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I just discovered that the Babylon official website has a line that most people skip: TBV itself isn’t a DeFi product—it’s just a primitive. The real products are the ones built on top of it. I read that sentence three times before I realized its weight.

What is TBV? It’s a protocol that turns BTC into programmable assets without taking it off the main chain, without bridging across chains, and without custodianship. But Babylon doesn’t plan to hold on to this mechanism and use it to do lending, trading, or derivatives. Instead, it does this: it packages TBV as an SDK—light-client verification module front-end toolchain—and then hands everything over to developers.

@BabylonLabs_io

In other words, Babylon isn’t building a whole building. It’s building a set of prefabricated panels. Anyone who wants to use BTC as collateral can pick up these panels and start working—no need to write Bitcoin scripts from scratch, and no need to set up their own light-node verification.

The collaboration with Aave is a typical example: Babylon’s only job is to lock BTC into a Vault and transmit the proof of state. As for how lending works and how liquidations happen—that’s all Aave’s own Core Lending Spoke and Vault Swap Spoke business.

The brilliance of this design philosophy is that it doesn’t have to guess what the market needs. Developers will build things with TBV that even Babylon itself hasn’t thought of. And as a governance token for this hand-tool factory, whether BABY’s value can take off depends not on how many products Babylon builds itself, but on how many developers are willing to pick up this wrench.

#baby $BABY

When I was reading the @BabylonLabs_io whitepaper yesterday, I found that Phase-3 is the most core step in Babylon’s roadmap—and also the most technically challenging one. Its goal is very simple: to let a staked BTC provide security guarantees for multiple PoS chains at the same time.

Sounds great, right? But when I think through the technical implementation, it gives me a headache. In the Phase-1 and Phase-2 models, one BTC corresponds to the security needs of only one chain. Stakers delegate their BTC to a Finality Provider, and that provider only needs to deliver finality confirmation services to a single chain. The logic is clear. @BabylonLabs_io

In a multi-staking scenario, the same BTC needs to serve N chains at the same time. Each chain has its own validator set, its own slashing rules, and its own consensus parameters. If the Finality Provider for any one chain misbehaves and gets slashed, the slashing comes from the same BTC. The other innocent chains are harmed as well. This is risk contagion.

Babylon’s solution is to use Babylon Genesis, a Cosmos SDK chain, as a coordination layer. All multi-staking states, slashing signals, and reward distribution are routed and managed through Genesis. The issue is that Genesis itself is a PoS chain, with its own validator set and consensus mechanism. Ultimately, the security of multi-staking depends on Genesis not having problems. That sounds a bit like circular reasoning: using one PoS chain to manage the security that Bitcoin provides to other PoS chains.

Babylon’s testnet for Phase-3 went live in Q3 2025, with the original plan to launch the mainnet in Q4. As of July 2026, it’s still delayed. My guess is that the technical complexity is far higher than the team anticipated. Multi-chain state synchronization, atomicity of cross-chain slashing, and fair reward allocation—each of these is a hard nut to crack.
#baby $BABY

I have read OpenZeppelin’s Babylon special security research report released in April 2026. The report genuinely discloses four core protocol vulnerabilities, all concentrated in weak points during boundary-state transitions—risks that ordinary users and developers can easily overlook.

The first is a delegate-state handling vulnerability. Babylon divides the on-chain operating cycle into multiple stages, and any changes to the permissions for added or exiting validator nodes are deferred until the boundary of the cycle, when they are updated all at once. This timing node triggers multiple system changes simultaneously: the validator replacement voting weight reset and state refresh synchronization happen together, putting extremely heavy computational pressure on the on-chain state machine. It is very easy for logic errors and data inconsistencies to occur.@BabylonLabs_io
Among the most alarming is the slashing-mechanism bypass vulnerability. The protocol itself sets strict mandatory slashing rules, but under certain special boundary conditions, malicious validators can find a path to circumvent penalties. Babylon’s slashing execution highly depends on off-chain committee threshold-signature verification. Because there is a natural synchronization delay between off-chain components and on-chain data, this time difference becomes an exploitable attack window.

In fact, this is not the first time the project has exposed a security issue. In January 2026, a BLS vote extension mechanism vulnerability was reported. Malicious validators could deliberately omit the block hash field, inducing the entire network’s set of validating nodes to collectively crash at a cycle boundary. Fortunately, the team fixed the vulnerability in time, and no actual asset loss occurred.

Before and after, Babylon engaged multiple professional auditing firms and also launched a bug bounty program. However, audits can never eliminate all hidden vulnerabilities. The issues uncovered by the white-hat teams are sufficient to show that there are still many security defects in the protocol’s underlying layer that have not been discovered.
#baby $BABY

Only a few days left until SanDisk’s financial results are released. Will it really take off this time? The market has been moving wildly these past few days. Even when I’m just doing short-term trades, I’m still on edge—I could get caught and lose a few cuts in an instant. I’d be terrified to death!
Doing a few trades a day just to make a bit of money for groceries would be fine too. I still really believe in SanDisk—don’t keep falling!
#TradFi晒单

I found that Babylon’s founding team background is still pretty hardcore in the crypto space.
The founder, David Tse, is a professor at Stanford University and a member of the U.S. National Academy of Engineering. The co-founder, Fisher Yu, is also an expert in blockchain security and cryptography. There are many Chinese faces in the team, but the core management is mostly made up of overseas backgrounds.

The advantage of an “academic-leaning” startup is that the technical foundation is solid. The downside is that, in many cases, they don’t really know how to communicate with retail investors.

In the whitepaper, those cryptography terms and protocol design details—ordinary people simply can’t get through them.

Also, Babylon has already completed multiple rounds of financing, totaling $96 million. This @BabylonLabs_io financing scale isn’t small in the 2024 market environment. But having a large amount of funding doesn’t necessarily mean the project will succeed. I think the key is where the money is spent—technical development, ecosystem building, and security audits. Every one of these is costly work.

To ensure security, Babylon hired two teams, Coinspect and Zellic, to conduct audits. One is a professional team specializing in Bitcoin script security, and the other has a background in white-hat and black-hat hacking. Even after security audits, vulnerabilities may still exist. Risks like smart contract issues and protocol failure are also explicitly mentioned in the official documentation. Whether you acknowledge these risks is up to you.
#baby $BABY

I’ve always remembered that in the early days when I was tinkering with Ethereum L2 Rollups, the biggest headache for me was those expensive Data Availability (DA) bills. I initially thought Babylon’s Bitcoin Timestamping protocol was only there to provide finality for PoS chains—a purely cryptographic game. But after repeatedly wrestling with its technical documentation, Section 4, I realized this is not a free lunch. In essence, it’s a BTC DA service wrapped in cryptography, with an extremely unique cost structure.

I reworked the logic: For a PoS chain to achieve Bitcoin-level immutability, it must push its key data—such as checkpoints and changes to the validator set—through Babylon into Bitcoin’s OP_RETURN. The whitepaper mentions it lightly, but I ran a simple calculation. A typical OP_RETURN script is only 80 bytes. If a PoS chain needs to frequently anchor state to maintain a fast unbonding experience at the seconds level, that means it has to grab tens of thousands of OP_RETURN slots on the BTC network every month.
This made me feel that simply looking at how many chains Babylon has onboarded TVL-wise is pointless—that’s just storytelling.
I’m going to focus on one hard metric: the ratio of the Gas fees that a PoS chain pays to Bitcoin miners to Babylon’s own revenue. If the Gas fees and token value generated by the PoS chain itself can’t cover the DA rent it pays to the Bitcoin network in order to align consensus, then this model can’t be sustained long-term. @BabylonLabs_io

My rationality is that BABY’s terminal value doesn’t depend on how much security it outputs, but on whether it can build a low-cost, high-efficiency data anchoring market. It isn’t free security—it’s a commercial activity that requires precisely calculating the DA cost for every byte. Until this system is proven economically viable, I’m still keeping a clear, rational head.
#baby $BABY

Over the years, I’ve read too many technical “yellow papers” from various public chains. I’ve slowly figured out a few things. I’m not so concerned with how high the theoretical TPS can run; instead, I look first at the security anchor it defines—whether it’s built on fragile inflationary tokens, or whether it’s just piggybacking someone else’s absolute hash power. I’ve seen too many new chains build towering structures, but the root of it was never that the ecosystem didn’t get going—it was that consensus was too cheap. The cost of attacking was so low that a single big player could bring the network to a halt. In that situation, all the “high performance” becomes a punchline.

When I dissected Babylon’s Bitcoin security service layer, what made me stop was this layer. @BabylonLabs_io It isn’t trying to pull investment from other PoS chains. Instead, it turns Bitcoin’s powerful, tamper-resistant immutability into a kind of rent-able, high-grade security service by using cryptographic primitives. New chains don’t need to inflate their own tokens to the ankle just to bootstrap initial security anymore; they can anchor historical states on Bitcoin’s mainnet through Babylon.

This idea is similar to how disaster recovery in different locations for large data centers can pursue extreme speed—but when it comes to data with finality, you have to schedule timely synchronization to physically isolated, unbreakable core facilities. On-chain systems have long lacked this kind of fluid mechanism of sovereignty-level security. What Babylon aims to fill isn’t liquidity—it’s an option for PoS chains to achieve top-tier security without overly sacrificing the economic model.

And I won’t be elevating it into a “security vault.” When BTC is congested, its timestamping can’t get in, and the security level drops accordingly. Even if Babylon’s own relayers make an error, the signal would be cut off just the same. What really matters isn’t how perfect the theory is, but whether, under extreme market conditions, this security rental protocol can still hold the line without introducing additional trust assumptions.

I believe the terminal value of $BABY depends on how thoroughly it can change the startup cost model for new chains. The more chains there are in the future, the less I care about what story a new chain tells—and the more I care about who can prove that its history exists in Bitcoin’s ledger, carved in like stone. #baby $BABY

I’ve researched the Bitcoin ecosystem for so long. Most projects try to add computational attributes to BTC, but I believe BABY’s truly disruptive aspect lies in how it deeply mines Bitcoin’s time attribute and determinism attribute, and cryptographically weaves them into the PoS consensus protocol.

Everyone is talking about how EOTS implements automatic slashing—that’s indeed brilliant. But I think the most core technical kernel in the @BabylonLabs_io whitepaper, though also the easiest to overlook, is its hard-constrained design of the staking state machine at the Bitcoin script layer.

Let’s clear the fog and look at the essence: on the Bitcoin chain, there are no smart contracts to maintain states such as already staked, pending unstaking, and already unstaked. Babylon’s cleverness is that it uses Bitcoin’s native UTXO script properties to force-simulate a dynamic state machine on a static ledger.

When a user initiates staking, BTC is locked in a specific UTXO. The unlocking condition of this UTXO is not a single condition, but a composite logic gate. The key is that it hard-couples the action of unstaking, at the cryptographic level, with the finality of consensus on the Babylon chain.
The whitepaper’s Section 5 details this observable unstaking mechanism. If the validators are honest, the unstaking must go through a safety period locked by CSV. This ensures that if they ever misbehaved, during this safety period there is enough time to extract the EOTS private key and execute slashing. This means the power to unlock BTC is not held by the Babylon protocol; it is held by two certain physical and mathematical facts: time itself and whether the validator has maliciously acted.

My realization is that this design, while trusting mathematics to an extreme, distrusts speed to an extreme. To achieve absolute security, it sacrifices a great deal of liquidity efficiency. An excessively long unstaking period may cause BTC stakers, in extreme market conditions, to watch helplessly as their assets cannot move.
BABY’s core value is not that it creates high returns, but that it creates a consensus-aware UTXO. It enables the otherwise rigid Bitcoin UTXOs to sense the external PoS chain’s consensus state. This is more hard-core than any sidechain or cross-chain solution I’ve seen. It’s not just a stack of code—it’s the most原始, most aggressive trust-mining of Bitcoin primitives.
#baby $BABY

I went through the economic model documentation for @BabylonLabs_io yesterday and found an awkward design detail about BABY’s value-capture mechanism: its most core functionality doesn’t actually require consuming BABY at all.

The market’s current common expectation is that BABY is like an Aave + EigenLayer for the Bitcoin ecosystem—a gate that turns trillions of BTC liquidity into utility—so the token must be valuable. The earlier narrative logic was: Babylon is a chain, so since it’s a chain, issuing tokens is only natural, and users need to pay BABY as Gas to perform actions.

But the real issue is that Babylon’s core business is selling Bitcoin security.

I crunched the numbers. When a PoS chain or an L2 needs to buy timestamp security services from Babylon, the fees they pay are typically staking rewards paid in the native token of that PoS chain, or in BTC. And when a BTC staker locks assets, it pays the native BTC network fees—about 2.66u. Both creation and redemption require paying those fees.

This creates an extremely absurd technical paradox: the most core, highest-frequency commercial activity in the entire ecosystem somehow doesn’t need to consume BABY at all.
The documentation hints at this somewhat indirectly: BABY is mainly used for governance, as well as extra incentives for acting as a Finality Provider.

That means BABY is more like a dividend-right token than a production-asset token. For the institutions and chains that truly use Babylon’s services, they don’t need to stockpile BABY at all—having BTC (or their own native coins) is enough.

This doesn’t even account for BABY’s inflation pressure. To incentivize early onboarding of Finality Providers, the protocol must spend large amounts of BABY as subsidies. A token that has no scenario where it’s consumed as Gas internally, yet faces massive external inflation pressure, has extremely weak value-capture ability. Unless future protocols forcibly require that FP must stake a certain amount of BABY to be eligible for verification, it is logically highly disconnected.

I think big players probably don’t care—they can hedge by earning BABY through staking BTC. But if retail users hold BABY purely to bet on token appreciation, they need to think clearly: in a system where all business uses BTC for settlement, how much value can a purely governance-focused token still retain after the tide goes out?

#baby $BABY

Everyone is talking about how BabylonLabs has made native BTC yield, but when I scoured the announcements and the community, I found that people seem to be deliberately avoiding one of the most important words in a whitepaper: Slashing.

I have no choice but to write this article to warn retail users who only see “no bridge, no custody, native UTXO” and rush in: “native” does not mean zero risk. “Native” means that if you get it wrong, your Bitcoin will truly be permanently deducted. @BabylonLabs_io

BABY’s mechanism works like this: BTC stakers lock their assets in UTXOs and delegate validation rights to a Finality Provider, which provides finality.
If the Finality Provider engages in serious malicious behavior such as Double Signing, then the delegated BTC will be slashed.
Technically, this is an extremely brilliant design—because for the first time it gives Bitcoin economic sanctions in a PoS-style manner. But for retail users, it’s a trust black box:
You can’t verify the Finality Provider’s technical competence. How does a retail user know the validator won’t double-sign due to server failures, code bugs, or a hacker attack? Once it happens, the validator only loses reputation, while you lose real, hard BTC.

This is a second layer of extraction by institutions from retail users. With only a small amount of BTC—like 0.1 BTC—retail users simply don’t have the right to run validators themselves.
They can only delegate to managed LST protocols such as Lombard, PumpBTC, or other custody institutions.
I found it turned into a rather ridiculous scene: BABY was originally meant to solve the “no bridge, no custody” problem. In the end, though, retail users still have to hand over native delegation rights of BTC to a middleman LST protocol just to chase that bit of APY.
Let’s do the numbers: the APY for native BTC staking is currently still in the Cap phase; the official yield hasn’t been set. Assume it’s 3%-5% versus the risk of sloshing 0.1 BTC slashing penalties.
If slashing happens, your BTC could be deducted by 20% or even more.
That means you would need to run fault-free for 5–10 years just to make back the loss from that one incident.

My personal view is that when retail users participate in BABY BTC staking, at its core they are making a risk-imbalanced bet.
I’m saying this to myself: if I don’t have at least 1 BTC, I wouldn’t touch this pure-native slashing mechanism. I’d rather go for those L2s whose yield model is clearer even if they involve bridges, because then at least I know where the risk is. #baby $BABY

Today I’m full and have nothing to do, so I went through a bit of Babylon’s whitepaper and found a few interesting points I’d like to share with everyone.

The core theme of the whitepaper is enhancing the security of a decentralized world through Bitcoin-enabled security.
There’s a concept in it that I find quite interesting: the Bitcoin timestamp protocol.
In simple terms, it uses the Bitcoin network’s timestamp functionality to provide other chains with secure validation.

I don’t remember whether it was in Chapter 3 or Chapter 4, but it discussed in detail the extractable one-time signature technology.
The logic of this technology is as follows: when you stake BTC, you don’t need to move the coins to another chain. The BTC stays on the Bitcoin network under your control.
But if you try to do something malicious—for example, double-spend—this signature mechanism will automatically expose your private key, and the staked BTC will be confiscated as a penalty. @BabylonLabs_io
In other words, it uses cryptography to constrain behavior. Pretty clever.

The whitepaper also mentions Babylon’s vision: to transform Bitcoin from a passive store of value into a programmable trust base. That phrasing really stood out to me. Bitcoin has been “digital gold” for years, and if its productivity potential can truly be activated, the imagination space is indeed huge.

To be frank, I personally think Babylon’s technical logic really has its unique merits, and a16z investing $15 million isn’t without reason.
But no matter how great the technology is, it still needs people to use it. The ecosystem is still early—whether it can truly attract Bitcoin holders to participate in staking and lending is the key.
I’ll keep watching. In the short term, I don’t plan to add to my position, and I don’t plan to sell. #baby $BABY

I’ve been watching this Newton project for almost two months. On June 23, the mainnet Beta went live. RedStone and Credora were among the first data partners to connect, and the VaultKit SDK was released alongside it. Developers can set rules like spending caps and collateral requirements—honestly, it really sounds like something usable.$NEWT

But there’s always been a thorn in my mind: the TEE layer.

The whitepaper wraps TEE like an impenetrable fortress—hardware isolation paired with ZKP, an almost perfect combination. I almost got fooled by it myself. Until I saw a line someone posted on KuCoin that snapped me awake: “trust the chip is still trust, just wearing a different hat.” Trusting the chip and trusting the project team are fundamentally the same thing—outsourcing trust to something you can’t control. The chip just sounds more high-tech.#Newt

What really chills me is what happened in October 2025. A research team from Georgia Tech and Purdue University built something called TEE.Fail, a side-channel attack costing less than $1,000. It can extract encryption keys from Intel TDX and AMD SEV-SNP DDR5 systems. Once the attacker has the keys, they can forge proof reports that pass official verification.

That means a tampered proxy can still generate remote proofs that say everything is fine, and the on-chain contracts can execute as usual—you won’t be able to tell that someone’s already interfered.

And this is just at the hardware level. Newton runs in Phala’s cloud environment, where in the early stage the network is led by the Foundation’s own TEE servers. Ten validators control 73% of the staking—just a few nodes can decide the direction of the entire network. There’s also another unlock round on July 24.@NewtonProtocol

The direction is right, but if the underlying issue of hardware trust isn’t solved and validator concentration doesn’t come down, I won’t put real money in. I’ll wait until it can support seamless switching across multiple vendors’ TEEs and until the proportion of community validators is over half. For now, at this stage, I’m watching—not moving.

I saw that GRVT’s TGE was scheduled for July 21 while I was scrolling on X. An official announcement popped up, so I clicked in to take a look, then swiped away.

It doesn’t really feel exciting. It’s not that I don’t care—I’ve just been waiting for so long that there’s no reaction left. First it said 2026 Q1, then it moved to the end of June, then to July, and finally it was set for July 21. Four different statements, three versions. Each delay came with a reason: like adjusting the timeline, optimizing allocations, extending Season 2, and so on. Taken individually, they all sound reasonable—put together, though, they’ve left me a bit annoyed.

When the first delay happened, some people in the community still expressed understanding. @grvt_io With the second delay, people started questioning it. By the third time, there was basically no buzz in the community. And I also did my part—there’s been interaction, I saved money, and I earned points. Honestly, I’m fed up with waiting!

But during this time, the project team really did a lot of things. The airdrop ratio increased from 22% to 28%, TVL rose from $11.30 million to $107.1 million, the mainnet went live with spot trading, and they even integrated Aave’s lending protocol. The product is moving forward, and the data is growing. I’ve seen all of that, and I’m not trying to deny it. But product progress is one thing, and TGE is another. Having a good product doesn’t mean you can keep changing your listed launch time. Every time you change it, you’re burning through the patience of people who have been waiting for half a year.

Now I just hope that this time, on the 21st, it really can launch successfully. If GRVT truly goes live, can the price hold up? I hope they show some vision and restraint!
#grvt

Ninth Anniversary event perfectly fully unlocked. If you still haven’t finished, hurry up! For the next anniversary, I’ll be staying by Binance again!
#BinanceTurns9

About Magic Labs’ 57 million users and 200,000 developers—I also almost got pulled in at first.

Later, I went through the on-chain data and did the math carefully, and found that the numbers don’t add up. Magic Labs’ 57 million wallet users refer to the total user count generated after its embedded wallet SDK is integrated into various apps. These users may be using apps that integrate Magic Wallet, and the vast majority of them don’t even know they’re using Magic’s technology, let alone know the name “Newton Protocol.”

The same logic applies to 200,000 developers: it’s the total number of developers who registered for and used any one of the SDKs across Magic Labs’ entire product matrix. It doesn’t mean the number of developers actively connecting to the Newton strategy execution layer. @NewtonProtocol

As for the parent company’s user scale versus the real adoption rate of the sub-protocol—the conversion relationship between the two has never been provided by any public materials. Magic Labs did announce in November 2025 that it would integrate the Newton SDK into its developer network, but there’s a whole execution phase between “announced integration” and “developers are already using it.”

The real extent to which Newton Protocol itself is adopted depends on two metrics: the number of independent protocols that actively connect to the Newton strategy layer, and the actual call volume at the Newton contract layer. These numbers have nothing to do with Magic Labs’ user scale. The demand logic behind $NEWT is based on how much Newton Protocol itself is being used—not on Magic Labs’ brand reach. Magic Labs’ 57 million users are an existing stock; how much Newton can actually capture is another matter. Whether the parent’s scale can be directly translated into value for the sub-protocol—that’s something I’m still digging into.

What do you think?
#newt $NEWT

While I was翻 @grvt_io ’s whitepaper, there was one detail that kept me stumped. Most trading protocols treat decentralization as their top selling point, yet GRVT’s official documentation talks over and over about market maker admission rules, risk engine parameters, and the clearing model.
At first I thought it was simply because their audience was different. But after looking at the architecture diagram of the Hybrid Exchange several times, I realized it wasn’t aiming at the retail market at all.

I believe that for professional traders who have ongoing hedging or arbitrage needs, asset self-custody is just the baseline requirement. What they care about is whether the order book can handle large orders, whether slippage can be kept under control, and whether the system will lag or freeze when market conditions get volatile.
In traditional CEXs, those problems are solved by centralized servers—at the cost of handing over the private keys. In a pure DEX, they’re solved by on-chain matching, but speed and depth still can’t really rise to the same level.

What I see in GRVT is that they’ve separated these two layers. The matching engine runs off-chain, processing tens of thousands of orders per second to ensure response times on par with centralized platforms. After each trade, the system compresses the trading data into a zero-knowledge proof and submits it to ZKsync’s settlement layer.
Any third party can verify that the trades are authentic, but no one can move users’ assets.
The order book is maintained by professional market makers, while ordinary users can also benefit from tighter spreads. The speed is handled by high-performance servers, and the security is backed by verifiable mathematics.

What surprised me even more, though, is its attitude toward compliance. Most DeFi projects do everything they can to avoid regulators. GRVT, instead, actively obtained licenses in Bermuda and Lithuania, and is pushing forward licenses for additional jurisdictions.
This isn’t to merely pass inspections—it’s so that market makers and institutional funds will feel comfortable coming in. With regulatory endorsement, the fiat on-ramp can be opened and liquidity depth can grow, rather than waiting to patch things up after something goes wrong. That’s also a key point I’m especially looking forward to.

So the reason I’m most interested in GRVT isn’t that it’s more decentralized than anyone else, or that it’s faster than anyone else. It’s that it puts several previously mutually exclusive goals—efficiency, security, compliance, and control—into the same system and lets each operate in its own lane.
I think whether this path can truly work will depend on how things perform going forward, and on the coin price after the launch on the 21st! #grvt

The Newton Protocol is built on EigenLayer AVS, which means it doesn’t need to build a validator network from scratch and can directly inherit Ethereum’s economic security. The shortcut saves costs, but it also welds the risk anchor onto the EigenLayer ship.

The restaking race is currently going through a profound “midlife crisis.” The market has begun to deeply question the business viability and system stability of the “shared security” model. The core issue is that high-grade economic security is not necessarily being used where it’s required. Although top AVSs lock up massive ETH—EigenDA with over 4 million and Cyber with 3.49 million—the assets that can be penalized for long periods may be effectively zero, so security has never actually passed real-world attack tests.

The same staked assets provide validation support for multiple protocols at once, continuously diluting the real anti-attack capability corresponding to each unit of assets. @NewtonProtocol , as an AVS, may have “shared” security in extreme cases that is far thinner than what the ledger numbers suggest.

In June 2025, during EigenLayer sidecar reward computation, a divide-by-zero error was found, which could potentially lead to denial of service across all AVSs and operators. If a similar vulnerability exists in the underlying restaking contract, the impact could propagate along the dependency chain to #Newt .

Validator power is highly centralized. Top nodes gain priority in AVS cooperation due to their brand and capital; EigenCloud’s market share exceeds 60%. If a major EigenLayer operator withdraws or runs into problems, Newton’s consensus aggregation time may increase noticeably, and policy validation delays would directly rise.

Slashing is a double-edged sword. EigenLayer mainnet slashing was activated in April 2025, allowing AVSs to impose economic penalties on misbehaving operators. But a single validator’s mistake can trigger penalties for every service it supports. If an operator is slashed in other AVSs, its staking capacity on Newton would also decline. $NEWT ’s security is not independent of the EigenLayer ecosystem; it is tied to the health of the entire restaking system.

My view is that EigenLayer restaking is a reasonable choice for Newton to launch quickly, but the security foundation is built on another complex protocol—this “safe” is conditional. Newton is currently just an AVS within the EigenLayer ecosystem, and its security capabilities fluctuate along with EigenLayer as a whole.