yyy

收手吧,阿祖。 Shitposts. Head of E-beggers. Chief Fud Officer. X 账号:@y_cryptoanalyst
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Bullish
Verified
Trump has only done a little something on top of the existing situation rather than helping in a time of need. To bring Hyperliquid into the US market. iykyk. #Hyperliquid $HYPE {future}(HYPEUSDT)
Trump has only done a little something on top of the existing situation rather than helping in a time of need.

To bring Hyperliquid into the US market.

iykyk.

#Hyperliquid $HYPE
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Initia L1 has been paused for 2 days. The high-performance public blockchain @initia, born in this market cycle and hailed as a beacon of Korean crypto, has suffered 2 hacking incidents in three weeks. According to the official announcement, the Initia team decided to halt the chain after coordinating with validators. No specific restart time has been announced yet. The governance token $INIT has seen some markedly counterintuitive price movements: after the second hack, its price quickly doubled, then plunged by half; the first hack also triggered a paradoxical price reaction, with the price briefly falling before quickly rebounding by about 15%. After all that, the price ended up right back where it started. #Initia $INIT {spot}(INITUSDT)
Initia L1 has been paused for 2 days.

The high-performance public blockchain @initia, born in this market cycle and hailed as a beacon of Korean crypto, has suffered 2 hacking incidents in three weeks.

According to the official announcement, the Initia team decided to halt the chain after coordinating with validators. No specific restart time has been announced yet.

The governance token $INIT has seen some markedly counterintuitive price movements: after the second hack, its price quickly doubled, then plunged by half; the first hack also triggered a paradoxical price reaction, with the price briefly falling before quickly rebounding by about 15%.

After all that, the price ended up right back where it started.

#Initia $INIT
yyy
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Bearish
A turbulent time for public blockchains: L2 chains are shutting down one after another, while L1 chains are being hacked frequently.

Another L1 chain, @initia, was just attacked by hackers and has halted block production.

The hackers exploited a bug related to MoveVM on Initia L1 to mint tokens without limit, then drained the liquidity of real reserves on the Ethereum side through a cross-chain bridge.

So far, the hackers have drained $2.6 million in liquidity from assets bridged to and from Initia.

Initia has a total TVL of just $5.8 million across its entire chain, meaning the hackers have indirectly drained nearly half of the chain's liquidity.

#Initia $INIT
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Little-known fact: Funds on the Elysium chain are held in a bridge contract on HyperEVM, controlled by a 4-of-11 multisig. The multisig signers have not been publicly identified. They have emergency upgrade privileges, with no timelock. Is it possible that the four multisig signers could be socially engineered? The funds across the entire chain could be drained. #HyperEVM #Elysium
Little-known fact:
Funds on the Elysium chain are held in a bridge contract on HyperEVM, controlled by a 4-of-11 multisig.

The multisig signers have not been publicly identified. They have emergency upgrade privileges, with no timelock.

Is it possible that the four multisig signers could be socially engineered?

The funds across the entire chain could be drained.

#HyperEVM #Elysium
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WTF. On the second day after the mainnet went live, the founder was already putting down the competition, taking shots at three chains at once: RHC, BSC, and Base. How much of a superiority complex and how little social awareness does it take to come up with this? Elysium is truly outrageous. #BSC #Elysium
WTF. On the second day after the mainnet went live, the founder was already putting down the competition, taking shots at three chains at once: RHC, BSC, and Base.

How much of a superiority complex and how little social awareness does it take to come up with this?

Elysium is truly outrageous.

#BSC #Elysium
yyy
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I wonder if anyone else has noticed:

As a chain built on the Arbitrum Orbit tech stack, @Arbitrum’s official X account seems quite reluctant to promote @Enter_Elysium.

As of now, Arbitrum’s official X account hasn’t published a single decent introductory post about Elysium. Even when Elysium just announced its mainnet launch on X, Arbitrum didn’t quote-tweet it.

For another Arbitrum Orbit chain, RHC, Arbitrum has been much more proactive in promoting it—so much so that it started heavily promoting it during the testnet phase.

I’m not sure what the specific reason is. Maybe I’m reading too much into it.

#Arbitrum #Elysium $ARB
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I wonder if anyone else has noticed: As a chain built on the Arbitrum Orbit tech stack, @Arbitrum’s official X account seems quite reluctant to promote @Enter_Elysium. As of now, Arbitrum’s official X account hasn’t published a single decent introductory post about Elysium. Even when Elysium just announced its mainnet launch on X, Arbitrum didn’t quote-tweet it. For another Arbitrum Orbit chain, RHC, Arbitrum has been much more proactive in promoting it—so much so that it started heavily promoting it during the testnet phase. I’m not sure what the specific reason is. Maybe I’m reading too much into it. #Arbitrum #Elysium $ARB {spot}(ARBUSDT)
I wonder if anyone else has noticed:

As a chain built on the Arbitrum Orbit tech stack, @Arbitrum’s official X account seems quite reluctant to promote @Enter_Elysium.

As of now, Arbitrum’s official X account hasn’t published a single decent introductory post about Elysium. Even when Elysium just announced its mainnet launch on X, Arbitrum didn’t quote-tweet it.

For another Arbitrum Orbit chain, RHC, Arbitrum has been much more proactive in promoting it—so much so that it started heavily promoting it during the testnet phase.

I’m not sure what the specific reason is. Maybe I’m reading too much into it.

#Arbitrum #Elysium $ARB
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Verified
The wave of public blockchain shutdowns has reached the Polkadot ecosystem. @AcalaNetwork, one of the first parachains in the Polkadot ecosystem, and its sister chain Karura have publicly announced on X that they will shut down their networks through proposals. The Acala chain’s genesis block officially launched on December 18, 2021. It has now been running smoothly for nearly five years, making the shutdown announcement all the more poignant. Moonbeam/Moonriver shut down earlier, and now it’s Acala/Karura’s turn. The entire Polkadot ecosystem is in tatters. #AcalaNetwork $ACA
The wave of public blockchain shutdowns has reached the Polkadot ecosystem.

@AcalaNetwork, one of the first parachains in the Polkadot ecosystem, and its sister chain Karura have publicly announced on X that they will shut down their networks through proposals.

The Acala chain’s genesis block officially launched on December 18, 2021. It has now been running smoothly for nearly five years, making the shutdown announcement all the more poignant.

Moonbeam/Moonriver shut down earlier, and now it’s Acala/Karura’s turn. The entire Polkadot ecosystem is in tatters.

#AcalaNetwork $ACA
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A textbook rug pull: After TGE, Berachain's former star project @puffpaw manipulated its price, sacrificing the entire project just to profit on Polymarket. After issuing its governance token $VAPE, the team controlled about 97% of the supply and used very little liquidity to pump the token's price to a $300-400M FDV, before quickly dumping it. All that for a chance to make $10,000 on a prediction market. #Rugpull #Polymarket
A textbook rug pull:
After TGE, Berachain's former star project @puffpaw manipulated its price, sacrificing the entire project just to profit on Polymarket.

After issuing its governance token $VAPE, the team controlled about 97% of the supply and used very little liquidity to pump the token's price to a $300-400M FDV, before quickly dumping it.

All that for a chance to make $10,000 on a prediction market.

#Rugpull #Polymarket
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Partly True
Before the public mainnet has even launched, HyperEVM Layer 2 chain @Enter_Elysium has been accused of centralized behavior that may be maliciously extracting value from users. The controversy quickly blew up, with community members muted on Telegram for raising questions and founder @0xOmnia blocking them. Here’s a quick rundown of how the situation unfolded: It began when someone in the Elysium builder group reported that a privileged address (0xD27392F3c657De75916fB1676855BfB56d6DeC8C) was running an MEV bot through a private node and capturing substantial profits on the launchpad; The team initially acknowledged this and said it had revoked the relevant RPC permissions. But the address’s malicious MEV activity continued, and the team then changed its explanation, saying the transactions followed the normal path through HyperEVM’s Delayed Inbox and did not abuse sequencer permissions; On top of that, Elysium’s questionable response was to mute users who kept asking about the MEV issue, while the founder’s X account also blocked people who questioned the matter. Setting aside conspiracy theories about whether these privileged MEV bots are being operated by Elysium insiders, the team’s attitude and actions toward those raising questions are quite unusual. With just one day to go before the public mainnet launch, instead of fixing the problem at this critical moment, they’re going after the people who raised it. #Hyperliquid $HYPE {spot}(HYPEUSDT)
Before the public mainnet has even launched, HyperEVM Layer 2 chain @Enter_Elysium has been accused of centralized behavior that may be maliciously extracting value from users.

The controversy quickly blew up, with community members muted on Telegram for raising questions and founder @0xOmnia blocking them.

Here’s a quick rundown of how the situation unfolded:
It began when someone in the Elysium builder group reported that a privileged address (0xD27392F3c657De75916fB1676855BfB56d6DeC8C) was running an MEV bot through a private node and capturing substantial profits on the launchpad;

The team initially acknowledged this and said it had revoked the relevant RPC permissions. But the address’s malicious MEV activity continued, and the team then changed its explanation, saying the transactions followed the normal path through HyperEVM’s Delayed Inbox and did not abuse sequencer permissions;

On top of that, Elysium’s questionable response was to mute users who kept asking about the MEV issue, while the founder’s X account also blocked people who questioned the matter.

Setting aside conspiracy theories about whether these privileged MEV bots are being operated by Elysium insiders, the team’s attitude and actions toward those raising questions are quite unusual.

With just one day to go before the public mainnet launch, instead of fixing the problem at this critical moment, they’re going after the people who raised it.

#Hyperliquid $HYPE
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Bullish
Partly True
Fun fact: Hyperliquid's priority fees hit an all-time high in a single day, while also reaching an all-time high as a share of total revenue. On November 5, priority fees hit a daily record, burning $550,000 worth of $HYPE; On November 6, priority fees also reached a record share of total revenue, exceeding 10% to reach 13.4%. This ATH was a classic event-driven spike. Extreme volatility amid a sharp drop in U.S. stocks amplified competition for queue priority, driving a surge in priority fee payments. 100% burned directly in $HYPE. #Hyperliquid $HYPE {spot}(HYPEUSDT)
Fun fact:
Hyperliquid's priority fees hit an all-time high in a single day, while also reaching an all-time high as a share of total revenue.

On November 5, priority fees hit a daily record, burning $550,000 worth of $HYPE ;
On November 6, priority fees also reached a record share of total revenue, exceeding 10% to reach 13.4%.

This ATH was a classic event-driven spike. Extreme volatility amid a sharp drop in U.S. stocks amplified competition for queue priority, driving a surge in priority fee payments.

100% burned directly in $HYPE .

#Hyperliquid $HYPE
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Solana and Arbitrum have long been at odds, and the rift was already seeded when Robinhood chose Arbitrum over Solana. Yesterday, core team members from both sides publicly traded barbs on X, which was already pretty ugly. But that doesn’t seem to have stopped Solana from trying to poach talent in a way that makes it look bad. @solana ecosystem figurehead and @Helius founder @mert left a rather ill-timed comment under a post by Robinhood co-founder @vladtenev, saying that Helius specializes in helping EVM chains and companies migrate to Solana. Wasn’t the implication that RHC should leave @arbitrum and migrate to Solana? I think bringing this kind of poaching out into the open makes them look a little bad. So far, though, neither Vlad nor the Arbitrum side has responded. #solana #Arbitrum $SOL $ARB {spot}(ARBUSDT) {spot}(SOLUSDT)
Solana and Arbitrum have long been at odds, and the rift was already seeded when Robinhood chose Arbitrum over Solana.

Yesterday, core team members from both sides publicly traded barbs on X, which was already pretty ugly. But that doesn’t seem to have stopped Solana from trying to poach talent in a way that makes it look bad.

@solana ecosystem figurehead and @Helius founder @mert left a rather ill-timed comment under a post by Robinhood co-founder @vladtenev, saying that Helius specializes in helping EVM chains and companies migrate to Solana. Wasn’t the implication that RHC should leave @arbitrum and migrate to Solana?

I think bringing this kind of poaching out into the open makes them look a little bad. So far, though, neither Vlad nor the Arbitrum side has responded.

#solana #Arbitrum $SOL $ARB
yyy
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People from the Arbitrum and Solana teams are openly fighting on X, all because Solana’s official account shilled a new product developed in-house.

Solana Labs, led by @toly, jumped in and built a mobile trading app, @leapxyz. The move has been criticized as an attempt to take business away from existing trading protocols in the Solana ecosystem.

Arbitrum core team member @CocoraEth mocked the move: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to compete directly with them, they should choose Arbitrum.

Solana Foundation Head of Product @vibhu didn’t hold back, firing back with a sarcastic jab: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to have any users, they should choose Arbitrum.

Things have now descended into chaos, with Solana heavyweights including @rajgokal and @toly joining the online feud.

#Arbitrum #solana $ARB $SOL

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People from the Arbitrum and Solana teams are openly fighting on X, all because Solana’s official account shilled a new product developed in-house. Solana Labs, led by @toly, jumped in and built a mobile trading app, @leapxyz. The move has been criticized as an attempt to take business away from existing trading protocols in the Solana ecosystem. Arbitrum core team member @CocoraEth mocked the move: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to compete directly with them, they should choose Arbitrum. Solana Foundation Head of Product @vibhu didn’t hold back, firing back with a sarcastic jab: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to have any users, they should choose Arbitrum. Things have now descended into chaos, with Solana heavyweights including @rajgokal and @toly joining the online feud. #Arbitrum #solana $ARB $SOL {spot}(SOLUSDT) {spot}(ARBUSDT)
People from the Arbitrum and Solana teams are openly fighting on X, all because Solana’s official account shilled a new product developed in-house.

Solana Labs, led by @toly, jumped in and built a mobile trading app, @leapxyz. The move has been criticized as an attempt to take business away from existing trading protocols in the Solana ecosystem.

Arbitrum core team member @CocoraEth mocked the move: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to compete directly with them, they should choose Arbitrum.

Solana Foundation Head of Product @vibhu didn’t hold back, firing back with a sarcastic jab: If on-chain developers don’t want their own chain to have any users, they should choose Arbitrum.

Things have now descended into chaos, with Solana heavyweights including @rajgokal and @toly joining the online feud.

#Arbitrum #solana $ARB $SOL
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Fun fact: Polygon seems significantly more efficient than Arbitrum at returning hackers’ stolen funds to Binance. As is widely known, in the Binance hack: Arbitrum froze and forcibly transferred the hacker’s stolen funds (74,559,805 ARB and 8,425 ETH) to an intermediary wallet; Polygon froze 70.49 million $POL at the hacker’s address and proposed recovering the funds via a hard fork. To recover funds on Arbitrum, Binance would have to wait at least 7 weeks, and a full DAO vote must pass before they can be released; whereas recovering funds on Polygon would take as little as 1–2 weeks, and could be done once the hard fork is activated on mainnet. #Binance $ARB $POL {spot}(POLUSDT) {spot}(ARBUSDT)
Fun fact:
Polygon seems significantly more efficient than Arbitrum at returning hackers’ stolen funds to Binance.

As is widely known, in the Binance hack:
Arbitrum froze and forcibly transferred the hacker’s stolen funds (74,559,805 ARB and 8,425 ETH) to an intermediary wallet;
Polygon froze 70.49 million $POL at the hacker’s address and proposed recovering the funds via a hard fork.

To recover funds on Arbitrum, Binance would have to wait at least 7 weeks, and a full DAO vote must pass before they can be released;

whereas recovering funds on Polygon would take as little as 1–2 weeks, and could be done once the hard fork is activated on mainnet.

#Binance $ARB $POL
yyy
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A classic case of L2s being far more centralized than L1s: Arbitrum and Polygon’s actions in response to the Binance hack.

Arbitrum acted first and asked questions later, while Polygon was willing but unable to do much.

The former urgently activated its privileged powers to freeze the hacker’s address and forcibly transfer the assets, all in one go;

The latter could only freeze the hacker’s address and was unable to forcibly transfer the stolen funds;

To recover the 70.49 million $POL, Polygon can only hard-fork by submitting a proposal. Once the proposal passes, the state can be modified to recover the funds.

#Arbitrum #Polygon $ARB $POL

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A classic case of L2s being far more centralized than L1s: Arbitrum and Polygon’s actions in response to the Binance hack. Arbitrum acted first and asked questions later, while Polygon was willing but unable to do much. The former urgently activated its privileged powers to freeze the hacker’s address and forcibly transfer the assets, all in one go; The latter could only freeze the hacker’s address and was unable to forcibly transfer the stolen funds; To recover the 70.49 million $POL, Polygon can only hard-fork by submitting a proposal. Once the proposal passes, the state can be modified to recover the funds. #Arbitrum #Polygon $ARB $POL {spot}(POLUSDT) {spot}(ARBUSDT)
A classic case of L2s being far more centralized than L1s: Arbitrum and Polygon’s actions in response to the Binance hack.

Arbitrum acted first and asked questions later, while Polygon was willing but unable to do much.

The former urgently activated its privileged powers to freeze the hacker’s address and forcibly transfer the assets, all in one go;

The latter could only freeze the hacker’s address and was unable to forcibly transfer the stolen funds;

To recover the 70.49 million $POL , Polygon can only hard-fork by submitting a proposal. Once the proposal passes, the state can be modified to recover the funds.

#Arbitrum #Polygon $ARB $POL
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Bearish
barring any surprises, Scroll will become the next top-tier L2 chain to shut down. The latest proposal has gone live on Scroll’s official DAO forum: pivot from a permissionless, general-purpose L2 public chain to a permissioned network dedicated to private AI, and migrate $SCR to Ethereum mainnet. Put plainly, maintaining a ZK Rollup L2 chain costs the team too much. They’re afraid they’ll be criticized if they shut it down outright, so they can only pivot to a private chain to cut costs during the transition. According to data from @growthepie_eth, Scroll’s average daily on-chain net profit is around a few dozen dollars. On-chain costs mainly include proof generation, L1 data publication, and verification, and do not include off-chain operating costs. Add in off-chain costs, and there’s no doubt that operating the Scroll chain is unprofitable. #scroll $SCR {spot}(SCRUSDT)
barring any surprises, Scroll will become the next top-tier L2 chain to shut down.

The latest proposal has gone live on Scroll’s official DAO forum: pivot from a permissionless, general-purpose L2 public chain to a permissioned network dedicated to private AI, and migrate $SCR to Ethereum mainnet.

Put plainly, maintaining a ZK Rollup L2 chain costs the team too much. They’re afraid they’ll be criticized if they shut it down outright, so they can only pivot to a private chain to cut costs during the transition.

According to data from @growthepie_eth, Scroll’s average daily on-chain net profit is around a few dozen dollars. On-chain costs mainly include proof generation, L1 data publication, and verification, and do not include off-chain operating costs.

Add in off-chain costs, and there’s no doubt that operating the Scroll chain is unprofitable.

#scroll $SCR
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Bullish
Hot fact: trade[XYZ] is the undisputed leader among Hyperliquid ecosystem HIP-3 deployers; Cold fact: @entropyIO is the runner-up among HIP-3 deployers and continues to close the gap; OI has surpassed a new high of $100 million, with market share climbing to 4.3%. #Hyperliquid $HYPE {spot}(HYPEUSDT)
Hot fact:
trade[XYZ] is the undisputed leader among Hyperliquid ecosystem HIP-3 deployers;

Cold fact:
@entropyIO is the runner-up among HIP-3 deployers and continues to close the gap;

OI has surpassed a new high of $100 million, with market share climbing to 4.3%.

#Hyperliquid $HYPE
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After sending $3.3 million worth of altcoins into a black hole, the hacker who attacked Binance has been exposed for another rookie mistake. This time, they sold altcoins into a pool with virtually no liquidity, making nearly $5 million vanish into thin air. According to on-chain data, the hacker's address dumped $PROM tokens with a nominal value of about $5 million in a single transaction into the shallow Uniswap V2 PROM/WETH pool, receiving just 0.0316 ETH, worth about $71.6. Greatness speaks for itself. #Binance #Hacker $BNB {spot}(BNBUSDT)
After sending $3.3 million worth of altcoins into a black hole, the hacker who attacked Binance has been exposed for another rookie mistake.

This time, they sold altcoins into a pool with virtually no liquidity, making nearly $5 million vanish into thin air.

According to on-chain data, the hacker's address dumped $PROM tokens with a nominal value of about $5 million in a single transaction into the shallow Uniswap V2 PROM/WETH pool, receiving just 0.0316 ETH, worth about $71.6.

Greatness speaks for itself.

#Binance #Hacker $BNB
yyy
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The hacker who attacked Binance was caught making a rookie mistake: they transferred altcoins worth about $3.3 million to the contract address of the $NEWT token.

It was basically like sending the coins straight into a black hole—they were permanently locked and could not be recovered.

Another mistake earlier was failing to immediately bridge the stolen funds from Arbitrum to another chain. They remained there for several hours and were urgently frozen by Arbitrum SC.

#Binance #Arbitrum $ARB
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The FBI has publicly called on THORChain to help block addresses associated with the Binance hacker. From Bybit to KelpDAO to Balance to Bitget and then Binance, the hackers who robbed them all transferred their stolen funds using @THORChain. Because THORChain touts itself as fully decentralized infrastructure, it cannot freeze funds centrally—and, naturally, it has never frozen a hacker’s funds before. But this time, something unexpected happened. While the hacker was transferring the stolen funds, an Ethereum reorganization happened to trigger a double refund, which in turn activated THORChain’s emergency pause mechanism. As of now, the vast majority of THORChain’s cross-chain swaps remain paused, leaving the hacker with no choice but to use other bridges to move the stolen funds. This time, the FBI has publicly called on THORChain to help block addresses associated with the hacker. Given the THORChain team’s usual MO, it seems unlikely they’ll cooperate. #Binance #THORChain $RUNE {spot}(RUNEUSDT)
The FBI has publicly called on THORChain to help block addresses associated with the Binance hacker.

From Bybit to KelpDAO to Balance to Bitget and then Binance, the hackers who robbed them all transferred their stolen funds using @THORChain.

Because THORChain touts itself as fully decentralized infrastructure, it cannot freeze funds centrally—and, naturally, it has never frozen a hacker’s funds before.

But this time, something unexpected happened. While the hacker was transferring the stolen funds, an Ethereum reorganization happened to trigger a double refund, which in turn activated THORChain’s emergency pause mechanism. As of now, the vast majority of THORChain’s cross-chain swaps remain paused, leaving the hacker with no choice but to use other bridges to move the stolen funds.

This time, the FBI has publicly called on THORChain to help block addresses associated with the hacker. Given the THORChain team’s usual MO, it seems unlikely they’ll cooperate.

#Binance #THORChain $RUNE
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The Starknet you imagine: Quickly freezes the 428 $STRK transferred by the hacker, saving Binance from a $19 loss; The actual Starknet: 19.5 million $STRK were transferred out of Binance’s hot wallet by a hacker, who successfully swapped them for 331 ETH. Even if we give it the benefit of the doubt, the liquidity for these $STRK is on Ethereum mainnet, not Starknet L2. Even if Starknet wanted to freeze it, it couldn’t. #STARKNET $STRK {spot}(STRKUSDT)
The Starknet you imagine:
Quickly freezes the 428 $STRK transferred by the hacker, saving Binance from a $19 loss;

The actual Starknet:
19.5 million $STRK were transferred out of Binance’s hot wallet by a hacker, who successfully swapped them for 331 ETH.

Even if we give it the benefit of the doubt, the liquidity for these $STRK is on Ethereum mainnet, not Starknet L2. Even if Starknet wanted to freeze it, it couldn’t.

#STARKNET $STRK
yyy
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The story about Starknet freezing 428 tokens transferred by the Binance hacker, worth about $19, of $STRK tokens is just something to laugh at; there’s no on-chain evidence proving it’s true.

Enabling the freeze privilege isn’t as simple as founder @EliBenSasson or any other single privileged person clicking a freeze switch to freeze things with one click.

Like Arbitrum, Starknet requires signatures from 9 of the 12 multisig members of the Security Council (SC) to carry out an emergency freeze.

You’re telling me Starknet went to all that trouble coordinating the multisigs just to help Binance recover $19? Yeah, right.

#Binance #STARKNET $STRK
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Titan Builder was probably the biggest beneficiary of the Binance hack after the hacker. In the past 24 hours, protocol revenue even surpassed that of stablecoin giants Tether and Circle, which have long dominated the rankings, reaching as much as $22.83 million. @titanbuilderxyz is a neutral block builder on Ethereum. Its main role is to aggregate public transactions, private bundles, and MEV opportunities submitted by searchers to build blocks. The Binance hack, in which the hacker dumped large amounts of stolen assets on Ethereum, caused severe price dislocations and created huge arbitrage and MEV opportunities. As a leading player in its niche, Titan Builder leveraged its strong operational capabilities (searcher order flow and efficient block-building algorithms) to win the right to build more high-value blocks through bidding, thereby capturing a considerable share of MEV value. Talk about going three years without a sale, then making enough to last three years. #Binance #TitanBuilder $BNB {spot}(BNBUSDT)
Titan Builder was probably the biggest beneficiary of the Binance hack after the hacker.

In the past 24 hours, protocol revenue even surpassed that of stablecoin giants Tether and Circle, which have long dominated the rankings, reaching as much as $22.83 million.

@titanbuilderxyz is a neutral block builder on Ethereum. Its main role is to aggregate public transactions, private bundles, and MEV opportunities submitted by searchers to build blocks.

The Binance hack, in which the hacker dumped large amounts of stolen assets on Ethereum, caused severe price dislocations and created huge arbitrage and MEV opportunities. As a leading player in its niche, Titan Builder leveraged its strong operational capabilities (searcher order flow and efficient block-building algorithms) to win the right to build more high-value blocks through bidding, thereby capturing a considerable share of MEV value.

Talk about going three years without a sale, then making enough to last three years.

#Binance #TitanBuilder $BNB
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The hacker who attacked Binance was caught making a rookie mistake: they transferred altcoins worth about $3.3 million to the contract address of the $NEWT token. It was basically like sending the coins straight into a black hole—they were permanently locked and could not be recovered. Another mistake earlier was failing to immediately bridge the stolen funds from Arbitrum to another chain. They remained there for several hours and were urgently frozen by Arbitrum SC. #Binance #Arbitrum $ARB {spot}(ARBUSDT)
The hacker who attacked Binance was caught making a rookie mistake: they transferred altcoins worth about $3.3 million to the contract address of the $NEWT token.

It was basically like sending the coins straight into a black hole—they were permanently locked and could not be recovered.

Another mistake earlier was failing to immediately bridge the stolen funds from Arbitrum to another chain. They remained there for several hours and were urgently frozen by Arbitrum SC.

#Binance #Arbitrum $ARB
yyy
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The story about Starknet freezing 428 tokens transferred by the Binance hacker, worth about $19, of $STRK tokens is just something to laugh at; there’s no on-chain evidence proving it’s true.

Enabling the freeze privilege isn’t as simple as founder @EliBenSasson or any other single privileged person clicking a freeze switch to freeze things with one click.

Like Arbitrum, Starknet requires signatures from 9 of the 12 multisig members of the Security Council (SC) to carry out an emergency freeze.

You’re telling me Starknet went to all that trouble coordinating the multisigs just to help Binance recover $19? Yeah, right.

#Binance #STARKNET $STRK
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