LearnToEarn

I’ve been thinking about how much of a lending protocol’s risk really comes down to a few numbers.

With @TermMax , MLTV and LLTV are the first things I’d look at.

MLTV sets how much you can borrow initially, while LLTV is where liquidation can actually begin. That gap matters because it gives a position some room before things become critical.

But risk doesn’t stop at LTV.

TermMax also uses fixed terms, partial liquidations, a 10% liquidation penalty, vault capacity limits, market whitelists, curators, and timelocks.

What I find more interesting is the physical delivery fallback. If a position can’t be fully liquidated, lenders may receive a pro-rata share of the collateral itself. That reduces the chance of simply ending with nothing, but it also means lenders can inherit an asset they may not actually want to hold.

So there’s a clear trade-off.

More aggressive parameters can improve capital efficiency, but they also leave less room for bad debt. More conservative settings protect lenders better, but can reduce utilization and growth.

That balance is probably where the real risk management happens.

I’m still curious how these parameters evolve as @TermMax markets mature.

DYOR. Not financial advice.#termmax @TermMax

I went back through the Dusk documentation last night, specifically the sections on the DS algorithm and how provisioners get selected for consensus.

I started by trying to map the stake eligibility rules. A provisioner’s stake S is treated as eligible only if the amount is at least the minimum (set at 1000 DUSK) and its age/length sits between 0 and M. The DS process then ranks those eligible stakes by a score that mixes the stake’s size with a deterministic function of the previous block hash and the provisioner’s public key. The highest-scoring provisioner becomes the one who can propose the next block.

Reading further, the flow became clearer: the selected provisioner broadcasts a candidate block, a committee of other provisioners runs validation, and if a simple majority (½ + 1) of ValidBk messages appears, the block moves to ratification. Ratification itself needs a stronger threshold ⅔ + 1 before the block is considered finalized and the new set of provisioners is locked in. Attestation and voting committees are formed the same deterministic way, just with different seeds.

What still feels unresolved for me is how sensitive the whole chain is to the exact value of M and to the 1000 DUSK floor. If those parameters shift, does the effective decentralization of the provisioner set change in ways that are hard to see from the outside? And once a block is attested, how much practical recourse exists if a later audit shows the DS ranking was gamed?

Curious how others who’ve dug into the same pages read the security margins around those majority thresholds.
#dusk $DUSK @Dusk

I’ve been thinking about how much of a lending protocol’s risk really comes down to a few numbers.

With @TermMax , MLTV and LLTV are the first things I’d look at.

MLTV sets how much you can borrow initially, while LLTV is where liquidation can actually begin. That gap matters because it gives a position some room before things become critical.

But risk doesn’t stop at LTV.

TermMax also uses fixed terms, partial liquidations, a 10% liquidation penalty, vault capacity limits, market whitelists, curators, and timelocks.

What I find more interesting is the physical delivery fallback. If a position can’t be fully liquidated, lenders may receive a pro-rata share of the collateral itself. That reduces the chance of simply ending with nothing, but it also means lenders can inherit an asset they may not actually want to hold.

So there’s a clear trade-off.

More aggressive parameters can improve capital efficiency, but they also leave less room for bad debt. More conservative settings protect lenders better, but can reduce utilization and growth.

That balance is probably where the real risk management happens.

I’m still curious how these parameters evolve as @TermMax markets mature.

DYOR. Not financial advice.#termmax @TermMax

I went back through the Dusk whitepaper last night, especially the sections on incentives, transactions, and Moonlight, and I found the design more nuanced than I first expected.

The consensus side uses 64 committee credits, with voting power weighted by credits. Quorum needs 2/3 for Valid, while Invalid, NoCandidate or NoQuorum can pass with 1/2 + 1. Rolling finality also caught my attention: if a block has two previous non-attested iterations, it needs 2×2 = 4 consecutive attested or confirmed blocks to become confirmed.

The incentive model is interesting too. Block rewards are split 80% to the generator, 10% to the voting committee, and 10% to Dusk. The generator’s 80% itself includes a fixed 70% plus a variable 10% tied to included votes. I can see why this exists: higher-iteration generators could otherwise benefit from earlier iterations failing.

On transactions, Moonlight is account-based and transparent, with public balances and a nonce for replay protection. Phoenix takes the UTXO route and uses ZK proofs and nullifiers for privacy.

What I’m still wondering is whether the 80/10/10 structure creates enough incentive for broad participation, and how decentralization behaves when stake concentration determines committee credits.

How does the community view these trade-offs?


#dusk $DUSK @Dusk

I went back through the Dusk whitepaper last night, especially the sections on incentives, transactions, and Moonlight, and I found the design more nuanced than I first expected.

The consensus side uses 64 committee credits, with voting power weighted by credits. Quorum needs 2/3 for Valid, while Invalid, NoCandidate or NoQuorum can pass with 1/2 + 1. Rolling finality also caught my attention: if a block has two previous non-attested iterations, it needs 2×2 = 4 consecutive attested or confirmed blocks to become confirmed.

The incentive model is interesting too. Block rewards are split 80% to the generator, 10% to the voting committee, and 10% to Dusk. The generator’s 80% itself includes a fixed 70% plus a variable 10% tied to included votes. I can see why this exists: higher-iteration generators could otherwise benefit from earlier iterations failing.

On transactions, Moonlight is account-based and transparent, with public balances and a nonce for replay protection. Phoenix takes the UTXO route and uses ZK proofs and nullifiers for privacy.

What I’m still wondering is whether the 80/10/10 structure creates enough incentive for broad participation, and how decentralization behaves when stake concentration determines committee credits.

How does the community view these trade-offs?


#dusk $DUSK @Dusk

I went back through the Dusk whitepaper last night, especially the sections on incentives, transactions, and Moonlight, and I found the design more nuanced than I first expected.

The consensus side uses 64 committee credits, with voting power weighted by credits. Quorum needs 2/3 for Valid, while Invalid, NoCandidate or NoQuorum can pass with 1/2 + 1. Rolling finality also caught my attention: if a block has two previous non-attested iterations, it needs 2×2 = 4 consecutive attested or confirmed blocks to become confirmed.

The incentive model is interesting too. Block rewards are split 80% to the generator, 10% to the voting committee, and 10% to Dusk. The generator’s 80% itself includes a fixed 70% plus a variable 10% tied to included votes. I can see why this exists: higher-iteration generators could otherwise benefit from earlier iterations failing.

On transactions, Moonlight is account-based and transparent, with public balances and a nonce for replay protection. Phoenix takes the UTXO route and uses ZK proofs and nullifiers for privacy.

What I’m still wondering is whether the 80/10/10 structure creates enough incentive for broad participation, and how decentralization behaves when stake concentration determines committee credits.

How does the community view these trade-offs?


#dusk $DUSK @Dusk

I went back through the Dusk whitepaper last night, especially the sections on incentives, transactions, and Moonlight, and I found the design more nuanced than I first expected.

The consensus side uses 64 committee credits, with voting power weighted by credits. Quorum needs 2/3 for Valid, while Invalid, NoCandidate or NoQuorum can pass with 1/2 + 1. Rolling finality also caught my attention: if a block has two previous non-attested iterations, it needs 2×2 = 4 consecutive attested or confirmed blocks to become confirmed.

The incentive model is interesting too. Block rewards are split 80% to the generator, 10% to the voting committee, and 10% to Dusk. The generator’s 80% itself includes a fixed 70% plus a variable 10% tied to included votes. I can see why this exists: higher-iteration generators could otherwise benefit from earlier iterations failing.

On transactions, Moonlight is account-based and transparent, with public balances and a nonce for replay protection. Phoenix takes the UTXO route and uses ZK proofs and nullifiers for privacy.

What I’m still wondering is whether the 80/10/10 structure creates enough incentive for broad participation, and how decentralization behaves when stake concentration determines committee credits.

How does the community view these trade-offs?


#dusk $DUSK @Dusk

I went back through the Dusk whitepaper last night, especially the sections on incentives, transactions, and Moonlight, and I found the design more nuanced than I first expected.

The consensus side uses 64 committee credits, with voting power weighted by credits. Quorum needs 2/3 for Valid, while Invalid, NoCandidate or NoQuorum can pass with 1/2 + 1. Rolling finality also caught my attention: if a block has two previous non-attested iterations, it needs 2×2 = 4 consecutive attested or confirmed blocks to become confirmed.

The incentive model is interesting too. Block rewards are split 80% to the generator, 10% to the voting committee, and 10% to Dusk. The generator’s 80% itself includes a fixed 70% plus a variable 10% tied to included votes. I can see why this exists: higher-iteration generators could otherwise benefit from earlier iterations failing.

On transactions, Moonlight is account-based and transparent, with public balances and a nonce for replay protection. Phoenix takes the UTXO route and uses ZK proofs and nullifiers for privacy.

What I’m still wondering is whether the 80/10/10 structure creates enough incentive for broad participation, and how decentralization behaves when stake concentration determines committee credits.

How does the community view these trade-offs?


#dusk $DUSK @Dusk

I went back through the TermMax pre-mine documentation last night, trying to map out exactly how the TMX allocation is supposed to work once mainnet is live.

The core idea seems straightforward on the surface: 1 billion TMX total supply, with a portion set aside for monthly campaigns that start on day one of mainnet. Eligible participants fall into two groups....people holding fixed-rate PT tokens (bought on the lending page or via vault deposits) and order makers who provide liquidity through range or custom limit orders. Rewards accumulate continuously during each campaign window and stay non-transferable until TGE, when they convert 1:1.

What I kept circling back to is the APY calculation language. It references a $50 million daily volume and TVL figure, then distributes TMX based on prior-day deposits. I’m still unclear whether that volume assumption is a hard parameter baked into the smart contracts or just an illustrative example. If the actual matched volume comes in much lower or higher, does the effective rate scale linearly, or is there a cap or floor that isn’t spelled out here?

On the governance side, the note that points (Kudos) from the earlier Term Structure protocol are “under discussion” for conversion into TermMax rewards left me with more questions than answers. Who decides the conversion ratio, and is that decision on-chain or off-chain? The disclaimer also reserves the right to adjust the pre-mine timeline if it benefits the platform. That flexibility is practical, but it raises the usual decentralization trade-off: how much control remains with the team versus token holders after TGE?

Curious how others are reading the eligibility and claiming mechanics. Does the current design create any obvious concentration risks for early order makers versus passive PT holders?

#termmax @TermMax

I went back through the Dusk whitepaper last night, especially the sections on incentives, transactions, and Moonlight, and I found the design more nuanced than I first expected.

The consensus side uses 64 committee credits, with voting power weighted by credits. Quorum needs 2/3 for Valid, while Invalid, NoCandidate or NoQuorum can pass with 1/2 + 1. Rolling finality also caught my attention: if a block has two previous non-attested iterations, it needs 2×2 = 4 consecutive attested or confirmed blocks to become confirmed.

The incentive model is interesting too. Block rewards are split 80% to the generator, 10% to the voting committee, and 10% to Dusk. The generator’s 80% itself includes a fixed 70% plus a variable 10% tied to included votes. I can see why this exists: higher-iteration generators could otherwise benefit from earlier iterations failing.

On transactions, Moonlight is account-based and transparent, with public balances and a nonce for replay protection. Phoenix takes the UTXO route and uses ZK proofs and nullifiers for privacy.

What I’m still wondering is whether the 80/10/10 structure creates enough incentive for broad participation, and how decentralization behaves when stake concentration determines committee credits.

How does the community view these trade-offs?


#dusk $DUSK @Dusk