On the night of Nov 17 to Nov 18, about 1.4 million LYX were stolen from about 300 accounts on LUKSO. The attacker did not touch anyone's private keys, did not steal a single seed phrase, and the chain itself had no problems. The money went out through the "email account recovery" path.

LUKSO's Universal Profile is a smart contract account, and one account can have multiple keys with different permissions. To make it convenient for people who forget their passwords, LUKSO built an email recovery service; once the email verification passes, it can help you recover your account. On the night of Nov 17, the attacker exploited a vulnerability in the backend of this recovery service; LUKSO did not publicly disclose what kind it was. After obtaining the recovery service's own "recovery account," the attacker added one of their own control keys to each of about 300 users' accounts, with address 0xa2f8Fd85366d1B4A3B13C33A48CD959F6D1Ba3a7. Once the key was added, the money could be transferred out. The 1.4 million LYX were first bridged to Ethereum, then exchanged on decentralized exchanges like Uniswap for about 50 ETH, worth about $95,000. LUKSO released a post-incident report on Nov 18, saying the email recovery service has been shut down and is being retired.

1.4 million coins sounds staggering, but after the swap they were worth only about 50 ETH. The value of the stolen coins depends on what they were worth at the time, not what they were worth at their peak.

This also matters to people who only buy spot. If your wallet, exchange, or app has any convenient feature like “recover by email” or “recover by phone number,” that’s another key that can be used to access your account. And that key isn’t in your hands—it’s in the service provider’s. Once the provider’s backend is breached, attackers don’t need to pick your lock; they can simply issue themselves a new key. Stealing a key still means picking a lock. Stealing the “power to add keys” is like getting the key-cutting machine itself—and all 300 accounts were unlocked overnight.

The cleanup is even trickier. LUKSO says revoking access alone isn’t enough. Affected users need to take two steps in order: first remove the control key added by the attacker, then remove the controller for the compromised “recovery account.” Skip a step or do them in the wrong order, and the attacker’s key remains in place, so the remaining funds can still be transferred out. LUKSO’s post-incident report includes a lookup tool to check whether your account is on the affected list. Accounts that never enabled email recovery were unaffected this time.

Three things you can do right now. First, check: LUKSO’s official post-incident report includes a lookup tool. See whether your account is among the 300 affected. If it is, remove both keys in the order specified by LUKSO—don’t just click “revoke access” once and assume you’re done. Next, check your current wallet and exchange. If email or phone recovery is enabled, ask yourself: who holds this backup key, and how much of my assets is worth entrusting to someone else? Finally, don’t keep large sums in accounts with these kinds of convenience features. Convenience and security are two ends of the same rope: loosen the convenience end, and the security end loosens too.

LUKSO’s own words were that the smart contract “was never compromised and operated as designed.” The chain wasn’t broken; the backup key outside the chain was. Sometimes avoiding scams just means asking one more question: who pays the price for convenience?

Does your wallet currently have email recovery enabled, or a similar convenience feature?

#LUKSO #钱包安全 #防骗 #邮箱恢复 #SmartContractWallet

— Web3 leek investor Xiaokai

This content reflects personal opinions only and does not constitute investment advice. Cryptocurrency prices are highly volatile; please assess the risks for yourself.