There’s nothing inherently wrong with rejecting “selective freezing.”
Technically it’s feasible, and whether or not to do it are two different things.
What THORChain can do is verify signatures from validators collectively stopping the chain or halting a specific chain—not blocklisting addresses like Tether does.
When their own funds were stolen in May, they used an all-network emergency stop to protect the protocol, not acting as judge over a particular victim.
What Bitget wants is: these publicly disclosed addresses should not be allowed to redeem.
Once you open that door, nodes must keep answering questions like: whose accusations count, for how long funds should be frozen, who compensates for mistaken freezes, and whether to freeze again when another exchange comes along.
That’s not a safety switch—it’s governance power.
So “technically feasible” only means it can act as a review layer; it doesn’t mean the protocol has committed to being that review layer.
Bitcoin miners could theoretically isolate certain transactions too, but nobody expects them to stand watch for every piece of stolen money.
THORChain’s treasury uses threshold signatures—more “controllable” than BTC—which increases moral pressure, but it doesn’t automatically imply an obligation to manage individual cases.
What everyone’s criticizing is the lack of unified standards:
If it’s your own theft, shut down; if it’s someone else’s funds passing through, pretend you don’t see.
That’s a question of governance will, not that the principle of “rejecting selective freezing” is wrong.
More effective for Bitget would be the issuer freezing stablecoins, centralized entry-point interception, bounties, and law enforcement. Once funds are converted into BTC, there simply isn’t any company that can instantly claw everything back.
If THORChain were to start freezing according to shouted blacklists, it might reduce stolen funds in the short term, but in the long run it would become a compliance layer that can be lobbied—capabilities still exist, just operated by a different set of people each time that switch is flipped.
In one sentence:
Being able to stop the entire network doesn’t mean it should be used to close a small door for specific addresses.
Principles are fine—so take them seriously. What they’re asking to test is whether they’re willing to publicly codify the same emergency-stop standards into stone, not who has the loudest voice.
Technically it’s feasible, and whether or not to do it are two different things.
What THORChain can do is verify signatures from validators collectively stopping the chain or halting a specific chain—not blocklisting addresses like Tether does.
When their own funds were stolen in May, they used an all-network emergency stop to protect the protocol, not acting as judge over a particular victim.
What Bitget wants is: these publicly disclosed addresses should not be allowed to redeem.
Once you open that door, nodes must keep answering questions like: whose accusations count, for how long funds should be frozen, who compensates for mistaken freezes, and whether to freeze again when another exchange comes along.
That’s not a safety switch—it’s governance power.
So “technically feasible” only means it can act as a review layer; it doesn’t mean the protocol has committed to being that review layer.
Bitcoin miners could theoretically isolate certain transactions too, but nobody expects them to stand watch for every piece of stolen money.
THORChain’s treasury uses threshold signatures—more “controllable” than BTC—which increases moral pressure, but it doesn’t automatically imply an obligation to manage individual cases.
What everyone’s criticizing is the lack of unified standards:
If it’s your own theft, shut down; if it’s someone else’s funds passing through, pretend you don’t see.
That’s a question of governance will, not that the principle of “rejecting selective freezing” is wrong.
More effective for Bitget would be the issuer freezing stablecoins, centralized entry-point interception, bounties, and law enforcement. Once funds are converted into BTC, there simply isn’t any company that can instantly claw everything back.
If THORChain were to start freezing according to shouted blacklists, it might reduce stolen funds in the short term, but in the long run it would become a compliance layer that can be lobbied—capabilities still exist, just operated by a different set of people each time that switch is flipped.
In one sentence:
Being able to stop the entire network doesn’t mean it should be used to close a small door for specific addresses.
Principles are fine—so take them seriously. What they’re asking to test is whether they’re willing to publicly codify the same emergency-stop standards into stone, not who has the loudest voice.