$700 million flowed through a bank account—and the U.S. Department of Justice only seized $84 million. The dollar pipeline behind the world’s largest stablecoin was cut in the middle.
📈 进群一起分析行情
On September 14, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a forfeiture order: about $84 million in bank deposits plus 1.18 million USDT were frozen. The money, on paper, belonged to a payments company called Capstone Ltd., incorporated in Montana and with an office in Sacramento. Tracing the line upward, Tether and an exchange in the same group were flagged as the two crypto firms standing behind it—yet neither was charged with any wrongdoing.
Start with the transaction records. From March to December 2025, more than $700 million was posted from Capstone’s corporate account at Wells Fargo. After stripping out the portion related to U.S. Treasury securities, about $337 million still had been transferred out. Nearly two-thirds of it went to hundreds of recipients, most outside the United States. Capstone is registered with FinCEN as a money services business, but the complaint says that when it introduced itself to Citibank, Wells Fargo, and JPMorgan Chase, it described itself as an “IT services company.” When asked whether it managed third-party funds and whether virtual currency was a high-risk business, the answers were all “no.”
The timeline tells the story even more clearly: in May 2025, Citibank shut down Capstone’s account due to anti–money laundering concerns, and the flow immediately shifted to Wells Fargo. In February 2026, the FBI searched the operator Kotaro Shimogori’s residence in Sacramento. On April 2, EQIBank, a digital bank with a license in Dominica, only then learned that about 80% of its financial assets had been frozen. On July 15, a civil forfeiture complaint was filed; the next day, the judge denied its motion to unfreeze the funds.
The contrast is striking. EQIBank says about $89 million was seized—about 80% of its financial assets. It has warned that if it cannot get the money back, it may not be able to continue operating. The Dominica regulator has placed it under enhanced supervision, with liquidation among the options. But in Tether’s view, this portion caps at about $63.8 million: less than 0.034% of total assets. Compared with the $4.11 billion in excess reserves, it is only about 1.55%—less than half of the $1.5 billion in operating profit in a single quarter. The reserves and the peg of USDT have not been touched; on the financial statements, it appears to be rounded off. For that bank and the customers waiting to redeem, however, it is a life-or-death question.
The real information is not that Tether has risk, but that the stablecoin’s dollar inflows and outflows still have to detour through layer after layer of payment providers and offshore banks. USDT settles on-chain in seconds, but minting and redemption must pass through these manual checkpoints. The more layers in the chain, the more compliance-failure points there are—any one of which can drag the whole system down. This year, Tether cooperated with U.S. law enforcement to freeze $344 million in USDT and recover nearly $61 million, and it is also moving toward more “legitimate” channels—taking an investment in Pave Bank and having USA₮ issued by licensed banks. Yet the global USDT principal still rests on offshore intermediaries. The reserve assurance report as of September 30 will tell us whether it needs to recognize impairment for this money.
Do you think the next big risk for stablecoins will come from the on-chain layer or from the banking channels? Let’s discuss in the comments.
Click the profile picture to watch the live stream.
Every day, I’ll help you track stablecoins and regulatory hotspots—more than just reporting what happens, I’ll show you the logic and opportunities behind it 👀🚀
📈 进群一起分析行情
On September 14, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California issued a forfeiture order: about $84 million in bank deposits plus 1.18 million USDT were frozen. The money, on paper, belonged to a payments company called Capstone Ltd., incorporated in Montana and with an office in Sacramento. Tracing the line upward, Tether and an exchange in the same group were flagged as the two crypto firms standing behind it—yet neither was charged with any wrongdoing.
Start with the transaction records. From March to December 2025, more than $700 million was posted from Capstone’s corporate account at Wells Fargo. After stripping out the portion related to U.S. Treasury securities, about $337 million still had been transferred out. Nearly two-thirds of it went to hundreds of recipients, most outside the United States. Capstone is registered with FinCEN as a money services business, but the complaint says that when it introduced itself to Citibank, Wells Fargo, and JPMorgan Chase, it described itself as an “IT services company.” When asked whether it managed third-party funds and whether virtual currency was a high-risk business, the answers were all “no.”
The timeline tells the story even more clearly: in May 2025, Citibank shut down Capstone’s account due to anti–money laundering concerns, and the flow immediately shifted to Wells Fargo. In February 2026, the FBI searched the operator Kotaro Shimogori’s residence in Sacramento. On April 2, EQIBank, a digital bank with a license in Dominica, only then learned that about 80% of its financial assets had been frozen. On July 15, a civil forfeiture complaint was filed; the next day, the judge denied its motion to unfreeze the funds.
The contrast is striking. EQIBank says about $89 million was seized—about 80% of its financial assets. It has warned that if it cannot get the money back, it may not be able to continue operating. The Dominica regulator has placed it under enhanced supervision, with liquidation among the options. But in Tether’s view, this portion caps at about $63.8 million: less than 0.034% of total assets. Compared with the $4.11 billion in excess reserves, it is only about 1.55%—less than half of the $1.5 billion in operating profit in a single quarter. The reserves and the peg of USDT have not been touched; on the financial statements, it appears to be rounded off. For that bank and the customers waiting to redeem, however, it is a life-or-death question.
The real information is not that Tether has risk, but that the stablecoin’s dollar inflows and outflows still have to detour through layer after layer of payment providers and offshore banks. USDT settles on-chain in seconds, but minting and redemption must pass through these manual checkpoints. The more layers in the chain, the more compliance-failure points there are—any one of which can drag the whole system down. This year, Tether cooperated with U.S. law enforcement to freeze $344 million in USDT and recover nearly $61 million, and it is also moving toward more “legitimate” channels—taking an investment in Pave Bank and having USA₮ issued by licensed banks. Yet the global USDT principal still rests on offshore intermediaries. The reserve assurance report as of September 30 will tell us whether it needs to recognize impairment for this money.
Do you think the next big risk for stablecoins will come from the on-chain layer or from the banking channels? Let’s discuss in the comments.
Click the profile picture to watch the live stream.
Every day, I’ll help you track stablecoins and regulatory hotspots—more than just reporting what happens, I’ll show you the logic and opportunities behind it 👀🚀
