#termmax @TermMax yesterday short $STAR booked loss of $15 now look it's again in the gainers today Hurry up go long on $SKYAI 0.15 is the tp also long
spent part of the afternoon reading through @TermMax's TMX pre-mine structure and one number made me stop.
40 million TMX.
out of a fixed 1 billion total supply, 4% was allocated specifically to incentivize early users through pre-mining.
At first I read it like another rewards campaign. deposit, provide liquidity, collect rewards, move on.
then noticed the split in how those rewards were actually earned.
FT holders accumulated TMX daily based on their FT balances.
Order makers earned TMX based on the trading volume of their matched orders. And when Curators qualified as order makers, their rewards were distributed directly to depositors of the corresponding vault.
hold up, thats two pretty different behaviors being subsidized.
one side rewards capital for holding fixed-rate positions.
the other rewards capital for actually creating order flow that gets matched.
kinda feels less like an airdrop faucet and more like TermMax trying to incentivize both participation and usable liquidity while the market is still developing.
and the displayed TMX APY makes it even more interesting.
TermMax's docs say that incentive APY was calculated using a $60M FDV assumption, based on the valuation of its funding round.
So TMX APY wasn't purely the underlying fixed-rate yield in the normal sense. The USD value assigned to those token incentives depended on an assumed valuation for TMX while the pre-mined tokens themselves were non-transferable during the campaign period.
thats the part I'd watch.
once TMX becomes liquid and the incentive gets an actual market price, do users still like the fixed-rate product underneath it…
or were the incentives doing more work than the interest rate?
$USELESS will pump again
@TermMax #TermMax Poll: What really proves TermMax demand after incentives?
#termmax very excited for @TermMax leaderboard let's see kitny teer Mary meny
jokes apart let me book profit of both $ACE n $BTW trade finally closed some trade in profit u can long $BR it will touch 0.24 very soon.. back to @TermMax
used to think a liquidity provider on TermMax had to decide upfront: am i lending here, or borrowing?
Two-Way Range Orders make that distinction much stranger.
one order carries a borrowing curve and a lending curve. Which side gets filled determines what the setter actually becomes.
i traced the borrowing side first. When a lending market taker fills it, their debt tokens mint equivalent FT and XT. The XT is exchanged against the Two-Way Range Order for additional FT.
Then comes the part i almost skipped.
TermMax checks whether that order has enough FT reserves for the exchange. If it doesnt, additional FT can be minted from the setter's GT — and the debt recorded inside that GT increases.
So the setter hasnt merely “provided liquidity.” Market demand has mechanically moved them into a borrower position with debt sitting inside their Gearing Token.
Fill the other side and the role reverses: the setter acts as lender and accumulates FT representing principal and fixed yield.
That makes a Two-Way Range Order feel less like passive liquidity and more like a position whose balance sheet changes depending on which side users actually demand.
Does letting one TermMax position dynamically become borrower or lender make capital genuinely more efficient, or does it make the setter's eventual exposure harder to anticipate??
#dusk $DUSK @Dusk I used to think the interesting part of Phoenix was simply that Dusk has a UTXO-based transaction model.
The deeper part is what that actually changes.
Instead of keeping one continuously updated account balance, ownership is represented through individual outputs that can later be consumed and replaced by new outputs. Each transaction effectively proves what can be spent and what new ownership state should exist.
That structure fits confidential transactions surprisingly well.
The protocol can reason about specific pieces of state without requiring every transaction to expose one global account history. Its a cleaner way to isolate what is being spent from everything else happening around it.
But theres a cost.
UTXO systems make state more explicit, which can also make applications harder to reason about when multiple pieces of state need to interact at once. The privacy benefit doesnt automatically make the programming model simpler.
So does discrete UTXO state give Dusk a better foundation for confidential financial transactions, or does the extra state complexity become the price of that privacy model??
Spent the Dusk task reading the ECSP plan again and one thing kept nagging at me: building infrastructure for regulated assets is one problem. Actually getting those assets onto the infrastructure is another. Dusk is applying for an ECSP licence to connect European businesses raising capital with investors through eligible offerings like loans, shares and bonds. thats the bit i got stuck on. Europe has roughly 34 million SMEs according to Dusk's update, while the same piece points to nearly $70B facilitated by crowdfunding platforms globally in 2025. Then theres the financing pressure: Dusk cites Q2 2026 data showing a 43-percentage-point margin of SMEs reporting rising bank-loan rates. So this isnt really just another licence sitting beside the tech stack. If approved, the ECSP route gives Dusk a way to bring businesses seeking capital into the same ecosystem where the resulting financial assets can eventually interact with identity, privacy, distribution and settlement infrastructure. Dusk's older regulatory material already positions ECSP as the permission covering retail-funded investment instruments across the EU. Hmm, thats a different growth model from waiting for somebody else to tokenize something. Businesses get another capital route. Investors get access to regulated offerings. Dusk potentially gets new assets and activity flowing into its own product stack. But hold up, an application isnt an approval, and a licence isnt demand. Businesses still have to choose the route and investors still have to fund the offerings. Coffee went cold while i kept coming back to that. Infrastructure can move assets once they exist. ECSP could help answer where those assets actually come from. So does pursuing ECSP turn Dusk from infrastructure waiting for regulated assets into infrastructure capable of sourcing them, or does that only matter once real businesses and investors start using the route at scale?? #dusk @Dusk $DUSK
#dusk @Dusk $TUT +22.66%, $UAI +25.87%, $ZRO+24.80%… Gainers tab is basically a party i wasn't invited to 😂
something about Dusk's DLT-TSS work kept making me read the roadmap wrong.
i was treating it like DuskEVM.
engineers build it.
testing finishes.
someone flips the switch.
then i went back through @Dusk's update on the NPEX application and… this milestone runs on a completely different clock.
DLT-TSS means DLT Trading and Settlement System.
the important part isn't another smart contract going live.
Dusk and NPEX are pursuing the regulatory permission needed to combine trading and settlement of regulated DLT financial instruments within the EU framework.
and Dusk's own description of the work is almost the opposite of a normal software release.
technical team involved.
business development involved.
Norton Rose Fulbright involved.
meetings with regulators.
changing requirements.
questions and revisions after submission.
that's the thing that stuck.
you can't GitHub your way through the last stage.
Dusk said in October 2025 that it was close to finalizing the application, after which regulators could come back with questions, revisions and ultimately a decision.
and Dusk's later material still labels the NPEX DLT-TSS as in progress.
so i'm careful with the word “launch” here.
the infrastructure can be technically ready while permission isn't.
and regulatory feedback could still force the infrastructure to change.
21X is useful context because an EU DLT-TSS-authorized venue already exists and Dusk works with it.
so this regulatory route isn't theoretical.
but NPEX still has its own process to clear.
hmm.
maybe that's why this milestone matters more than another product release.
software proves Dusk can build the rails.
DLT-TSS permission would test whether regulators are willing to let an existing securities venue actually run regulated trading and settlement over them.
#dusk $DUSK @Dusk bought $ZEC at 365 now look it break its all time high 300 + profit patience always pays off
$POL is about to short fuel ended now
i keep thinking about how much wallet friction gets blamed on blockchains when sometimes its just discovery.
The interesting part of Dusk Connect isnt really the connect button. Its that a dApp can discover multiple compatible wallet providers, expose them to the user, and let the user choose instead of hardcoding one extension into the application.
That sounds minor. It isnt.
The old single-provider assumption gets messy once several wallets exist in the same browser. EIP-6963-style discovery tackles that general problem by letting providers announce themselves instead of competing to be the one object a dApp happens to find. Dusk Connect is aiming at the same practical outcome on Dusk: discover whats available first, select second, request access after.
i like the separation. What im less convinced about is whether discovery alone removes the real friction. The application still has to react correctly when the selected provider, profile, authorization or network changes after connection.
Thats where clean standards usually meet messy user behavior.
So does multi-wallet discovery actually solve the connection problem, or does it just move the difficult part from finding a wallet to managing its state correctly??
#dusk $DUSK @Dusk Spent the CreatorPad window poking around @Dusk's transaction models instead of just reading the pitch deck, and the bridge incident from last week is what actually made it click for me. Aug 16, Dusk's monitoring flagged suspicious activity tied to a team-managed wallet used in bridge operations. Team disabled and recycled the related addresses, paused bridge services, and this is the part that stuck shipped a Web Wallet recipient blocklist to stop transfers to known dangerous or sanctioned addresses. Coordinated with Binance once part of the flow touched their platform. No user funds impacted, per the team's own notice. Here's the thing. $DUSK 's whole pitch is Phoenix and Moonlight, pick your privacy level, switch back and forth whenever. Phoenix is the shielded UTXO model, notes and nullifiers, ZK proofs, no sender/receiver/amount visible without a view key. Moonlight is account-based and public, balances sit in plain sight, built for easy compliance reporting. Cool duality on paper. But watch what got reached for the second something looked wrong: the fix that shipped was a blocklist on the transparent side. You can screen a Moonlight address against a sanctions list in real time. Screening a Phoenix note the same way is a lot harder, that's the whole point of it existing. So "switch back and forth at the click of a button," sure, technically true. But the emergency lever was the public rail. Not knocking the call, probably right. Just noticing the dual model isn't symmetric under stress. Makes me wonder if regulated users end up defaulting to Moonlight for anything that might need fast incident response, and Phoenix stays the wrapper for stuff nobody's worried about freezing. Anyone seen an actual Phoenix-side incident response yet, or is that still untested?
#termmax @TermMax the worst thing ever happened to me short $ENA yesterday now it's among the gainers trade still going on in loss but I Kept reading @TermMax market parameters today and one tiny distinction made more sense the second time through: MLTV and LLTV arent the same threshold.
MLTV controls how much can initially be borrowed against collateral. LLTV sits further out and is where liquidation actually triggers if the loan's LTV reaches or crosses it.
So theres intentionally some room between “maximum borrowing” and “liquidate this position.”
That gap is the interesting part.
TermMax could theoretically let borrowing run right up against the liquidation boundary, but then a relatively small collateral move could push a newly created position straight into trouble. MLTV instead leaves a buffer before LLTV.
Makes sense. But that buffer isnt permanent protection. Collateral can fall or the debt token can rise, eating through the distance between those thresholds.
I spent a while thinking about whether users will treat MLTV as a safety number when mechanically its really an entry constraint. The liquidation boundary is still LLTV.
Does separating MLTV from LLTV create enough useful breathing room for borrowers, or can the existence of that buffer make the position feel safer than it actually is?? @TermMax #TermMax $ENA
Spent the Dusk task thinking about what “privacy for institutions” actually means and i dont think hiding everything is the useful answer. A bank, venue or custodian may need to verify something about a transaction. An auditor or supervisor may need evidence too. But that doesnt mean every balance, counterparty and transaction detail should become public just so those specific parties can do their job. thats where Dusk's selective disclosure model gets interesting. Dusk describes the network as confidential by default, using zero knowledge proofs and controlled visibility for audit, supervision and regulated disclosure. Sensitive financial state can stay protected while the evidence a particular participant or authority needs is disclosed to them. So verification and publication stop being the same thing. I kept coming back to that because public blockchains usually collapse those ideas together: if everybody can verify it, everybody can also see it. Fine for some assets. Pretty strange for financial infrastructure where customer balances, positions and counterparties can be commercially or personally sensitive. The positive is obvious. A regulated workflow doesnt have to choose between exposing customer data to the internet and asking approved parties to trust a private database. But hold up, selective disclosure creates another question: who decides which party is authorized to see what? Cryptography can control the visibility, but policy still defines the audience. Had my tab open way too long on that distinction. Privacy isnt useful if nobody can verify anything, and transparency isnt useful if verification requires exposing everything. So is selective disclosure the right middle ground because approved parties get the evidence they need, or does deciding who gets visibility simply move the hardest trust question into the authorization policy?? #dusk @Dusk $DUSK
#dusk disappointed my rank is not improving tried each and everything now I'm done $TREE n $HEMI are the rising star of today
Spent the Dusk task digging through an engineering update and got stuck on a transfer mechanic i genuinely hadnt thought about: a smart contract doesnt have to accept DUSK just because another contract sends it. Dusk added transfer_to_contract, where one contract can transfer DUSK to another and attach arbitrary data to the call. The receiving contract gets to inspect that data and either accept or reject the transfer. sounds tiny. It isnt. A normal transfer model basically treats receiving money as passive. If somebody sends value to an address, the value arrives. Here, receiving can become part of the application's logic. A contract can effectively say “i accept this payment only if the information attached to it satisfies my rules.” I kept coming back to what that means for financial workflows. A payment might need to correspond to a particular instruction, state or condition before the receiving application should treat it as valid. Instead of accepting funds first and figuring out what they were for afterward, the receiver can make acceptance part of execution itself. Thats cleaner, but it also means payments arent universally neutral anymore. The destination contract has agency over whether the transfer completes, and badly designed acceptance logic can reject perfectly legitimate flows. Weirdly, the interesting part isnt that contracts can send money. Thats expected. Its that the receiving side gets a vote. So is explicit receiver acceptance the right primitive for financial contracts that need conditional payments, or does letting contracts reject incoming value add complexity to something transfers should keep simple?? #dusk $DUSK @Dusk
Conditional DUSK payments: better primitive or extra complexity?
#dusk @Dusk $DUSK $CLO $ALPINE made my day booked profit happy but rank Dekh k Sara mood kharab hogaya
The strange thing about comparing DuskVM with DuskEVM is that the comparison starts to fall apart once you understand what each one is trying to preserve.
DuskVM preserves proximity to Dusk itself.
It runs Rust/WASM contracts directly on the Dusk L1. That gives contracts access to Dusk-native assets, transaction models, privacy-aware flows and zero-knowledge capabilities close to the base protocol. Dusk’s own docs position it as the route for protocol-level logic and applications that genuinely need those primitives.
But being native also means accepting a more specific world.
A developer has to understand Dusk’s architecture, ABI and tooling rather than arriving with years of Ethereum habits intact.
DuskEVM seems designed around that friction.
It is an OP Stack-based EVM environment where developers can use Solidity or Vyper and familiar infrastructure such as Hardhat, Foundry and EVM wallets. Yet execution is not simply detached from Dusk: DuskEVM uses DuskDS for settlement and data availability, with DUSK serving as its gas token.
That changes how I see the comparison.
DuskVM feels like choosing the network’s native language because the application needs something close to the protocol. DuskEVM feels like choosing compatibility because rebuilding an entire developer culture from zero would be unnecessary friction.
And Dusk is already connecting those environments. Its current bridge lets testnet DUSK move between Dusk L1 and DuskEVM Testnet, although withdrawals back require proving and finalizing on L1.
So perhaps DuskVM versus DuskEVM is the wrong contest.
The more interesting test is whether Dusk can make two execution environments feel like deliberate choices rather than two separate worlds developers have to mentally stitch together.