Another case of “governance itself being an attack surface.” According to an investigation by Bitquery, X100’s on-chain governance was exploited on October 24: its Senate had only three seats, held by the addresses with the most X locked. The first attacker used a flash loan to lock up X, acquiring two seats with just 0.000001 more X than the existing members. They then voted to have the treasury sell 400,000 X for $35.68. Together, the two attackers drained about 4.85 million USDT from X100’s only liquidity pool: the first took about 4.75 million, while the second took about 96,000 and swapped it out via ChangeNOW. More ironically, about 99% of the funds added to the pool came from money Senate members had injected themselves just minutes earlier. Bitquery says the first attacker’s 2,022.86 tokens at $ETH remain untouched, and two seats are still open to anyone. The lesson is clear: if voting power can be flash-loaned within a single transaction, snapshots, lock-up periods, or timelocks are essential—otherwise, the governance module is a backdoor.
#Web3安全 #DeFi #闪电贷 #链上治理 $ETH
#Web3安全 #DeFi #闪电贷 #链上治理 $ETH