The U.S. “New Sanctions Bill” targets Russia’s energy buyers, with hidden extraterritorial reach that could mean up to 100% tariffs
On September 16, the U.S. Congress completed the legislative process for a new sanctions bill targeting Russia. The core clause of this bill authorizes the president to impose punitive tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian oil and natural gas. Although the bill text does not directly name any country, during congressional debates and interpretations by multiple mainstream U.S. media outlets, China and India are explicitly viewed as the primary potential targets of this provision. This kind of legislative approach continues the U.S.’s recent style of “long-arm jurisdiction,” by using vague definitions of the sanctioned parties to turn geopolitical pressure into a concrete tool of trade barriers. Notably, the bill grants the president the final discretion to decide whether to impose the additional tariffs. That means its implementation—or lack thereof—will depend largely on the executive branch’s political will and strategic considerations, rather than purely judicial or administrative procedures. This “delegated-authority” sanctions model often carries strong domestic political bargaining overtones. Its aim is to respond to domestic public opinion by projecting a tough stance, while leaving policy room for possible future trade friction.
In terms of practical impact, although the bill does not directly mention China, its intent is unmistakable. China, as one of Russia’s important markets for energy exports, naturally falls within the scope of this sanctions logic. However, when examining the U.S.’s past sanctions record and trade data, it becomes clear that this “tariff club” has far less deterrent effect in reality than it appears on the surface. According to data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), during the Trump administration and subsequent rounds of tariff increases, the value of U.S. imports from China fell from $503.65 billion to $429.43 billion between 2017 and 2024, a decrease of about 14.7%. This figure seems to support the idea that tariffs suppress trade volumes. But deeper analysis of trade structure shows that the U.S. trade deficit with China has not shrunk significantly. Based on U.S. statistics, China’s share in the U.S. trade deficit fell from 48% in 2018 to 32% in 2022, yet in 2024 the U.S. trade deficit with China remained as high as $295 billion. This reveals a key fact: U.S. consumers and businesses’ dependence on products made in China and on Chinese supply chains far exceeds what tariff barriers alone can sever. In the end, tariff costs were not borne by the exporters alone; through price transmission mechanisms, they were partially shifted to importers, retailers, and ultimately consumers within the United States.
Meanwhile, the real-world effects of U.S. sanctions on Russia also present a complex picture. Even though the U.S. has imposed more than a thousand sanctions measures against Russia, the Russian economy has not collapsed as Western expectations predicted. According to official Russian data, its economy achieved 1% year-on-year growth in 2025. Over the past three years, cumulative GDP growth reached 9.7%, with total output rising from 211.88 trillion rubles in 2024 to 214 trillion rubles. By contrast, European allies that moved in step with the U.S. have absorbed a more direct economic hit— including an energy crisis, soaring inflation, and rising household living costs. This mismatch between “sanctions exported” and “costs internalized” reflects limitations in the U.S. sanctions system at the execution level. For China, if it truly faces a 100% tariff surcharge, retaliatory measures would inevitably follow. China is a major export market for high-value U.S. products such as agricultural goods, aircraft, and chips, meaning that U.S. companies’ interests in the Chinese market would be the first to be affected. Especially with midterm elections approaching, damage to the interests of farm owners in key agricultural states will become political pressure that the governing party must face head-on. Such two-way economic entanglement makes it difficult for any unilateral extreme tariff measures to be carried out smoothly.
In addition, from the perspective of geopolitical risk, if the U.S. tries to cut off Russia’s energy exports through more extreme means (such as a military blockade or a comprehensive embargo), it would face extremely high strategic risk and resistance from allies. A military blockade would mean a direct confrontation with a nuclear-armed power, with unpredictable consequences. A comprehensive embargo could trigger a strong backlash from European allies, because European industry is highly sensitive to energy costs, and expensive U.S. LNG exports themselves have already increased Europe’s energy burden. Therefore, giving the president the authority to impose additional tariffs is more of a political symbol of pressure than a trade policy that must necessarily be executed. Packaging domestic political struggles as a hardline posture toward China may not truly change the fundamentals of U.S.-China trade; instead, it could undermine the U.S.’s credibility and interests within the international trading system. In an era where global supply chains are deeply intertwined, unilateral tariff barriers can hardly serve as an effective tool to address trade imbalances or geopolitical problems. In the end, the outcome is often harm to multiple parties, and U.S. consumers and businesses will ultimately pay the price.
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On September 16, the U.S. Congress completed the legislative process for a new sanctions bill targeting Russia. The core clause of this bill authorizes the president to impose punitive tariffs of up to 100% on major buyers of Russian oil and natural gas. Although the bill text does not directly name any country, during congressional debates and interpretations by multiple mainstream U.S. media outlets, China and India are explicitly viewed as the primary potential targets of this provision. This kind of legislative approach continues the U.S.’s recent style of “long-arm jurisdiction,” by using vague definitions of the sanctioned parties to turn geopolitical pressure into a concrete tool of trade barriers. Notably, the bill grants the president the final discretion to decide whether to impose the additional tariffs. That means its implementation—or lack thereof—will depend largely on the executive branch’s political will and strategic considerations, rather than purely judicial or administrative procedures. This “delegated-authority” sanctions model often carries strong domestic political bargaining overtones. Its aim is to respond to domestic public opinion by projecting a tough stance, while leaving policy room for possible future trade friction.
In terms of practical impact, although the bill does not directly mention China, its intent is unmistakable. China, as one of Russia’s important markets for energy exports, naturally falls within the scope of this sanctions logic. However, when examining the U.S.’s past sanctions record and trade data, it becomes clear that this “tariff club” has far less deterrent effect in reality than it appears on the surface. According to data from the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), during the Trump administration and subsequent rounds of tariff increases, the value of U.S. imports from China fell from $503.65 billion to $429.43 billion between 2017 and 2024, a decrease of about 14.7%. This figure seems to support the idea that tariffs suppress trade volumes. But deeper analysis of trade structure shows that the U.S. trade deficit with China has not shrunk significantly. Based on U.S. statistics, China’s share in the U.S. trade deficit fell from 48% in 2018 to 32% in 2022, yet in 2024 the U.S. trade deficit with China remained as high as $295 billion. This reveals a key fact: U.S. consumers and businesses’ dependence on products made in China and on Chinese supply chains far exceeds what tariff barriers alone can sever. In the end, tariff costs were not borne by the exporters alone; through price transmission mechanisms, they were partially shifted to importers, retailers, and ultimately consumers within the United States.
Meanwhile, the real-world effects of U.S. sanctions on Russia also present a complex picture. Even though the U.S. has imposed more than a thousand sanctions measures against Russia, the Russian economy has not collapsed as Western expectations predicted. According to official Russian data, its economy achieved 1% year-on-year growth in 2025. Over the past three years, cumulative GDP growth reached 9.7%, with total output rising from 211.88 trillion rubles in 2024 to 214 trillion rubles. By contrast, European allies that moved in step with the U.S. have absorbed a more direct economic hit— including an energy crisis, soaring inflation, and rising household living costs. This mismatch between “sanctions exported” and “costs internalized” reflects limitations in the U.S. sanctions system at the execution level. For China, if it truly faces a 100% tariff surcharge, retaliatory measures would inevitably follow. China is a major export market for high-value U.S. products such as agricultural goods, aircraft, and chips, meaning that U.S. companies’ interests in the Chinese market would be the first to be affected. Especially with midterm elections approaching, damage to the interests of farm owners in key agricultural states will become political pressure that the governing party must face head-on. Such two-way economic entanglement makes it difficult for any unilateral extreme tariff measures to be carried out smoothly.
In addition, from the perspective of geopolitical risk, if the U.S. tries to cut off Russia’s energy exports through more extreme means (such as a military blockade or a comprehensive embargo), it would face extremely high strategic risk and resistance from allies. A military blockade would mean a direct confrontation with a nuclear-armed power, with unpredictable consequences. A comprehensive embargo could trigger a strong backlash from European allies, because European industry is highly sensitive to energy costs, and expensive U.S. LNG exports themselves have already increased Europe’s energy burden. Therefore, giving the president the authority to impose additional tariffs is more of a political symbol of pressure than a trade policy that must necessarily be executed. Packaging domestic political struggles as a hardline posture toward China may not truly change the fundamentals of U.S.-China trade; instead, it could undermine the U.S.’s credibility and interests within the international trading system. In an era where global supply chains are deeply intertwined, unilateral tariff barriers can hardly serve as an effective tool to address trade imbalances or geopolitical problems. In the end, the outcome is often harm to multiple parties, and U.S. consumers and businesses will ultimately pay the price.
Follow me—my next post will give you a fast read of the market so you don’t miss anything.
