傻爷说币

ONE was once a star blockchain in the sharding track. At the peak of the bull market, its market cap exceeded NEO, EGLD, and KSM, and its on-chain DeFi and stablecoin ecosystems were thriving. It was then hit one after another by incidents including cross-chain bridge hacks and a malicious minting vulnerability at the underlying layer. Only by rolling back the chain was the situation salvaged, but a large number of ordinary users’ transactions were reversed, damaging community trust. Today, its market value has shrunk significantly, and institutional capital has largely stepped aside. The past moments of glory only reflect the sentiment pricing of the bull market. Patching the vulnerability doesn’t mean the ecosystem can quickly return to its former level.

Harmony（ONE）On-chain stablecoins are all wrapped cross-chain bridge-mapped versions; there are no project-issued native stablecoins. After a chain rollback event, a large amount of bridged stablecoins remains on-chain.

1、USDT (Bridge Version 1USDT): It was once the most liquid stablecoin on-chain. After the Horizon cross-chain bridge was hacked, the remaining supply shrank. Within the valid window during the rollback, some deposits and transfers were invalidated, but bridged USDT outside the rollback window was preserved. It still remains the largest stablecoin by on-chain volume.

2、DAI (Bridge Version 1DAI): An Ethereum DAI cross-chain mapping. Transactions within the rollback removal window are wiped; DAI mapped in during periods outside the attack remains stored and can still be traded on DEXs, but its liquidity depth is far lower than before.

3、FRAX: The Frax cross-chain deployed version. In the past, it was one of the main trading pairs on the ONE-chain DeFi ecosystem, and TVL fell significantly. However, a substantial balance still remains on-chain, and there are still trading pools on the market.

4、USDC, BUSD: Externally bridged wrapped assets. Overall supply is thin and pool depth is insufficient. Most of the balances exist in contracts, and actual market activity is very low.

SC and ONE do not have a fixed total cap, so there is inflationary release. It doesn’t seem quite reasonable that SC’s market value is higher than ONE; SC’s ecosystem is quiet and lacks real business activity. ONE is a complete sharded L1, with an independent ecosystem and on-chain stablecoin circulation. Although ONE had a malicious minting vulnerability at the base layer, the risk was resolved by chain rollback; however, its security reputation was damaged.

In the past year, there have been a number of heavyweight events in the blockchain space. ONE is an L1 public chain base-layer minting vulnerability: it can roll back the chain to self-rescue, but it sacrifices ordinary users’ transactions. The issues with SAND and wDOT involved cross-chain wrapped contracts, which have no rollback capability—so the only option is to manually isolate the stolen coins. The batch of hard-cap 21-billion coin public chains such as RVN, DGB, and ZIL did not show any protocol-level minting vulnerabilities; the theft of ZIL wallet funds was merely a transfer of holdings. Separately, the regulatory bill—CLARITY—is advancing through the legislative standoff, and during Q2 Grayscale adjusted its holdings and planned deployments across leading and niche-track public chains. Regulatory and institutional actions are only catalysts. We must distinguish the level of security incidents; ultimately, market performance will depend on fundamentals and incremental capital.

Multiple illegal minting incidents have occurred over the past year. ONE is a L1 blockchain underlying-layer vulnerability, which can be traced back and mitigated by rolling back the chain. The issues with SAND and the bridged version of DOT both occurred in cross-chain wrapper contracts: the native main tokens are unaffected, but there is no rollback mechanism, so the only option is manual isolation. A theoretical infinite-forgery vulnerability was uncovered in the ZEC privacy pool, prompting an emergency fork and fix. RVN, DGB, ZIL, and this group of 21-billion-hard-cap chains have seen no protocol-level minting vulnerabilities in the past year. Stolen wallets are merely a transfer of assets; they are not the same as contracts creating tokens out of thin air. Applying a patch to a vulnerability doesn’t mean the trust trauma from the past will disappear immediately.

ONE is still being watched by copycat-coin traders. Although the vulnerability has been patched, the rollback left a trust wound. With retail speculation and gambling as the main driving force, Celo continues to focus on a mobile-first track, transitioning into an OP Layer 2. It aims to deliver real-world payments for stablecoins and has a unique track moat, but it must deal with sell pressure from institutional token unlocks. Kava keeps deepening the trading and liquidity infrastructure foundation, bridging the EVM and Cosmos ecosystems, focusing on RWA and stablecoin businesses. All three have highlights, but none of them necessarily guarantee a rise in price—market performance depends on ecosystem delivery and incremental capital, with risk control taking priority.

RVN and Mina have solid underlying security foundations, but the SAND architecture layer is inherently prone to security issues. RVN is a 21-billion hard-cap PoW chain; previous vulnerabilities do not generate new tokens. Mina’s ZK base layer has no minting incidents—only inflation token-release pressure from scheduled emissions. SAND is an ERC20 token; cross-chain contracts across multiple chains are independent risk points, and there is no public-chain rollback safety net—if a contract is compromised, it can mint an unlimited number of tokens

ZIL is a 21-billion-yuan hard-fork sharded public chain. The previous theft was due to a third-party wallet vulnerability; the public chain’s underlying layer is fine. It’s just that the tokens (chips) were moved away by the hackers, and the total supply of tokens will not increase. This time, SAND is completely different: a cross-chain contract revealed a minting vulnerability that allows minting a large amount of tokens out of thin air. There is a risk similar to LUNA—massive issuance followed by the token going to zero. SAND is an application token, with no public-chain rollback safety net. Once malicious tokens are widely distributed, there are no underlying remedial measures to fall back on. Wallet theft and contract minting carry entirely different risk levels.

This incident with SAND is even more tricky from a risk perspective than ONE. ONE is an independent chain; if something goes wrong, it can coordinate with validator chains to roll back and erase the illegally minted tokens. SAND is merely a token running on someone else’s chain, with no underlying permissions at the blockchain layer—so there is no chain rollback. Once the cross-chain contract is compromised, the malicious tokens will spread and circulate widely, with no underlying way to revoke them.

SAND is a multi-chain ERC20 token. Cross-chain contracts face the risk of minted-forging without a rollback safeguard. There is a huge gap compared to the underlying hard-cap architectures of RVN and BTC.

SAND is merely an ERC‑20 token on top of Ethereum; it is not an independent blockchain. The OF cross-chain wrapper contracts deployed on multiple chains such as BSC, Base, and MATIC have independent minting logic. If a contract has a vulnerability, it can create an enormous amount of tokens out of thin air. In contrast, BTC and RVN are layer-1 base blockchains, with a total supply of 21 billion hard-coded directly into the underlying code, thereby preventing arbitrary issuance at the root.

When ONE, as an L1 blockchain, encounters an inflation vulnerability, it can still rely on network-wide validators to perform chain rollbacks to erase the illegal tokens. But for multi-chain deployed ERC20 tokens like SAND, once a cross-chain contract goes wrong, there is no way to rollback on-chain to destroy the illegally minted tokens on other chains. The project can only shut down cross-chain channels for isolation, making risk response highly passive. This time, the vulnerability was exploited in the cross-chain contract on the Base chain. The original mainnet Ethereum version of the total SAND supply with a hard cap was not breached, but it also exposed an inherent weakness of the multi-chain OF cross-chain model: each chain’s wrapper contract is an independent risk point. If the permissions of any one cross-chain contract are compromised, it will produce a massive amount of fake tokens and disrupt the market order book across the whole ecosystem. At least ONE has a native rollback mechanism to cover the risk. SAND lacks the underlying blockchain-level capability; if multiple chains’ cross-chain contracts are compromised in succession, the project has no native technical remediation measures.

SAND is merely an ERC‑20 token on top of Ethereum, not an independent blockchain. The OF cross-chain wrapper contracts deployed across multiple chains such as BSC, Base, and MATIC have independent minting logic—once a vulnerability appears in a contract, attackers can mint an enormous number of tokens out of thin air. Compared with BTC and RVN: both are layer-1 blockchains, with a total supply of 21 billion hard-coded directly into the base protocol, thereby preventing arbitrary issuance at the root. As an L1 chain, when ONE encounters a minting vulnerability, it can rely on network validators to roll back the chain and eliminate the illegal tokens. But for multi-chain deployed ERC20 tokens like SAND, after a cross-chain contract goes wrong, there is no chain rollback mechanism to destroy the illegitimately minted tokens on other chains; the only option is for the project team to shut down the cross-chain channels for isolation. As a result, the risk response is highly passive.

SAND is not an independent chain; it is merely an ERC20 token on Ethereum. The cross-chain wrapper contracts on each chain—BSC, Base, and MATIC—are independent risk points. If any of them is compromised, an attacker can mint large amounts. Since ONE is a public chain, it can also roll back the chain to remediate. SAND has no underlying public-chain capabilities; if something goes wrong, it can only rely on manual shutdown and cross-chain isolation, with no native rollback or burn mechanism. Compared to BTC and RVN, which hard-code the total supply limit into the underlying code, their risk architectures are vastly different. Note that the vulnerability lies in the cross-chain contracts: the original SAND contract on the Ethereum mainnet has not been breached, but multi-chain deployment introduces multiple attack surfaces, so the risk should not be underestimated.

A Base-chain SAND has triggered an infinite minting alert; monitoring shows that more than 500 million tokens have already been created, and the attack is still ongoing. The vulnerability lies in a smart-contract permission flaw, which can easily lead to token dilution and a sell-off. However, the risk only occurs in Base cross-chain derivative contracts; the original SAND on the Ethereum mainnet has not been affected. Compared with the ONE and LUNA incidents, this time there is no need for a chain rollback—officially, they shut down cross-chain isolation for the abnormal tokens. South Korean exchanges have paused deposits and withdrawals, and price volatility is intense. Don’t rush into betting on a rebound; wait for the official complete incident report.

SAND triggers an abnormal minting alarm; two major South Korean exchanges urgently suspend deposits and withdrawals. The vulnerability lies in the Base and BSC cross-chain contract—not in the Ethereum mainnet native token. The 3 billion supply cap on the mainnet was not broken. The official team shuts down cross-chain functionality, isolates the abnormal tokens, and prepares compensation for affected LPs. Compared to the LUNA and ONE incidents, there’s no need for a chain rollback this time, but the cross-chain security has exposed shortcomings. The mainnet fundamentals haven’t collapsed, which doesn’t mean the market will be repaired immediately—you need to wait for the complete incident report.

After reviewing today, the discussion heat between RVN and OP has diverged. RVN is still digesting the post-event chips, and the volume and price do not show a clear direction. OP has made moves, but the力度 is insufficient. POL’s trading is calm, with no obvious fund flow anomalies. At the moment, the market signals are fragmented and not extreme, so it’s suitable to wait and observe rather than rush to act. Keep a close eye on volume, price, and the order book/position of chips; make plans only when the structure becomes clear. Put risk control first and don’t let market hype drive your decisions.

ZIL, EGLD, and ONE are the three biggest early-stage sharding L1 public chains in the industry. Everyone hopes to solve blockchain scalability challenges with sharded parallel processing, but their token models, security track records, and the crises they’ve faced are completely different, and their market valuations have diverged dramatically.

ZIL is the earliest public chain to deliver sharding in the industry. With a hard cap of 21 billion tokens, it initially used a hybrid PoW consensus. It later upgraded to PoS and completed EVM compatibility. It then pivoted toward the gaming and RWA sectors. The underlying chain protocol has never had a minting-level vulnerability. The previous incident was a wallet client signing vulnerability—not a flaw in the chain’s security foundation. Its weaknesses are that early institutional holdings were unlocked in batches, causing the ecosystem’s heat to remain relatively flat for a long time, and its market cap has continued to be undervalued. EGLD uses adaptive state sharding, and the entire architecture has been optimized through deep end-to-end integration. It focuses on high throughput and low fees. Its token supply includes an inflation-release mechanism, with no hard cap. The project has never experienced a malicious minting incident at the protocol level. Its ecosystem is centered on DeFi and tokenized real-world assets, and institutional recognition is fairly good, but competition in the sector is fierce, and its narrative advantage has gradually been diluted by next-generation public chains. ONE is also based on a state-sharding architecture, relying on the beacon chain to schedule multiple shards. It was once a star project in the sharding track. However, a fatal logic vulnerability occurred in cross-shard receipt verification. Attackers could mint an unlimited amount of native tokens out of thin air. It only avoided a zero-outcome scenario because all network validators executed chain rollbacks, erasing the illegally minted tokens. Although the vulnerability patch has been sealed, the rollback also wiped out a large number of ordinary users’ transactions. Combined with multiple historical cross-chain bridge thefts and other deep-layer security incidents that severely damaged community trust, its current market cap has shrunk significantly.

While they are all wrapped in the same sharding “shell,” the root causes of risk are vastly different. ZIL has a hard supply cap; its risk comes from sell pressure on token unlocks. EGLD has token inflation release. ONE suffered a bottom-layer protocol flaw that allowed potentially infinite minting. Sharding is just a scalability technique, and it doesn’t automatically imply native security. Cross-shard interactions in a sharding architecture are inherently a high-risk point. Leverage Library warns not to be misled by technical narratives. A technical architecture is only the first layer. Token supply rules, the history of security incidents, and the token-holding structure jointly determine long-term valuation. ZIL has the foundation for “missed judgment and recovery.” EGLD needs to be evaluated by inflation and ecosystem execution. Even if ONE patches the漏洞, rebuilding trust is still a long road ahead, and the three cannot simply be grouped as sharding assets of the same level.

ZIL, EGLD, and ONE are the three major legacy sharded public chains. They achieve high-concurrency scaling through sharding. ZIL has a hard cap of 21 billion tokens; when something goes wrong, it’s confined to the wallet side, while the public chain’s underlying layer remains intact—but valuation is suppressed by the unlocking of locked tokens. EGLD uses adaptive sharding and has excellent performance, but the token faces inflationary releases. ONE suffered a fatal vulnerability triggered by explosive cross-shard activity; it avoided going to zero by using chain rollbacks, and the resulting trust damage is very difficult to repair. Sharding is only a scaling technology; cross-shard interactions themselves carry inherent risks. You can’t just focus on technical concepts and ignore security history.

RVN, DGB, and ZIL are all hard-cap Layer 1 blockchains with a total supply ceiling of 21 billion. Because of the consensus vulnerability panic, RVN’s market cap is actually lower than DGB’s, making it a typical case of an event being wrongly punished. The vulnerability won’t create any new tokens; the underlying hard cap hasn’t been broken, the asset issuance narrative is still intact, and the community is also working on stablecoins. In the short term, the market is swayed by sentiment, but in the long run, market cap will ultimately be weighed against fundamentals. Fixing a wrongly punished event takes time—wait for negative news to be fully digested and for incremental capital to come in.

The ONE hacking incident is full of drama. The hacker exploited a cross-shard vulnerability to illegally mint 4 billion ONE tokens, planning to dump them on the market to cash out for huge profits. However, verifiers across the network can execute a chain rollback—directly reverting to the block before the vulnerability was triggered. All of the tokens illegally minted by the hacker are zeroed out, leaving not a single one able to be taken. Not only are the stolen tokens erased into nothing, but the original tokens the hacker had staked on the network are also frozen along with the staking transactions within the rollback window. This sharply increases the attacker’s costs, and in the end, the hacker gains nothing.

The vulnerability has already been patched and the malicious minting of the same kind is completely prevented. The hacker’s arbitrage scheme has completely failed. But chain rollback is a heavy emergency measure. While it thwarts the hacker, it also wipes out more than 100,000 ordinary users’ normal transfers and staking transactions. Some ordinary holders’ legitimate on-chain actions are innocently undone, sparking community debate over the immutability of blockchain.

Even though the fatal risk of over-minting has been eliminated, the accumulation of multiple major security incidents on top of this rollback event means the project’s trust damage is objectively real. Security patches can fix code flaws, but rebuilding market confidence and the developer ecosystem cannot be done overnight, and the project’s subsequent remediation path will remain long. As Livermore said, the market will not play out exactly according to the participants’ script. The hacker’s calculations were meticulous, but the plan failed. Still, the hacker’s crushing defeat doesn’t automatically mean the token market will reverse. You can’t be overly optimistic based solely on this outcome.

ONE hacker attack incident is quite dramatic. The hacker exploited a vulnerability to create 4 billion ONE tokens, preparing to crash the market and cash out. But in the end, the execution chains across the entire network were rolled back—any illegally minted tokens were all wiped to zero. No one, including the hacker, could get a single token. Even the tokens the hacker had staked themselves were frozen. It was a busy operation that yielded nothing. Although the vulnerability was patched and the hacker’s scheme failed, the rollback erased a large number of ordinary users’ transactions, damaging community trust. The road to repair remains long.