Medium-sized CEX queues collapse. Based on past experience, this is a sign the bear market is bottoming out. Hang in there, everyone—get through the final drop, get through the darkest night before dawn! The bull market is right ahead! Send out a red packet to boost everyone’s morale. Just leave a comment in the comment section saying “Lao Tang says hang in there,” and you’ll get an airdrop token red packet. I’ll send out 3,800 red packets first; if that’s not enough, I’ll add more. I’ll make sure everyone gets one. Remember to follow me—come by often to claim red packets. #红包 $BNB
Just watched Mom’s post and was shocked to find that BitMEX, BitMax, and BitMart—these three CEXs—went bankrupt one after another, and their names are oddly similar! Could it be some kind of metaphysical/occult “science” at work? So I asked DeepSeek to analyze the fortune—good or bad—of the “BitM” prefix in the names of the three exchanges before they went under. The result was actually: “On the surface, slightly good luck, but hidden within, major bad luck!” This AI is really damn accurate! Looks like everything is destined by heaven $BB
Changxin Memory (CXMT) opens at a price after a 1765x P/E ratio implodes. It’s not like I can just sit by—if I’m not going to take a shot, I really can’t be bothered for the audience. I just opened a 3x small short position at 7.26. Let’s see if I can scalp up enough for a pack of cigarettes’ worth of money. $CXM.US
After Changxin Storage’s listing, the largest sell order reached $24.982 million. A certain address posted 1.425 million sell shares After Changxin Storage’s listing, a certain address currently has 98 sell orders for Changxin Storage. The sell orders cover a price range from $7.32 to $23, totaling 1.425 million shares sold, with a notional amount of approximately $24.982 million. The address currently holds 2,462.5 shares of Changxin Storage short positions. If the sell orders above are filled one after another, it will further increase its short exposure.
Changxin Technology tops the A-share market with a market cap of 3.3 trillion yuan, reaching the top after its listing; first-day trading volume exceeds 100 billion yuan, setting a record China’s DRAM (memory) leader Changxin Technology listed on the STAR Market today. The issue price was 8.66 yuan; at the open, it was 49.50 yuan; it is currently quoted at 49.47 yuan, up 471.36% from the issue price.
With a market cap of 3.3 trillion yuan, it surpasses Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to become the #1 A-share by market value.
First-day trading value exceeded 100 billion yuan, surpassing the 90 billion yuan record set by Oriental Fortune in October 2024, refreshing the record for highest single-day trading value of an individual stock on A shares.
Based on the static calculation for 2025 used in the offering announcement, Changxin Technology’s opening price earnings ratio is about 1,765 times. If the company’s forecast attributable net profit of 50 billion to 57 billion yuan for the first half of the year is simply annualized, it would be about 29 to 33 times. The latter is only a rough estimate, assuming that second-half profits can maintain the level of the first half.
For the first five trading days after Changxin Technology’s listing, there is no daily price limit. The first batch of tradable shares accounts for only 6.73% of total shares outstanding, and the stock price may still experience significant volatility in the short term. In the medium to long term, the key factors are DRAM pricing, the ramp-up of DDR5, HBM R&D, and constraints from external equipment. A market cap of 3 trillion yuan already reflects bets that storage demand will remain highly favorable. If the industry cycle cools down, both earnings and valuations could decline at the same time.$CXT.US
Deep Reflection by Intel’s Former CEO: For a Decade, He Didn’t Buy a Single Lithography Machine, Yet Spent $100 Billion to Repurchase Shares
The internal people the boss should be most wary of are finance and HR! Finance makes the company stagnate! For example, Intel. HR often doesn’t do HR! For example, this time they messed up the Xiaohongshu IPO.
Deep reflection by Intel’s former CEO: For ten years, he didn’t buy a single lithography machine, yet spent $100 billion to repurchase shares! For 15 years, he let the finance people steer the ship, missing out on iPhone chips and the mobile era!
In July 2026, Intel’s former CEO Pat Gelsinger appeared on the All-In Podcast, where he engaged in an honest, in-depth conversation with the host Jason for nearly an hour.
The stock market is freezing cold! A Korean college student used 5x leverage to trade and made 300 million KRW! Getting rich to the point of liquidation—everything wiped out in 28 days overnight!
Can you believe it? 20 million KRW in capital, 5x leverage, and turning it into 300 million in a month—then in just four weeks, losing everything, including principal and interest. You might think this is a fabricated joke, but this is a real trading experience from a 24-year-old Korean college student.
Recently, this story has spread widely in the investment world. Many people are watching for entertainment, but after reading it, I only feel chills down my spine—because I believe this isn’t just one person’s gamble going wrong. It’s a snapshot of a nationwide leveraged binge collapsing, containing all the fatal traps that are easiest for retail investors to fall into.
Not a one-off—this is a liquidation wave of millions
This is a student named Lee Seung-ho. His principal was 20 million KRW saved from serving in the military. On a trading app, he pressed a button to enable 5x leverage and went all-in on the semiconductor sector. He happened to catch the AI rally in the first half of the year—his account peaked at nearly 300 million KRW, a full 15x gain. The broker even mailed him VIP customer gifts. Then by late May, the market flipped—within four weeks, his paper wealth vanished completely, and even the original principal was wiped out. In his own words: “I’m simply unable to breathe.”
At this point, you might think this guy was just unlucky. But what I want to say is: he was actually lucky—that’s exactly what makes it the tragedy’s beginning. And I don’t believe he’s an exception. This year, the level of leverage frenzy in Korea’s stock market has reached absurd heights. At the end of May, regulators approved 16 leveraged ETFs linked to Samsung and SK Hynix with 2x leverage. These leverage tools, originally accessible only to professional investors, were suddenly opened to all retail investors with no entry barrier. In just a few weeks, the scale of these products jumped from $3 billion to $9.1 billion, and 92% of buyers were ordinary retail investors. $SOL
Decentralization is just what the crypto projects do—one more has collapsed. Storj Labs files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization in the United States; operations will continue The decentralized cloud storage project Storj’s parent company, Storj Labs, announced that it has voluntarily filed for bankruptcy reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code to address historical debts and continue operating.
Storj Labs said that during the reorganization, business will continue as usual, customer service will not be interrupted, and the reorganized company is planned to be jointly owned by management, the community, STORJ token holders, and investors.
Founded in 2014, Storj is a decentralized storage network. Users can provide cloud storage services to global customers by sharing unused hard-drive space, and use the STORJ token for incentives and payments. $SOL
Can Nomura get it right this time? ?! Nomura Securities sets a target price of 116 yuan for CXMT, corresponding to a market cap of 7.76 trillion yuan
On July 27, Nomura Securities initiated coverage of CXMT (Changxin Memory Technologies) with a target price of 116 yuan, representing a 20x price-to-earnings ratio.
This valuation is twice Micron’s valuation, which means that CXMT’s share price has risen by about 13.4 times from its IPO price, corresponding to a market cap of approximately 7.76 trillion yuan. $CXM.US
If he’s right, how many people will get liquidated? A whale shorting CXMT with 40x leverage, planning to liquidate between 13 and 30 yuan According to Yu Jin monitoring, since yesterday a certain whale has continued to short CXMT. The current short position size has reached about $18 million, with the average opening price around $6.4 (about 43 yuan).
This address previously set take-profit limit orders for the short position, with a price range of $2 to $4.5 (about 13 to 30 yuan). The pre-market contract price of CXMT once surged to $7, causing the whale’s current unrealized loss to be about $1.4 million. $AAPL.US
Let’s talk about how to arbitrage? Jiang Zhuoer: The arbitrage space for Changxin Technology has disappeared. Bidding at 50 yuan is close to the price corresponding to HYPE. Jiang Zhuoer posted that Changxin Technology “can’t play anymore.” He said the initial bidding price was 50 yuan, while the HYPE price is 6.76 USD multiplied by an exchange rate of 6.73, which is about 45.49 yuan.
Jiang Zhuoer said that currently you can neither buy in nor carry out arbitrage.$CX.US
CZ responds to industry turmoil and praises the “bullish return signal” tweet: user asset safety comes first, recommends self-custody Binance founder CZ posted on X platform in response to Bitmart’s shutdown and praised a “bullish return signal” tweet. He said that the industry is once again facing difficult times, but for now it appears that related events are being carried out in an orderly manner, and users can still withdraw their own assets.
CZ emphasized that in an uncertain market environment, users should focus more on asset safety rather than chasing short-term gains. In addition, when responding to “why not acquire a small CEX,” CZ said that acquiring a centralized exchange is different from other types of business: if a hacker attack occurs after the acquisition, it would be difficult to determine whether the issue came from backdoors left by the previous team or from a new problem, making security and compliance risks higher. He stressed that acquiring a CEX is still possible, but the due diligence and risk-control processes are more complex.$BNB
The weekend was lively, and “the exchanges lining up to go bankrupt” became a hot topic. No policy pressure, no hacker attacks—yet one after another, they suddenly shut their doors. What’s the reason?
I don’t understand exchange operations. But as a veteran crypto enthusiast of more than a decade, I have a direct intuition: they probably aren’t making money—maybe even losing money. Put simply, if you open for business, from a thousand to ten thousand a day, you’re supposed to earn money. Every day when you wake up, there are so many people waiting to get paid, and there are so many daily operating expenses. If you’re not making money, how can you last?
I think exchanges have two major sources of revenue. One is transaction fees from traders. But now this money is harder to make. The bear market has been going on for too long: when people come in, they get trapped and cut losses. The profitability effect is too low. On top of that, the stock market has been soaring—newcomers don’t come to crypto, and older participants either get wiped out or are lured into the stock market. If nobody trades, then there’s no way to earn transaction-fee revenue.
The other source of revenue should be things like listing fees—money from token issuance projects. In a bear market, it’s hard for crypto projects to raise investment, so there are fewer issuances. Meanwhile, top-tier exchanges keep aggressively pushing Alpha and have become the preferred channel for new projects to get listed. As a result, mid-sized exchanges can’t really earn from listing fees either.
They can’t make money from transaction fees, and they also can’t make money from listing fees. And mid-sized exchanges are still big operations with lots of overhead—how do they survive by just eating into their old capital every day? When you look ahead, the bear market doesn’t seem like it has an end. So there’s only one road left: shut down and cut losses.
Based on past experience, whenever exchanges start failing one after another and can’t hold on anymore, it often ends up being a signal that the bear market is near its bottom. We’ll see—also, I don’t know if this old piece of experience can still work this time. Let’s hope together. $BMT
I'm afraid Jia Yueting probably didn't expect that on the very first day of the consolidation, Faraday Future's stock price would collapse, dropping as much as 39.66%! After the 150-for-1 reverse stock split was implemented, Faraday Future's stock price became $10.755, but even at the opening the shares began to tumble with heavy volume. By the close, the stock price was only $6.49, and its market value was just over $16 million. After all, this time Jia Yueting really did break his promise. When Faraday Future's stock price had not yet fallen into the delisting risk zone below $1, Jia Yueting repeatedly said he would not carry out a stock consolidation. However, with promising prospects for FX new vehicles and EAI robots, Faraday Future's stock price still kept sliding. It has now reached a dangerous situation where it could face delisting if a consolidation is not carried out. To preserve Faraday Future's listing status, Jia Yueting may not have had much choice. But honestly, since Faraday Future went public, its performance has been extremely poor. If we adjust for the splits, Faraday Future's stock price at its highest would have been as high as $29.88 million. That means if someone had invested $29.88 million when Faraday Future listed, the current value would be only $6.49—such a decline is probably hard to describe in words. But this isn't even the worst part. As Faraday Future's market capitalization continues to shrink, the difficulty of financing will increase as well. With a market value of only over ten million dollars, it would likely be hard to secure funding in the tens of millions. And this may be an outcome Jia Yueting would not want to see. In short, this may be one of the most critical moments since Faraday Future was founded. It remains to be seen whether Jia Yueting can pull off another turnaround—the pressure really is substantial. $FF.US
Trump 2028 may run for president again and will wear a “TRUMP 2028” hat
Trump said: “I’m going to do it one more time. Should be easy. I’m getting better at running for president. I’ve won 3 times.” He then put on a hat with “TRUMP 2028” printed on it.
Trump said that the second election was a “manipulated election.” $TRUMP
Killa, a quantitative trader focused on BTC, predicted the peak of this bull run in May 2025. On the X platform, he has more than 200,000 followers. In mid-April, he shorted Bitcoin at $74,688, and then switched to going long during the broad market drop on June 5. Killa’s outlook is grounded in his identity as a quantitative trader. At its core, his view is a concrete execution of the “cycle acceleration theory” in trading. The short position he opened in mid-April above $74,000 and the long shift in June are two key moves within the same trading framework, with the central logic being to capture high-volatility opportunities brought about by cycle acceleration. Recently, several well-known traders (such as James Wynn) have publicly echoed similar views—like “new highs before the halving”—and have already built large long positions. This is not an isolated opinion, but rather a convergence of trading strategies based on on-chain data (such as the proportion of profitable addresses) and expectations for macro liquidity. Killa sets his stop-loss at $31,950—a price far below the “strong support” area that the market generally considers currently. This reflects both his caution regarding a potential deep pullback and also suggests that his strategy has sufficient contingency plans for extreme volatility. In this sense, his position management is more critical than simply calling for upside. On July 25, the well-known trader Killa (@KillaXBT) posted that the Bitcoin cycle is accelerating. The move from the bottom to a new ATH took only 476 days—much faster than the previous two cycles. He expects this cycle to also set new highs before the next halving.$BTC
What is something you only find out after you get to Taiwan? Welcome to the chain
1, Only after coming to Taiwan do you know that if a beautiful girl comes up to you and flirts with you, and then says she’ll treat you to fried chicken gizzards, you mustn’t agree—because in Taiwan, fried chicken gizzards are chicken buttholes (chicken gizzards), unless you actually like eating chicken gizzards.
2, The holidays here are completely different from those on the mainland. April 4 is Children’s Day, August 8 is Father’s Day, and September 28 is Teachers’ Day.
3, Whether it’s in school or the library, most books are not printed horizontally—they’re printed vertically, which is more similar to books from ancient times.
4, Before buying instant noodles in the supermarket, you must first buy a pair of chopsticks or a fork, because Taiwanese instant noodles only come with the seasoning packets and don’t include a fork.
Zong Jichang is probably the happiest person right now—not because he can return to the company, and not because Zong Fuli’s appeal was dismissed, but because not only did his uncles and grandmas in the Zong family support him, but also all the elders and close relatives from the Zong family’s ancestral clan back home have unified behind him—no one speaks up for Zong Fuli.
The Zong family is a typical traditional Zhejiang family, so this attitude is not surprising. After all, the ancient Chinese tradition has long been that family business is passed down through sons, not daughters. No matter what, Zong Jichang and Zong Jisheng are sons—so the family business is passed to the sons and still carries the Zong surname. If it were passed to a daughter, it would mean taking someone else’s surname.
Nowadays, many people online are calling for it to follow tradition and morality, saying that only the legitimate daughter and Princess Zong Fuli as the eldest princess-consort have inheritance rights, and that Zong Qinghou’s other three children have no inheritance rights because they are illegitimate. In fact, they’ve got China’s tradition exactly backwards. Look at the succession to the throne in ancient times: it’s clear that tradition has always been that it passes through sons, not daughters. If the empress had a legitimate son, succession would go to the legitimate son. If the empress had no children, it would pass to the legitimate sons of the concubines. If the concubines also had no children, even a son born to a palace lady could work. And if the emperor had no sons at all, it would be preferable to choose a nephew from a collateral branch rather than let the legitimate princess daughter born to the empress inherit!
Besides, it’s still hard to say whether Zong Jichang, Zong Jiali, and Zong Jisheng are truly illegitimate children. It’s said that Du Jianying was also registered as married to Old Zong; if it was registered, then they would count as legitimate children by marriage.
Now that this has dragged on to this point, the elders of the Zong family likely have their own views. After all, back then, Zong Fuli had already taken control of the vast majority of the family business—tens of billions were in her hands. The other three children only asked to inherit the rights to a trust fund: every month they could live off the interest from that trust, and everyone could coexist peacefully. But instead, she chose not to give it, turned hostile, and took the matter to court—ruining the positive image of a national business leader that Zong Qinghou’s generation built through a lifetime of hard work. It’s truly heartbreaking.$BNB
Come to Qingdao to eat seafood potstickers This meal is less than 10U So many and so fragrant Also a huge fried chicken Recommended by local reviews I can’t even think about how many 10U I’ve lost trading crypto these past few years $SOL
Xiaohongshu Former Executive Chen Hao Refuses Offline Meeting Invitation, Demands an Internal Investigation and an Apology
What Chen Hao can’t let go of is this: the management of Xiaohongshu handled things too ruthlessly. You can fire people, and you can take advantage of others—but you can’t do everything under the sun and then insult their dignity at the same time. After taking full advantage of Chen Hao, the reason for firing others was actually the most insulting one—“not capable.” For anyone with real ability, that kind of grievance is almost as deep as a hatred comparable to killing one’s parents or cutting off one’s livelihood. If this grudge isn’t avenged, how will one stand in the world in the future?
So Chen Hao’s dishonorable past in reporting Xiaohongshu to the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission is meant to make the Hong Kong regulator reflect on its own moral guidance: whether it should allow a company like Xiaohongshu to go public. If Xiaohongshu is allowed to go public, then the entire Hong Kong securities market will be assessed by global capital as “a capital market with no moral bottom line—will you dare to enter and invest?!”