#dusk $DUSK
I went looking for the auditor's limits in Dusk's own paper
Privacy claims in regulated crypto usually come down to who holds the decryption key. I have started reading the specification before the launch post, since the two rarely describe the same product.

With Dusk (@DuskFoundation), the gap sits in a single sentence. The paper behind Hedger, arXiv 2511.17842, published under the name Haults, calls the auditor the only participant permitted to perform force transfers, which move funds between users "with or without their consent." Every transfer amount is separately encrypted to that auditor's key, so the seizure capability runs through the same machinery that makes the system auditable in the first place.

@Dusk_Foundation 's June 2025 launch post markets Regulated Auditability and describes Hedger as auditable by design. Force transfers are not mentioned. The public docs do not either.

I want to be fair here. Forced transfer is normal in regulated tokenization. ERC-3643 ships forcedTransfer. Tether blacklisted 4,163 addresses and locked around $1.26 billion during 2025. Court orders and lost keys are real, and Dusk is building for licensed venues..

My hesitation is narrower. ERC-1644 at least requires a controller transfer to emit an event. The Haults paper specifies no multisig, no time lock, no disclosure obligation on the auditor at all.
So what is self-custody actually protecting in that setup?