I keep coming back to a strange asymmetry in Babylon's design: the people whose capital is actually at risk don't get a vote.BTC stakers are the ones who post collateral, who get slashed if a Finality Provider double-signs or goes rogue, who carry the downside if the security model breaks.

But governance which BSNs get admitted, what the slashing parameters are, how inflation gets allocated runs entirely through BABY holders. BTC stakers don't vote at all. Two different populations: one bears the risk, the other sets the rules for that risk.

That's a normal pattern in traditional finance bondholders don't vote either but it sits oddly on a protocol that markets itself on trust minimization. The pitch is "no intermediaries, no custodians, just cryptography."

The reality is a policy layer sitting on top of that cryptography, controlled by a token whose holders can have very different incentives than the BTC actually being secured. A BABY holder optimizing for token price might approve riskier BSNs faster than a BTC staker ever would.

The honest weakness: this isn't a management failure, it's structural. As more BSNs get onboarded and slashing conditions get tuned, every one of those calls is made by people who don't hold the asset that gets slashed.

"The security is trustless. The rules about that security aren't."

@BabylonLabs_io #baby $BABY $BTW $IDOL
Should BTC stakers vote in Babylon governance?

Give BTC a vote
100%
Keep it as is
0%
Only slashing
0%
Doesn't matter
0%
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