuits will be challenged, preparing separate “honest” and “dishonest” versions becomes impractical.
That was when the 301 opened circuits stopped looking like wasted work. They are the cost of making verification unpredictable.
To me, that is the real design choice behind BABE. The protocol does not rely on participants being honest. It makes honesty the safer strategy because no one can predict what will be inspected.
The numbers 307–301–6 are therefore more than implementation details. They reflect a deliberate architectural trade-off inside TBV: spending more computation during verification to reduce trust assumptions before Bitcoin secures an application.
@BabylonLabs_io $ON $BABY #baby
That was the first thought that came to mind when I encountered the numbers 307–301–6 in the BABE mechanism behind Trustless Bitcoin Vaults (TBV) by @BabylonLabs_io. I understood the numbers. What I didn’t understand was why a protocol would intentionally create so much extra work.
During peg-in, BABE generates 307 garbled circuit instances. Through a cut-and-choose protocol, 301 instances are opened to verify how the circuits were created, while only the remaining 6 are actually used.
At first, that looked terribly inefficient. Nearly 98% of the circuits never contribute to the final computation. If only six are needed, why not generate six from the start? Because that only works if the circuit generator already knows which six will survive. BABE removes exactly that advantage.
All 307 instances must be created before the protocol randomly selects 301 for inspection. The verifier is not simply checking the final result, but the integrity of the generation process itself. Since no one knows in advance which circuits will be challenged, preparing separate “honest” and “dishonest” versions becomes impractical.
That was when the 301 opened circuits stopped looking like wasted work. They are the cost of making verification unpredictable.
To me, that is the real design choice behind BABE. The protocol does not rely on participants being honest. It makes honesty the safer strategy because no one can predict what will be inspected.
The numbers 307–301–6 are therefore more than implementation details. They reflect a deliberate architectural trade-off inside TBV: spending more computation during verification to reduce trust assumptions before Bitcoin secures an application.
@BabylonLabs_io $ON $BABY #baby
Chờ đợi và hi vọng GRVT vào ngày 30/7 trên Binance Alpha, nghe nói air lỏ lắm không biết có lên alpha không đây
$ON
$ON
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