Regarding the Bitget theft incident, let me say a bit more
I found that many people haven’t realized what this incident truly reflects
Let’s do a simple comparison.
Last time, when Bybit was hacked for 1.5 billion, they didn’t shut down withdrawals the whole time. There was a global bank run—within a short period, about 5 billion in funds fled from the entire network.
This time, Bitget was hacked for roughly 300 million (3.x), and they immediately disabled user withdrawals. At that moment, user funds couldn’t move at all.
That’s the real issue. If you’re an exchange and you have a problem, whether it’s your technical vulnerabilities or whether the hacker is simply very capable—that’s your problem. So why did you immediately shut down user withdrawals? Don’t you call it “protecting users” like that? The hell with it—I’m the one protecting and controlling risk with my own wallet. Shouldn’t that be my choice?
If something goes wrong and you pass the risk to the users immediately, that’s effectively a bankruptcy of trust—i.e., you’re “funneling the risk” into a backstop, keeping it covered. If you can’t cover it, then users end up paying.
After the last Bybit hack, they withstood the pressure and put limits on user withdrawals. Later, the funds gradually came back, because users choose you not because they expect you never to have problems, but because after problems happen, you take responsibility.
But this time with Bitget—freezing user withdrawals immediately at the first moment—it’s truly despicable. No one will want to go back to a platform that freezes customer funds immediately when something goes wrong.
It looks like they’re basically finished this time.
Trust and reputation are built quickly, but they can be destroyed very easily.
Freezing withdrawals doesn’t only affect retail users. Market makers, quantitative trading strategies, cross-exchange arbitrage—everything gets impacted. And the losses are real and measurable. For cross-exchange arbitrage, each “leg” can only be executed when liquidity is available. If you freeze withdrawals for another day, these people’s losses get magnified.
After taking this big hit, if the big players are so easily willing to return, then hell would have to freeze over.
I found that many people haven’t realized what this incident truly reflects
Let’s do a simple comparison.
Last time, when Bybit was hacked for 1.5 billion, they didn’t shut down withdrawals the whole time. There was a global bank run—within a short period, about 5 billion in funds fled from the entire network.
This time, Bitget was hacked for roughly 300 million (3.x), and they immediately disabled user withdrawals. At that moment, user funds couldn’t move at all.
That’s the real issue. If you’re an exchange and you have a problem, whether it’s your technical vulnerabilities or whether the hacker is simply very capable—that’s your problem. So why did you immediately shut down user withdrawals? Don’t you call it “protecting users” like that? The hell with it—I’m the one protecting and controlling risk with my own wallet. Shouldn’t that be my choice?
If something goes wrong and you pass the risk to the users immediately, that’s effectively a bankruptcy of trust—i.e., you’re “funneling the risk” into a backstop, keeping it covered. If you can’t cover it, then users end up paying.
After the last Bybit hack, they withstood the pressure and put limits on user withdrawals. Later, the funds gradually came back, because users choose you not because they expect you never to have problems, but because after problems happen, you take responsibility.
But this time with Bitget—freezing user withdrawals immediately at the first moment—it’s truly despicable. No one will want to go back to a platform that freezes customer funds immediately when something goes wrong.
It looks like they’re basically finished this time.
Trust and reputation are built quickly, but they can be destroyed very easily.
Freezing withdrawals doesn’t only affect retail users. Market makers, quantitative trading strategies, cross-exchange arbitrage—everything gets impacted. And the losses are real and measurable. For cross-exchange arbitrage, each “leg” can only be executed when liquidity is available. If you freeze withdrawals for another day, these people’s losses get magnified.
After taking this big hit, if the big players are so easily willing to return, then hell would have to freeze over.