#dusk $DUSK @Dusk was going through the DuskEVM docs on Hedger and almost skimmed past the disclosure flow diagram... then noticed the "viewer key" box sitting quietly off to the side of every confidential transaction
confidential from the public, sure. but every workflow still routes through a key that lets someone decrypt the underlying data on demand. the docs call it reviewable privacy. reading it slow, what that actually means is privacy with a door, and the door has a key, and someone is holding that key
that's the part that stuck. the marketing framing is confidential EVM workflows, but what's actually being described is encrypted-by-default with an access path built in from day one, not encrypted-full-stop
hold up, that's kind of the opposite of what most privacy L1 threads imply when they say zero-knowledge, default assumption is nobody can see it, period.
what actually happens in the docs is the ZK proof confirms the computation was correct without revealing the data publicly, but the viewer key is a separate, parallel mechanism, and who holds that key isn't a cryptography question anymore, it's an operational and legal one.
makes me wonder how many "confidential" onchain narratives quietly assume the key holder problem is already solved
confidential from the public, sure. but every workflow still routes through a key that lets someone decrypt the underlying data on demand. the docs call it reviewable privacy. reading it slow, what that actually means is privacy with a door, and the door has a key, and someone is holding that key
that's the part that stuck. the marketing framing is confidential EVM workflows, but what's actually being described is encrypted-by-default with an access path built in from day one, not encrypted-full-stop
hold up, that's kind of the opposite of what most privacy L1 threads imply when they say zero-knowledge, default assumption is nobody can see it, period.
what actually happens in the docs is the ZK proof confirms the computation was correct without revealing the data publicly, but the viewer key is a separate, parallel mechanism, and who holds that key isn't a cryptography question anymore, it's an operational and legal one.
makes me wonder how many "confidential" onchain narratives quietly assume the key holder problem is already solved