#dusk $DUSK @Dusk Dug through Dusk's own news archive for this CreatorPad task and almost scrolled past the one entry that actually mattered not the Chainlink CCIP announcement itself, the bridge incident postmortem sitting right next to it.
what stopped me: on Jan 16, 2026, someone compromised a Dusk to EVM bridge signing wallet and drained it in stages 9,000 DUSK gone at 21:28:45 UTC, then 89,700 more fifteen minutes later, then 2.74M, then 8.06M, first hit tx hash starting d1e23f3a1c14…82318.
team shut the bridge down at 23:12 UTC, which is the only reason a final 8.91M DUSK attempt failed. Over 11M DUSK still moved before containment.
That's not a whitepaper claim, that's a receipt and it reframes the whole CCIP decision less grand interoperability vision, more a team that got burned running its own lightweight, single path bridge and decided fast and simple wasn't worth it anymore. Default behavior was speed.
What they actually shipped after was isolation signing separated from event handling, hot wallet balances capped, manual cold top ups only.
Kind of changes how you read every we chose CCIP for security line once you've seen what happens without it. Hmm… makes me wonder how many other chains are one compromised signer away from writing the same postmortem.
what stopped me: on Jan 16, 2026, someone compromised a Dusk to EVM bridge signing wallet and drained it in stages 9,000 DUSK gone at 21:28:45 UTC, then 89,700 more fifteen minutes later, then 2.74M, then 8.06M, first hit tx hash starting d1e23f3a1c14…82318.
team shut the bridge down at 23:12 UTC, which is the only reason a final 8.91M DUSK attempt failed. Over 11M DUSK still moved before containment.
That's not a whitepaper claim, that's a receipt and it reframes the whole CCIP decision less grand interoperability vision, more a team that got burned running its own lightweight, single path bridge and decided fast and simple wasn't worth it anymore. Default behavior was speed.
What they actually shipped after was isolation signing separated from event handling, hot wallet balances capped, manual cold top ups only.
Kind of changes how you read every we chose CCIP for security line once you've seen what happens without it. Hmm… makes me wonder how many other chains are one compromised signer away from writing the same postmortem.
