At 4:05 a.m. Beijing time on October 30, five Binance hot wallets began sending XRP to the same unfamiliar address. They stopped four minutes later, after 233 million XRP had been sent.

At 4:20 a.m., a strange transaction appeared on Ethereum, containing 50 EIP-7702 authorizations signed by Binance’s own Binance14 hot wallet. At 4:24 a.m., a transfer took away $2.53 billion.

Over the next three-plus hours, money flowed out across 11 chains, until the final ETH transaction was recorded on-chain at 7:56 a.m. Elliptic put the total at $6.43 billion, while Binance’s own estimate was about $6.34 billion. When Bybit lost about $1.5 billion last February, everyone called it the biggest heist in crypto history. This time, the sum was more than four times as large. Elliptic’s assessment: it was almost certainly the largest known single theft—not just in crypto.

On October 31, the FBI named the culprit: North Korea.

The most critical link in the entire attack was a Binance engineer running a code repository sent by an “interviewer” on a work computer.

On November 3, Binance published a preliminary investigation report. Combined with the on-chain tracking by TRM, Chainalysis, and Elliptic over the past few days, it’s now possible to piece together what happened. It’s worth noting that Binance’s report is preliminary and has not been independently verified by a third party. The company also says it is withholding some technical details to prevent copycat attacks. Any speculation in the article below will be clearly marked.

A new computer, but the same target list

The story starts in June.

Engineer A on Binance’s wallet operations team wanted to install an AI coding tool. While searching, they ended up installing a tampered version of Homebrew. Binance’s report specifically links to an analysis published in May this year by the SANS Internet Storm Center: attackers put up fake Homebrew pages in search ads, tricking users into copying a command into their terminal. What gets installed is MacSync Stealer, an information-stealing trojan.

Binance’s security team found out, gave A a new computer, and reset their credentials. Anyone would think that was the end of it.

But one line in the report really stings: A’s role, along with those of colleagues responsible for wallet infrastructure, had already been exposed.

You can replace a computer and change a password, but you can’t replace an organizational structure. Here’s a theory: the most valuable thing the attackers got from A may have been a list of who managed wallets at Binance and who had access to the signing system.

Second interview: the person on the other end claimed to be a CEO

In September, software engineer B was contacted through a legitimate job platform by someone claiming to be a project director.

The first interview was a video call with an “HR rep” who even sent over their social media accounts, complete with lifestyle photos and videos, all to make B believe the person on the other end was real. For the second round, they switched to a popular messaging app. The person on the other end was the “CEO” of a company that didn’t exist. Finally, they sent B a code repository and asked them to complete a task.

B ran it on their work computer.

During environment setup, a malicious script deleted the legitimate pyenv files, replaced them with its own version, created a symlink, and then launched zsh. pyenv is a small tool for managing Python versions—once it’s installed, nobody gives it a second thought. Hiding malware there was devious. The company’s endpoint protection didn’t block it at the time; Binance says it was a zero-day exploit.

This kind of scheme isn’t new in crypto. In 2024, DMM Bitcoin lost 4,502.9 BTC, worth about $308 million. The FBI and Japan’s National Police Agency concluded that TraderTraitor operatives impersonated recruiters on LinkedIn and approached an employee with system access at wallet software company Ginco, sending a malicious Python script on GitHub as a “pre-employment test.” In 2022, the Ronin cross-chain bridge lost about $600 million. The Block, citing two people familiar with the matter, reported that a senior engineer was invited to several fake job interviews on LinkedIn and eventually opened a spyware-laced “job offer” PDF. Sky Mavis never confirmed that detail. Earlier still, a TraderTraitor advisory issued by the U.S. CISA in April 2022 said the group specifically targeted people in systems administration and DevOps roles at crypto companies, using high-paying jobs as bait.

Why does this trick keep working? Job seekers want to make a good impression, and the task is specifically asking you to download and run something. Not doing it can make you look unprofessional. Security training teaches you not to click unfamiliar links, but nobody teaches you not to do interview assignments.

They waited more than a month

B was compromised in September. The next move came on October 20, and the money was moved in the early hours of October 30. From June, that’s nearly half a year.

The report doesn’t explain why they didn’t act sooner. A reasonable explanation is that getting access to an engineer’s computer is still a long way from being able to move money. They had to take their time figuring out where the signing service was, how deployments worked, and which people had tokens on their computers.

Binance’s report says its security team detected and stopped 57 suspected cyberattacks linked to North Korea this year. Binance Chief Security Officer Jimmy Su said in an interview with Decrypt last August that North Koreans try to get jobs at Binance every day. They stopped 57 attempts and missed one. The cost: $6.3 billion.

The company’s own AI tool opened the door for them

On October 20, the attackers started from B’s computer and used an internal Binance AI tool to take over the computers of two other wallet engineers: A’s new computer and the computer of C, a wallet software engineer.

A got a new computer, but still couldn’t escape.

The report called it a “compromised internal AI tool,” and the remediation plan specifically called for rebuilding the tool and its access controls. In other words, what was exploited was the tool’s access privileges. An internal tool that can help you perform actions on a colleague’s computer is, in itself, a network connected to many computers. Normally, it makes things easier for you; with someone else sitting in B’s place, it makes things easier for them.

On A’s computer, the attackers found what they were really after: a container deployment token that could run their own code on Binance’s servers. Binance co-CEO Richard Teng later said the attackers didn’t rely on just one engineer’s access, and that the whole process was not as simple as “one click.”

They started at 4 a.m.; first, a dress rehearsal in broad daylight

The on-chain preparations began even earlier than the report says. According to Elliptic, between October 28 and 29, a new wallet received three transfers of 0.1 ETH from Tornado Cash. TRM and Chainalysis also confirmed that the attackers received funds from the mixer. At 11:59 p.m. Beijing time on the 29th, the attackers deployed a “sweeper” contract. About four hours earlier, they had already rehearsed the operation with another wallet.

From 1:15 to 3:56 a.m. on the 30th, the attackers logged into C’s computer, used A’s credentials to deploy a container, and launched the attack script. The script targeted the wallet signing service, which has to approve every transfer from a hot wallet.

At 4:05 a.m., XRP started flowing out. Then a Solana hot wallet sent out about 970,500 SOL, an Optimism wallet sent out about 44.2 million OP, and a Bitcoin hot wallet sent out 18,270 BTC. TRM’s analysis says the Ethereum transfers used 7702 delegation, while transfers on the other nine chains were “normally signed”—meaning the attackers could get Binance’s signing system to approve transactions for them. Around 7:05 a.m., a second wave hit Avalanche and Polygon.

The tap was shut off, but the water kept flowing

Binance suspended withdrawals and shut down its hot wallet services. Why didn’t that work?

Because those 50 delegations had already been set up on-chain using EIP-7702, granting the attackers’ contract partial execution rights over Binance14. 7702 was introduced in Ethereum’s Pectra upgrade in May last year, with the aim of letting regular addresses use smart-wallet features. The delegation was recorded on-chain, so Binance could shut down its own systems, but it would still remain active on-chain. Elliptic noted that the delegation remained valid, and the attackers later swept up four more rounds of newly deposited funds without needing any new signatures. Richard Teng’s exact words were that the delegation “did not go through our normal approval controls.”

To revoke it, the wallet itself had to sign another transaction. But Binance’s hot wallets use MPC, which splits the private key into several parts so no one person holds the complete key. It’s one of the best designs for preventing theft, but when it came time to urgently sign a revocation, no one could produce a signature right away. The team had to put together a special process on the spot. The lock designed to keep thieves out had locked the owner outside, too.

At 7:56 a.m., the final transfer of 2,961.9 ETH was confirmed. At 8:10 a.m., Binance sent a delegation revocation from Binance14 to the zero address, clearing the delegation. There were no further unauthorized transfers.

Who did it?

First, what’s been confirmed.

On October 31, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the IRS Criminal Investigation division issued a notice saying North Korea was responsible for the theft. They named TraderTraitor and published 628 addresses: 608 Ethereum, 19 Bitcoin, and one Solana address. They called on THORChain nodes, cross-chain services, and exchanges to reject related transactions. The FBI named the same group in last year’s $1.5 billion Bybit hack. Binance’s report cited the FBI notice; Binance did not name a perpetrator independently.

Blockchain analytics firms made the attribution even earlier than the FBI. On the day of the attack, TRM attributed it to TraderTraitor with “high confidence.” Chainalysis CEO Jonathan Levin wrote on X that it was “likely the North Korean group TraderTraitor.” Elliptic initially described the attribution as “likely,” then said the FBI’s announcement confirmed its assessment. Media outlets including CoinDesk have described TraderTraitor as a branch of Lazarus.

There are a few main pieces of evidence. Chainalysis says its strongest piece was seeing the stolen Binance funds being mixed in real time with funds stolen from Bitget in September. That Bitget theft was widely believed to be North Korean. Elliptic also confirmed this: as of November 3, about $16 million had flowed into addresses that also held Bitget’s stolen funds. Other clues include funding from Tornado Cash, overlap with services used in previous TraderTraitor cases involving BigONE, WOO X, AFX, and others, a long period of lying low, and tactics resembling the Bybit attack—including exploiting the victim’s own signing system.

Now, what remains uncertain. On November 3, North Korea’s KCNA published a statement by Kim Yo Jong denying the accusation and saying the FBI wanted to portray North Korea as a “cybercrime state.” An AMLBot analyst also cautioned that blockchain analysis can link wallets to an actor, but cannot prove their nationality. Binance’s report does not spell out whether the “project director” who approached B was actually a TraderTraitor member. For now, that is an inference based on the tactics used.

What was in the $6.4 billion, and how much was frozen?

Elliptic provides the most detailed breakdown. On Ethereum, $3.8 billion across 186 token types, including $1.9 billion in USDT and $823 million in USDC. A single Binance14 wallet was emptied of 167,464 ETH and 63 token types, including $1.6 billion in USDT. The 18,270 Bitcoin were worth about $1.48 billion. On Tron, there was $612.7 million in USDT. There were 233 million XRP. Stablecoins totaled $3.46 billion.

The large share of stablecoins was bad news for the hackers. Around 5:01 a.m. Beijing time, Tether froze the attackers’ main wallet. Elliptic estimates that this locked up 1.18 billion USDT; four more addresses were frozen within 17 minutes. Three minutes later, Circle froze all $823 million in USDC, before any of it could be converted. Tether CEO Paolo Ardoino said they froze over 1.56 billion USDT in total. Ripple froze RLUSD, while World Liberty, Paxos, and First Digital also froze their own stablecoins; exact figures were not disclosed. TRM said Arbitrum’s Security Council froze 8,426 ETH and 74.6 million ARB, while Optimism governance moved those 44 million OP out of the attackers’ address. All the stolen assets on those two chains were brought under control.

In total, Elliptic verified that $2.85 billion had been frozen or seized, about 44% of the stolen funds; stablecoins accounted for 94% of that. Binance’s report also put the figure at around $2.85 billion, while Chainalysis’s figure as of November 3 was about $2.8 billion. A lawyer told CoinDesk that freezing the funds was only the first step; returning the money to Binance would still require legal procedures.

Native assets such as BTC, XRP, SOL, and NEAR have no issuer that can freeze them, so not a single one was frozen.

For users, Binance says the company will cover the losses, using its SAFU fund and company funds as a backstop. It set aside more than $6.34 billion, of which $5 billion was already held in the stolen assets themselves. As of October 31, 98% of the affected assets had been replenished. Users can check this for themselves on the proof-of-reserves page. The remaining less-liquid coins are still being bought gradually on the market and over the counter. Withdrawals resumed in stages starting at 2 p.m. Beijing time on November 1, with Bitcoin first; fiat withdrawals were added on November 2. According to SecurityWeek, about $4.6 billion in withdrawals were processed on the day services reopened.

Laundering on autopilot

Before the freezes took effect, the attackers moved fast. Elliptic estimates that around $786 million in stablecoins were converted to ETH and TRX before being frozen. On Ethereum, 434 million USDT was swapped for 160,451 ETH through Uniswap, 1inch, and market-maker quote systems, at a loss of 12% to 26% compared with market prices. They didn’t care. Another wallet deposited 59.9 million USDT as collateral on Aave, borrowed 19,762 ETH, and left; Aave subsequently froze the relevant markets. 48 million RLUSD was sold before Ripple’s freeze, while about 150 other obscure tokens were dumped for ETH on DEXs.

On Tron, 234 million USDT was swapped for TRX on SunSwap. Starting at 10:19 a.m. on the 30th, a distribution wallet sent funds out in 1,113 transactions over 51 hours, with a median interval of 90 seconds. It kept going through both nights, and the amounts varied down to six decimal places. Receiving wallets usually moved the funds again within two minutes. When a cross-chain bridge rejected a transfer, the funds were immediately resent from a new wallet to the same destination. Elliptic says there’s no way to tell from the blockchain whether the operation was run by AI agents or ordinary scripts; the pattern of retries after failures looks more like a script.

These TRX went through at least six cross-chain bridges. As of November 3, at least $147 million had left Tron via bridges, almost all of it converted into ETH on Ethereum. THORChain was the biggest exit route, handling about $31 million as of October 31. Another 128 million TRX went through JustLend, with some converted into USDD, which claims to be “uncensorable.” On the Bitcoin side, about 28 BTC entered the WabiSabi mixer starting November 1, and around 200 BTC were newly acquired through swaps from SOL, Tron, and ETH.

In the first three and a half days, the attackers used around 12,000 wallets and over 40,000 transactions; Tron alone accounted for 7,700 addresses. The Chainalysis CEO expects the attackers to use tens of thousands of addresses in the coming weeks.

How much is left now? Elliptic’s figure as of November 3 is about $3.18 billion, mostly in ETH and BTC, with only a tiny amount estimated to have actually been cashed out. The 18,270 BTC are split across 19 addresses and haven’t moved since the attack. The nine largest ETH addresses hold 89% of the ETH, and those funds also haven’t moved since October 30. Another roughly 68,600 ETH is scattered across 840 smaller addresses. The 233 million XRP were moved to six new addresses on November 2, and about 87,000 SOL were moved, leaving roughly 825,000. Elliptic’s assessment is that laundering these funds will take months, as it did in the Bybit case.

What does this mean for ordinary people?

For ordinary users, Binance says the platform will cover the losses, based on the information publicly available so far. You can check its proof of reserves for yourself. But remember, an exchange is your counterparty. One exchange may be able to absorb a $6.4 billion shortfall; another might not. It’s worth reconsidering where you keep large amounts of crypto that you don’t move often.

People who write code should be especially alert: every entry point in this report involves an everyday action. Searching for a tool and installing it without a second thought; taking an interview and running the code without a second thought; being given a company AI tool and granting it full access without a second thought. Run code repositories sent by interviewers only in a clean virtual machine. Don’t log into any accounts or store any wallets there, and delete the VM when you’re done. Install tools like Homebrew and pyenv only from their official websites, and skip all ad links in search results. Even if the other person seems just like a real HR rep or CEO, look up public contact details on the company’s official website and verify them independently.

If you handle security at another exchange, you should call a meeting tonight. Are there any 7702 delegations on your hot wallets, and is anyone monitoring them? Is there a documented emergency MPC revocation process, and has it been rehearsed? Which computers can your internal AI tools access, and whose laptops have deployment tokens on them? You can read the report Binance spent $6.3 billion to produce for free.

The whole chain of events started with an engineer wanting to install an AI coding tool.