CoinVoice has recently learned that on October 22, SlowMist founder Yu Xian posted on social media that the Lightning Network had experienced a replacement cycle attack, which was somewhat similar to the sandwich attack in MEV, using front and back attacks to extract the funds of the target.
This attack is not easy to implement and requires the following conditions to be met:
· Open two channels on the victim. · Route the payment through one of these two channels. · Successfully replace the HTLC-timeouts of the loop victim within Δ blocks. · At the same time, make sure that the victim does not discover the HTLC pre-image transaction.
Before this risk is fixed, project owners using the Lightning Network should be cautious before establishing channels with upstream and downstream parties. It is best to establish channels with reputable parties to reduce the risk of being squeezed. The specific situation requires further testing and verification. [Original link]