$DYDX bought tokens in September. A separate treasury delegation problem shows why buying and earning need different scorecards.
KPK's October 13 report records 1,080,989 DYDX purchased for 128,890.51 USDT. After the September 17 validator-set reduction, 8.34M treasury-delegated DYDX sat outside the active set without rewards: approximately 9.26% of 90.04M treasury-staked tokens at September-end. These are different cohorts, not evidence that the newly purchased tokens stopped earning. Nor does the report establish that the inactive positions remain unresolved today. [1]
The economic question is specific: when the treasury buys and stakes DYDX, who receives the resulting income, and can that capital remain productive?
Two beneficiaries, not one dividend
The Foundation's April 2026 disclosure assigns 75% of net protocol revenue to treasury buybacks and staking, 15% to delegators, and the remainder to MegaVault and operations. Governance controls allocations; validator commissions reduce proceeds. [2]
Consequently, buying DYDX and earning staking fees are separate transactions. Treasury-owned positions generate treasury income; merely holding liquid tokens does not create a direct entitlement to that income. Repurchases can absorb available inventory, but staking does not destroy the purchased supply. Counting the buyback allocation and the treasury's subsequent rewards as two independent distributions to every holder would double-count the investment case.
The strongest counterargument is operational
The validator-reduction proposal argued that a smaller active set could improve operator viability as activity weakened. Its authors also distinguished the broader validator set from the eight designated block proposers. Fewer active validators therefore do not mechanically mean a proportional loss of block-production capacity. The trade-off is a higher entry hurdle for competing operators. [3]
This is also potentially repairable. A separate September 8 review redelegated 10.204M DYDX without interrupting rewards. That predates the later set reduction and is not proof the subsequent inactive positions were fixed. [4] Successful reassignment would address an execution gap, not create a new source of revenue.
Supply and competition still set the ceiling
The original allocation was 1B ethDYDX; the amended insider release schedule runs through June 1, 2026. Later grants and treasury distributions still matter. Current native float, the next unlock quantity and activation of additional issuance were not independently verified. No float-adjusted buyback yield or upcoming-unlock percentage is asserted. Released inventory is not automatically sold. [2]
On product economics, Hyperliquid uses a 14-day weighted-volume fee schedule and staking discounts; dYdX documentation describes 30-day volume tiers. Those windows and benefits are not interchangeable. Depth, funding and realized execution costs must accompany headline fees. No matched-period adoption comparison was verified, so this analysis makes no market-share victory claim. [5][6]
Research checked October 17, 2026 UTC. Primary sources:
[1] KPK, October 13; September-end observations: https://dydx.forum/t/dydx-treasury-subdao-community-update-september-2026/5166
[2] Foundation-submitted token transparency filing; relevant disclosures dated April 2026, not a live parameter audit: https://blockworks.com/token-transparency/filing/dydx--2
[3] September 11 validator proposal: https://dydx.forum/t/drc-reduce-active-set-to-21/5153
[4] September 11 report of September 8 redelegation: https://dydx.forum/t/staking-programme-ad-hoc-review/5154
[5] Hyperliquid fee documentation: https://hyperliquid.gitbook.io/hyperliquid-docs/trading/fees
[6] dYdX fee-tier documentation: https://docs.dydx.community/dydx/modules/governance/governance-adjustable-parameters/fee-tiers
My take: The disclosed inactive delegation is an execution shortfall, not evidence of token losses or a broken buyback mechanism. I would prioritize restoring productive treasury stake over celebrating an allocation percentage. A subsequent staking review showing reassignment and resumed rewards would strengthen that assessment; persistent inactivity would weaken it. Even a repair cannot substitute for competitive trading economics and durable fee generation. NFA. DYOR.