Scared after being hit by a flash loan? I specifically went through the TermMax risk control documents
Lately I’ve also seen cases where an agreement was drained by flash loans. Honestly, I don’t have much money in my wallet, so I’m nervous too. So when I come across a new project, my first thing to do is read the safety section in the whitepaper. This time I reviewed TermMax with a mindset of looking for flaws.
About oracle attacks: the whitepaper describes multi-source weighted price feeds, not just relying on a single one. It also includes price deviation detection and a time-weighted mechanism. In simple terms, the price won’t jump just because one pool gets instantly smashed—an alert is triggered only when multiple sources are simultaneously abnormal. The “change price for one second and liquidate everything” that flash-loan attackers want so badly is basically not going to happen.
I think this approach is pretty solid. In the past, many protocols trusted a single oracle too much. Then someone borrowed a huge amount of money, nudged the price off course, and caused cascading liquidations. TermMax also added a buffer in the liquidation process— even if there’s an extreme market move, it handles things in batches, so it won’t all fall like a row of dominoes.
Of course, there’s no 100% security, but at least the risk-control logic is designed to defend against “instant manipulation.” What normal users want is exactly that—don’t make me wake up one day to find my positions are gone.
#termmax @TermMax
Lately I’ve also seen cases where an agreement was drained by flash loans. Honestly, I don’t have much money in my wallet, so I’m nervous too. So when I come across a new project, my first thing to do is read the safety section in the whitepaper. This time I reviewed TermMax with a mindset of looking for flaws.
About oracle attacks: the whitepaper describes multi-source weighted price feeds, not just relying on a single one. It also includes price deviation detection and a time-weighted mechanism. In simple terms, the price won’t jump just because one pool gets instantly smashed—an alert is triggered only when multiple sources are simultaneously abnormal. The “change price for one second and liquidate everything” that flash-loan attackers want so badly is basically not going to happen.
I think this approach is pretty solid. In the past, many protocols trusted a single oracle too much. Then someone borrowed a huge amount of money, nudged the price off course, and caused cascading liquidations. TermMax also added a buffer in the liquidation process— even if there’s an extreme market move, it handles things in batches, so it won’t all fall like a row of dominoes.
Of course, there’s no 100% security, but at least the risk-control logic is designed to defend against “instant manipulation.” What normal users want is exactly that—don’t make me wake up one day to find my positions are gone.
#termmax @TermMax