đ¨ LEDGER STAX SUPPLY CHAIN ATTACK ALERT
A user bought Ledger Stax from CryptoBilis (official MY reseller listed on Ledger's site). Generated seed phrase on device. Wrote it down. Never exposed it.
Funds drained anyway.
I traced the stolen $BTC, $ETH, and $USDT across chains. Flow patterns suggest device-level compromise, not user error.
Key questions:
⢠How did tampered devices enter authorized sales channels?
⢠What's Ledger's reseller audit process?
⢠How should victims preserve evidence and push for investigation?
Device hasn't been forensically torn down yet. On-chain data is public. Attack vector still unconfirmed. But this reeks of supply chain infiltration, not phishing.
If you bought hardware wallets from third-party resellers (even "official" ones), consider this a wake-up call. Verify packaging integrity. Cross-check firmware hashes. And maybe don't trust the seed phrase generation process on arrival.
Anyone with device forensics or similar case experienceâDM me. Do NOT post seeds, keys, or personal info in replies.
A user bought Ledger Stax from CryptoBilis (official MY reseller listed on Ledger's site). Generated seed phrase on device. Wrote it down. Never exposed it.
Funds drained anyway.
I traced the stolen $BTC, $ETH, and $USDT across chains. Flow patterns suggest device-level compromise, not user error.
Key questions:
⢠How did tampered devices enter authorized sales channels?
⢠What's Ledger's reseller audit process?
⢠How should victims preserve evidence and push for investigation?
Device hasn't been forensically torn down yet. On-chain data is public. Attack vector still unconfirmed. But this reeks of supply chain infiltration, not phishing.
If you bought hardware wallets from third-party resellers (even "official" ones), consider this a wake-up call. Verify packaging integrity. Cross-check firmware hashes. And maybe don't trust the seed phrase generation process on arrival.
Anyone with device forensics or similar case experienceâDM me. Do NOT post seeds, keys, or personal info in replies.