Athena#ENA It is the best choice in the crypto ecosystem to provide public chain-based synthetic dollars.
The dust on the crust was pleasantly warm as expected, but at night it was bitterly cold. This weather pattern creates a miserable snow condition known as dust on the Earth's crust. Beneath the seemingly beautiful, untouched power slabs lurk ice and crispy snow. This is nasty stuff.
As winter turns to spring at an accelerated pace, I would like to revisit the article "Dust on the Earth's Crust" that I published a year ago. In this article, I propose ways to create a comprehensively supported fiat stablecoin that does not rely on the TradFi banking system for its existence. My idea is to combine a long cryptocurrency hedge with a short perpetual swap position to create a synthetic fiat currency unit. I named it Nakadollar because I envisioned using Bitcoin and short-term XBTUSD "perpetual" swaps as a way to create synthetic dollars. I end the article by pledging to support a solid team trying to do everything I can to turn this idea into a reality.
What a difference a year makes. Guy is the founder of Ethena. Prior to Ethena, Guy worked at a $60 billion hedge fund investing in special situations including credit, private equity and real estate. Guy caught shitcoins during the DeFi summer that started in 2020 and never looked back. After reading "Dust on the Earth's Crust," he was inspired to launch his own synthetic dollar. But as all great entrepreneurs do, he wanted to improve upon my original idea. Instead of using Bitcoin, he is creating a synthetic USD stablecoin using Ethereum.
Guy chose Ethereum because of the native benefits the Ethereum network provides. To provide security and process transactions, Ethereum network validators are paid a small amount of ETH per block directly through the protocol. This is what I call ETH staking yield. Additionally, since Ethereum is now a deflationary currency, there are fundamental reasons why ETH/USD forwards, futures, and perpetual swaps trade continue to trade at a premium to spot. Holders of short-term perpetual swaps can capture this premium. Combining physically collateralized ETH plus a short ETH/USD perpetual swap position creates high-yielding synthetic USD. As of this week, staked Ethena USD (sUSDe) is currently earning around >50% annualized return.
The best idea is meaningless without a team to execute it. Guy named his synthetic dollar Ethena and assembled a team of rock stars to launch the protocol quickly and securely. Maelstrom became a founding advisor in May 2023, and in exchange we received governance tokens. I have worked with many high quality teams in the past and the staff at Ethena got the job done without cutting any corners. Fast forward 12 months, and just 3 weeks after its mainnet launch, Ethena’s stablecoin USDe is approaching 1 billion units (TVL of $1 billion; 1 USDe = 1 USD).
I believe Ethena can surpass Tether to become the largest stablecoin. This prophecy will take many years to come true. However, I want to explain why Tether is the best and worst stablecoin in crypto. It's the best because it's probably the most profitable financial intermediary per employee in TradFi and crypto. This is the worst, because Tether exists to keep its poorer TradFi banking partners happy. The jealousy of banks and the problems Tether creates for the guardians of America’s peaceful financial system could lead to the immediate end of Tether.
To all those misinformed Tether FUDsters out there, I want to make it clear. Tether is not a financial fraud, nor does Tether lie about its reserves. Additionally, I have the utmost respect for the founders and operators of Tether. But IMHO, Ethena will rock Tether.
This article will be divided into two parts. First, I’ll explain why the Wachoonline, the U.S. Treasury, and the big politically connected U.S. banks want to destroy Tether. Second, I’m going to discuss Ethena in depth. I will provide a brief overview of how Ethena is built, how it maintains its peg to the U.S. dollar, and its risk factors. Finally, I will provide a valuation model for the Ethena governance token.
After reading this article, you will understand why I believe Ethena is the best choice in the crypto ecosystem for providing public chain-based synthetic dollars.
NOTE: Physically-backed fiat stablecoins are tokens in which the issuer holds fiat currency in a bank account, i.e. Tether, Circle, First Digital, etc. A synthetic-backed fiat stablecoin is a token in which the issuer holds the cryptocurrency and hedges it with short-term derivatives, namely Ethena.
jealous green
Tether (ticker: USDT) is the largest stablecoin measured in circulating tokens. 1 USDT = 1 US dollar. USDT is sent between wallets on various chains such as Ethereum. To maintain the peg, Tether holds $1 in bank accounts for every unit of USDT in circulation.
Without a USD bank account, Tether cannot fulfill its functions of creating USDT, escrow USDT USD, and redeeming USDT.
Creation: Without a bank account, USDT cannot be created as traders cannot send USD.
USD Custody: Without a bank account, there is nowhere to hold USDT-backed USD.
Redemption of USDT: Without a bank account, USDT cannot be redeemed because there is no bank account to send USD to the redeemer.
Having a bank account is not enough to ensure success because not all banks are created equal. There are thousands of banks around the world that accept U.S. dollar deposits, but only some have master accounts with the Federal Reserve. Any bank wishing to clear U.S. dollars through the Federal Reserve to fulfill its obligations as a U.S. dollar correspondent bank must hold a master account. The Federal Reserve retains complete discretion over which bank master accounts are granted.
I'm going to quickly explain how agent banking works.
There are 3 banks: A, B and C. Banks A and B are located in two non-U.S. jurisdictions. Bank C is a US bank with a master account. Banks A and B want to be able to move dollars within the fiat financial system. They each apply to use Bank C as their correspondent bank. Bank C evaluates the bank's customer base and approves.
Bank A needs to send $1,000 to Bank B. The funds flow is a transfer of $1,000 from Bank A's account at Bank C to Bank B's account at Bank C.
Let's change the example a little and add Bank D, which is also a US bank with a master account. Bank A uses Bank C as its correspondent bank, and Bank B uses Bank D as its correspondent bank. Now, what happens when Bank A wants to send $1,000 to Bank B? The flow of funds is Bank C moving $1,000 from its account at the Federal Reserve to Bank D's account at the Federal Reserve. Bank D eventually deposits $1,000 into Bank B's account.
Typically, banks outside the United States use correspondent banks to wire U.S. dollars around the world. This is because once dollars move between jurisdictions, they must be cleared directly through the Fed.
I have been in the crypto space since 2013, and oftentimes, the bank at a crypto exchange where you deposit fiat is not a US-domiciled bank, meaning it relies on a US bank with a master account to process fiat deposits and withdrawals. These smaller, non-US banks crave deposits and bank crypto companies because they can charge high fees and pay nothing for deposits. Globally, banks are often desperate for cheap USD funding because the USD is the global reserve currency. However, these smaller, foreign banks must interact with their correspondent banks to process USD deposits and withdrawals outside of their domicile. While correspondent banks tolerate these crypto-related fiat flows, sometimes certain crypto clients are removed from smaller banks at the behest of the correspondent bank for whatever reason. If smaller banks do not comply, they lose their correspondent banking relationship and the ability to move USD internationally. A bank that loses its ability to move USD is the walking dead. Therefore, smaller banks will always drop crypto clients if the correspondent bank demands it.
This correspondent banking is crucial when we analyze the strength of Tether’s banking partners.
Tether banking partners: Britannia Bank & Trust, Cantor Fitzgerald, Capital Union, Ansbacher, Deltec Bank and Trust.
Of the five banks listed, only one, Cantor Fitzgerald, is registered in the United States. However, none of these five banks has a Fed master account. Cantor Fitzgerald is a primary dealer who helps the Fed conduct open market operations, such as buying and selling bonds. Tether’s ability to move and hold U.S. dollars is entirely dependent on the whims of fickle correspondent banks. Given the size of Tether's U.S. Treasury portfolio, I believe their partnership with Cantor will be critical to continued access to this market.
These banking CEOs are fools if they didn’t negotiate a stake in Tether in exchange for providing banking services. You'll understand why when I introduce Tether's revenue per employee metric later.
This is why Tether’s banking partners are not doing well. Next, I want to explain why the Fed doesn’t like Tether’s business model and why, fundamentally, it has nothing to do with cryptocurrencies and everything to do with how the U.S. dollar money markets work.
full reserve bank
From a TradFi perspective, Tether is a fully reserved bank, also known as a narrow bank. Fully-reserved banks take deposits without lending them out. The only service it provides is sending money back and forth. Since savers face no risk, it pays almost no interest on their deposits. If all depositors request a refund at the same time, the bank can fulfill this request immediately. Hence the name - Total Reserve. In contrast to fractional reserve banks, the bank's loan base is larger than its deposit base. If all depositors simultaneously demanded their funds from a partially retained bank, the bank would go bankrupt. Fractional reserve banks pay interest to attract deposits, but savers face risks.
Tether is essentially a fully-reserved U.S. dollar bank that provides U.S. dollar trading services powered by a public chain. No loans, no funny stuff.
The Fed doesn’t like full-reserve banks, not because of who their customers are, but because of how these banks handle deposits. To understand why the Fed hates the full-reserve banking model, I have to discuss the mechanics of quantitative easing (QE) and its effects.
Banks collapsed during the 2008 financial crisis because they did not have enough reserves to cover losses on bad mortgages. Reserves are funds held by banks with the Federal Reserve. The Fed monitors bank reserves based on total outstanding loans. After 2008, the Fed ensured that banks would never run short of reserves. The Fed does this through quantitative easing.
Quantitative easing is the process by which the Federal Reserve purchases bonds from banks and credits them with reserves held at the Fed. The Fed engaged in trillions of dollars worth of quantitative easing bond purchases, causing bank reserve balances to swell. Long live!
Quantitative easing does not significantly cause inflation because bank reserves remain at the Fed. Pandemic stimulus payments go directly to people to spend as they please. If banks instead lent out these reserves, inflation would rise immediately after 2008 because the money would be in the hands of businesses and individuals.
Fractional reserve banks exist to make loans; if they don't lend, they don't make money. Therefore, all else being equal, fractional reserve banks prefer to lend their reserves to paying customers rather than keep them at the Fed. The Fed has a problem. How do they ensure that the banking system has nearly unlimited reserves without causing inflation? The Fed chooses to "bribe" the banking industry instead of lending.
Bribing banks requires the Fed to pay interest on excess reserves in the banking system. To calculate the amount of the bribe, multiply the total bank reserves held by the Fed by the interest on reserve balances (IORB). The IORB must hover between a lower and upper bound on the federal funds rate.
Lending is risky. Borrowers default. Banks would rather earn risk-free interest income from the Fed than lend to the private sector and incur possible losses. So as QE progressed, the banking system’s outstanding loans grew at a different rate than the Fed’s balance sheet. Success, however, is not cheap. When the Fed Funds rate was 0% to 0.25%, bribes were not expensive. But now, with the Fed Funds rate at 5.25% to 5.50%, IORB bribes are costing the Fed billions of dollars a year.
The Fed keeps policy rates "high" to curb inflation; however, due to the higher cost of IORB, it becomes unprofitable for the Fed. The U.S. Treasury Department, along with the American public, is directly funding the Federal Reserve's bribery of banks through the IORB program. When the Fed makes money, it sends those payments to the U.S. Treasury. When the Fed loses money, the U.S. Treasury borrows money and sends it to the Fed to cover the losses.
QE solved the problem of insufficient bank reserves. The Fed now wants to reduce bank reserves to curb inflation. Enter quantization tightening (QT).
QT is when the Fed sells bonds to the banking system and pays for them with reserves held by the Fed. Quantitative easing increases bank reserves, while quantitative easing decreases bank reserves. As bank reserves fall, so do IORB bribery costs. Obviously, the Fed won't be happy if bank reserves increase while paying high interest rates to the IORB.
The full-reserve banking model operates contrary to the Fed’s stated goals. Full-reserve banks do not make loans, meaning 100% of deposits are held as reserves at the Fed. If the Fed starts granting fully-reserve banking licenses to banks that engage in similar businesses to Tether, this will exacerbate the central bank’s losses.
Tether is not a US licensed bank, so it cannot deposit directly with the Fed and earn IORB. But Tether can deposit cash in a money market fund, which can use the reverse repurchase program (RRP). RRP is similar to IORB, and the Fed must pay an interest rate between the fed funds floor and ceiling in order to accurately determine the direction of short-term interest rate transactions. Treasury bills (T-bills) are zero-coupon bonds with maturities of less than one year, and their trading yields are slightly higher than the recommended retail price (RRP) rate. So while Tether is not a bank, its deposits are invested in instruments that require interest payments from the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury. Tether has nearly $81 billion invested in money market funds and Treasuries. Tether is strangling the Fed. The Fed can't either.
Tether arbitrages the Fed because Tether pays 0% on USDT balances but earns around the upper limit of the federal funds rate. This is Tether’s net interest margin (NIM). As you can imagine, Tether is very happy about the Fed raising interest rates, as in less than 18 months (March 2022 to September 2023), the net interest margin has gone from essentially 0% to nearly 6% %.
Tether isn’t the only stablecoin issuer targeting the Fed. Circle (USDC) and all other stablecoins that accept USD and issue tokens are doing the same thing.
If banks abandon Tether for whatever reason, the Fed won't be able to help.
What about Yellen? Does her treasury have any conflicts with Tether?
Tether is too big
Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen needs a well-functioning Treasury market. This allows her to borrow the necessary funds to pay for the trillion-dollar government deficit each year. After 2008, the Treasury market swelled dramatically along with the fiscal deficit. The larger it grew, the more vulnerable it became.
The chart from the U.S. Government Securities Liquidity Index clearly shows declining liquidity in the U.S. Treasury market since the pandemic (higher numbers mean worse liquidity conditions). It only takes a small amount of selling to disrupt the market. What I mean by disrupting the market is a rapid drop in bond prices or a rise in yields.
Tether is currently one of the 22 largest holders of U.S. Treasuries. If Tether had to quickly reduce its holdings for whatever reason, it could send global bond markets into chaos. I say global because all fiat debt instruments are priced in some way, shape, or form independent of the U.S. Treasury curve.
If Tether's banking partners launch Tether, Yellen may intervene by:
Perhaps she would stipulate that Tether be given a reasonable period of time to retain its customer status so that it is not forced to sell assets to quickly satisfy redemption requests.
Maybe she will freeze Tether’s assets so that nothing can be sold until she thinks the market can absorb Tether’s assets.
But Yellen certainly won’t help Tether find another long-term banking partner. The growth of Tether and similar stablecoins serving the cryptocurrency market poses risks to the U.S. Treasury market.
Perhaps if Tether decided to buy bonds that no one wanted (i.e. long-term bonds with maturities over 10 years) instead of short-term notes that everyone wanted, Yellen might be on their side. But why would Tether take this duration risk to earn less money than a shorter-maturity Treasury bond? This is due to an inverted yield curve (where long-term interest rates are lower than short-term interest rates).
The most powerful sectors of American-style financial institutions would rather Tether didn’t exist. And none of this has anything to do with cryptocurrencies.
Tether is too rich
The talented analysts at Maelstrom created the following speculative balance sheet and income statement for Tether. They used a combination of Tether’s public disclosures and their judgment to create this outcome.
Listed below are eight "too big to fail" (TBTF) banks in the peaceful economic and political system under the United States and their fiscal year 2023 net profits.
Cantor Fitzgerald is not a bank but a primary dealer and trading company. There are only 23 primary dealer banks. So, in the Total Deposits column, this number for Cantor represents the value of its balance sheet assets. I obtained estimates of Cantor's net profit and headcount from Zippia.
Tether’s revenue per employee is $62 million. No other bank on the list comes close. Tether’s profitability is another example of how cryptocurrencies will impact the largest transfer of wealth in the history of human civilization.
Why don’t these TBTF banks offer competing fiat-pegged stablecoins? Tether earns more per employee than any of these banks, but Tether would not exist without these banks and others like them.
Perhaps one of these banks could buy Tether instead of asking for Tether to be debanked. But why would they want to do that? It certainly wouldn’t fit the technology. The code to deploy a clone of the Tether smart contract is already on the internet, thanks to the transparency of public blockchains.
If I were the CEO of a US bank supporting the existence of Tether, I would immediately unbank them and offer a competing product. The first US bank to offer stablecoins will soon dominate the market. As a user, holding JPMorgan stock is less risky than Tether. The former is the responsibility of too-big-to-fail banks, but is essentially the responsibility of empires. The latter is the responsibility of a private company, scorned by the entire U.S. banking system and its regulators.
I have no reason to believe that a US bank is plotting to overthrow Tether. But doing so is trivial. Why did Tether, owned by a crypto stooge hanging out in the Bahamas and whose existence relies 100% on access to the U.S. banking system, earn more than Jamie Dimon in a few trading days?
As the cryptocurrency bull market progresses, any stock not related to the cryptocurrency business will rise. A U.S. bank, whose stock price is falling due to market panic over bad commercial real estate loans, could gain a valuation boost by entering the crypto stablecoin market. This could be all the motivation Bank of America needs to finally compete directly with Tether, Circle, and others.
If Circle's IPO goes well, expect the banking system to face challenges. Stablecoin businesses such as Circle and Tether should trade at a discount to earnings because they have no competitive moat. The fact that Circle was able to IPO is a comedy in itself.
There is no higher mountain than this...
I just explained why it would be easier for the US banking system to destroy Tether than it would be to beat Caroline Ellison at the Math Olympiad. But why would we as a crypto ecosystem create a different type of fiat-pegged stablecoin?
Thanks to Tether, we know that crypto capital markets crave a stablecoin pegged to fiat currencies. The problem is that banks provide poor services because there is no competition to make them better. With Tether, anyone with an internet connection can make USD payments 24/7.
Tether has two main problems:
Users will not receive any cut of Tether’s NIM.
Even if Tether plays by the rules, it could be shut down by the U.S. banking system overnight.
To be fair, users of any currency generally do not share in seigniorage revenue. Holding physical cash dollar bills doesn't entitle you to the Fed's profits... but it definitely can afford its losses. Therefore, USDT holders should not expect to receive any net interest margin from Tether. However, one user group that should be compensated are cryptocurrency exchanges.
The primary use case for Tether is as a funding currency for cryptocurrency transactions. Tether also provides a near-instant way to transfer fiat currencies between trading venues. Exchanges provide utility to Tether as a place to trade cryptocurrencies, but they get nothing in return. There are no Tether governance tokens available for purchase that provide holders with NIM claims. Unless an exchange somehow acquired a stake in Tether in its early days, it wouldn't be able to share in Tether's success. This isn’t a sob story about why Tether should provide funds to exchanges. Instead, this would prompt exchanges to support stablecoin issuers, passing on a large portion of NIM to holders, and provide exchanges with the opportunity to purchase governance tokens at cheap valuations in the early stages of an issuer’s development.
Quite simply, if you want to outperform Tether, you have to pay stablecoin holders a large portion of NIM and sell cheap governance tokens to exchanges. This is how vampire squid attacks physical fiat-backed stablecoins.
Ethena followed this script to the letter. USDe holders can stake it directly to Ethena and earn the majority of their NIM. Major exchanges have invested in Ethena in early funding rounds. Ethena’s cap table includes Binance Labs, Bybit via Mirana, OKX Ventures, Deribit, Gemini, and Kraken as exchange partner investors.
In terms of market share represented by these exchanges, they cover approximately 90% of ETH open interest on major exchanges.
How does Ethena work?
Ethena is a synthetically backed fiat cryptocurrency USD.
ETH = Ether
stETH = Lido-staking ETH derivatives
ETH = stETH
ETH = stETH = $10,000
ETH/USD perpetual swap contract value = 1 USD worth of ETH or stETH = 1 / USD value of ETH or stETH
hook up
USDe is a stablecoin issued by Ethena that is designed to be pegged 1:1 to the U.S. dollar.
Ethena joins various Authorized Participants (APs). AP can mint and burn USDe at a ratio of 1:1 USD.
coin:
Currently, stETH Lido, Mantle mETH, Binance WBETH and ETH are accepted. Ethena then automatically sells the ETH/USD perpetual swap to lock in the USD value of ETH or ETH LSD. The protocol then mints an equivalent amount of USDe that matches the dollar value of the short’s permanent hedge.
example:
AP deposits 1 stETH, worth $10,000.
Ethena sells 10,000 ETH/USD per swap contract = 10,000 USD/1 USD contract value.
AP receives 10,000 USDe because Ethena sold 10,000 ETH/USD per swap contract.
combustion:
To destroy USDe, AP deposits USDe into Ethena. Ethena then automatically covers a portion of its short ETH/USD perpetual swap position, thereby unlocking a certain amount of USD value. The protocol will then destroy USDe and return an amount of ETH or ETH LSD based on the total USD value unlocked minus execution fees.
example:
AP deposits 10,000 USDe.
Ethena buys back 10,000 ETH/USD per swap contract = 10,000 USD/1 USD contract value
AP receives 1 stETH = 10,000 $1 / $10,000 stETH/USD minus execution fees
To understand why, initially USDe should be trading at a slight premium to USD on stablecoin exchanges like Curve, I will explain why users would want to hold USDe.
dollar yield
The combination of ETH staking yield and ETH/USD perpetual swap funding equates to a high synthetic USD yield. To earn this yield, USDe holders stake it directly on the Ethena app. It takes less than a minute to start earning yield.
Because sUSDe’s yield of around 30% at launch is very high; users who already hold USD stablecoins that yield much less will switch to sUSDe. This puts pressure on the buyers and will drive up the price of USDe in the Curve pool. When the trading premium of USDe is large enough, AP will step in and arbitrage the difference.
Picture this: 1 USDe = 2 USDT. If an AP can create 1 USDe with 1 USDT worth of ETH or stETH, they can earn a risk-free $1 profit. This is the process:
Wire USD to an exchange.
Sell $1 for ETH or stETH.
Deposit ETH or stETH on the Ethena app and receive 1 USDe.
Deposit USDe on Curve and sell for 2 USDT.
Sell 2 USDT for 2 USD on the exchange and withdraw the USD to your bank account.
If users believe Ethena is safe and the yield is real, then in this hypothetical example, USDT in circulation will fall, while USDe in circulation will rise.
UST yield
Too many people in the cryptocurrency space believe that Ethena will fail like UST. UST is a stablecoin attached to the Terra/Luna ecosystem. Anchor is a decentralized money market protocol in the Terra ecosystem that offers a 20% annual yield to those who stake UST. People can deposit UST and Anchor will lend that deposit to borrowers.
Any stablecoin issuer must convince users why they should switch from (usually Tether) to a new product. High production volumes are what prompted this shift.
UST is backed by Luna, and Bitcoin is purchased by selling Luna. Luna is the governance token of the ecosystem. The foundation owns a majority stake in Luna. Due to the high price of Luna, the foundation sold Luna into UST to pay high UST interest. The interest rate is not paid in physical dollars, but you earn more UST tokens. While UST maintains a 1:1 peg to the U.S. dollar, the market believes that if you hold more UST, you also hold more dollars.
As the total value of Anchor’s locked UST grows, so does its UST interest expense. The foundation's continued sale of Luna to subsidize Anchor's UST rewards became unsustainable. The yield comes only from the market's belief that Luna should be worth trillions of dollars.
The death spiral for algorithmic stablecoins began when Luna prices began to fall. Because Luna is minted and burned in such a way as to maintain a 1:1 peg of UST to the U.S. dollar, as Luna depreciates, it becomes more difficult to maintain a peg of UST to the U.S. dollar. Once the anchor exchange rate breaks violently, all UST interest accumulated on Anchor becomes worthless.
Ethena Yield
The way USDe generates revenue is completely different from UST. Ethena holds two income-producing assets.
Staking ETH:
ETH is collateralized using liquid staking derivatives such as Lido (stETH). stETH earns ETH staking income. Deposit ETH into Lido. Lido runs validator nodes capitalized on ETH deposits and remits ETH paid by the Ethereum network to stETH holders.
Perp Swaps:
A perpetual swap is a series of consecutive short-term futures contracts. Funding rates for most perpetual contracts reset every 8 hours. Funding rates are based on a PR vs. PR premium or discount. If the perpetual contract has traded at a 1% premium to other perpetual contracts in the past 8 hours. The funding rate for the next period is +1%. If the funding rate is positive, longs pay shorts; if interest rates are negative, the opposite is true.
Ethena holds a short perpetual swap position to lock in the USD value of its staked ETH holdings. Therefore, if funds are positive, Ethena will earn interest income. If it is negative, interest is paid. Obviously, as USDe holders we want to be confident that Ethena will receive interest rather than pay interest. The question is why is ETH/USD forward trading at a premium?
Ethereum is now a deflationary currency. The dollar is an inflationary currency. If ETH decreases but USD increases in the future, then ETH/USD forwards should trade higher. This means that any leveraged forward derivatives (such as perpetual swaps) should trade at a premium to spot. Funds should be mostly positive, meaning Ethena will receive interest. The data supports this.
What would cause Ethereum to transition from a deflationary currency to an inflationary currency? If Ethereum's network usage drops significantly, much less ETH Gas will be burned per block. In this case, the Ethereum block reward will be greater than the Ethereum burned.
What would cause the dollar to shift from an inflationary currency to a deflationary currency? American politicians need to stop spending tons of money just to get re-elected. The Fed must reduce its balance sheet to zero. This will lead to a serious contraction in the circulation of US dollar credit currency.
I think both scenarios are unlikely to happen. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect funding rates to be positive for most periods in the foreseeable future.
USDe is not UST.
The combination of ETH staking yield and positive perpetual swap funding generates the USDe yield. The yield is not based on the value of the Ethena governance token. USDe and UST generate revenue in completely different ways.
Ethena Risk Points
Ethena is subject to counterparty risk. Ethena is not decentralized, nor does it attempt to be. Ethena holds short-term perpetual swap positions on the Centralized Exchange for Derivatives (CEX). If these CEXs are unable to pay out profits on swap positions or return deposited collateral for a variety of reasons, Ethena will suffer capital losses. Ethena attempts to reduce direct counterparty risk by placing funds with third-party custodians, such as:
Tether’s counterparty risk comes from TradFi Bank. Ethena’s counterparty risk comes from derivatives CEXs and cryptocurrency custodians.
CEXs are investors in Ethena and have a vested interest in not being hacked and ensuring that their derivatives are properly paid out. Derivatives CEX are the most profitable cryptocurrency companies and they want to keep it that way. Fucking your customers is not good business. As Ethena develops, growth in derivatives open interest will increase CEX’s fee income. All incentives are aligned. CEX wants Ethena to do well.
Tether’s products help the functioning of crypto capital markets. Cryptocurrency exists to disintermediate TradFi Bank. TradFi Bank Wants Cryptocurrencies to Fail. From a fundamental perspective, banking Tether hastened the demise of TradFi. Incentives are inconsistent. TradFi Bank doesn’t want Tether to do well, and regulators don’t want Tether to do well.
Ethena For Us, By Us, aka FUBU (For Us, By Us).
Tether For Us, By Them, aka FUBAR (For Us, By Them).
LSD Smart Contracts and Penalty Risks
Ethena holds ETH LSD. It faces smart contract risks. For example, Lido could have issues that render stETH worthless. Additionally, there is a risk of being punished. Penalties occur when an Ethereum node network validator breaks certain rules. As a penalty, the ETH capital held by the validator is reduced.
Negative funds
As I mentioned before, perpetual swap funding rates may be negative for long periods of time. Financing rates could become so negative that the net asset value of Ethena assets is less than the amount of USDe issued. USDe will then break the downside peg.
Ethena smart contract risks
Just like Tether, Ethena runs smart contracts on a public blockchain. There may be bugs in the code that cause unexpected behavior and ultimately lead to losses for USDe holders. Typically, hackers will try to mint large amounts of stablecoins for free and then trade them for another cryptocurrency on platforms like Uniswap or Curve. As the supply of stablecoins increases without a corresponding increase in the assets backing the stablecoins, this can lead to the peg being broken.
However, Ethena smart contracts are relatively simple and most of their complexity lies in off-chain engineering. The on-chain mint/redemption contract is only about 600 lines of code, and only approved participants can interact with the most sensitive contracts on the chain, which helps reduce the risk of blocking malicious unknown counterparties from interacting with it.
limits to growth
USDe’s circulating supply can only grow to the total open interest of exchange Ethereum futures and currency swap contracts. Physically backed fiat stablecoins have a circulating supply of ~$130 billion. Ethereum has $8.5 billion in open interest across all exchanges. $12 billion across all exchanges, and another $31 billion in open interest in Bitcoin contracts that can be tapped once Ethereum decides to accept Bitcoin as collateral. With total open interest for Bitcoin and Ethereum at ~$43 billion, there’s no way Ethereum could take the number one spot given current market conditions. While Ethena started with ETH, it’s very easy for BTC and SOL to be added to their system, it’s just a matter of sequencing.
As cryptocurrencies grow as an asset class, total open interest will grow exponentially. Some believe cryptocurrencies as an asset class will reach $10 trillion in this cycle. At this level, it’s not ridiculous that Ethereum’s open interest could exceed $1 trillion, considering that Ethereum is the second-largest cryptocurrency by fiat market cap.
Ethereum will grow as cryptocurrencies grow.
insurance fund
The purpose of an insurance fund is to mitigate financial losses due to some of the risks mentioned above. If funding rates become negative or the synthetic USD depegs, these funds will act as bidders for USDe on the open market. The fund consists of stablecoins (USDT and USDC), stETH and USDe/USD LP positions. Currently, the insurance fund is capitalized by funding from Ethena Labs’ funding round, as well as an uncollateralized portion of proceeds generated by USDe. In the future, as the circulating supply of USDe grows, these funds will be capitalized through long-term yields. As of this writing, the insurance fund is $16 million.
Neither USDT nor USDe is risk-free. However, the risks are different. Tether and Ethena may eventually fail, but for different reasons.
When people begin to believe that the yield on USDe is not high, USDe's circulation will increase.
This is where the upcoming Ethena governance token comes into play.
Ethena Valuation
Like any currency issuer, Ethena lives or dies by seigniorage. This is the difference between the cost of creating money and the cost of creating money. I'd like to propose a simple model for valuing Ethena based on these seigniorage revenues. For those who might be purchasing the Ethena governance token in the coming months, you should at least try to build a model to evaluate the protocol.
Any USDe issued can be staked and earn earnings on ETH staked plus perpetual funding. As of now, Ethena will distribute the income generated by assets backing sUSDe, while the income generated by assets backing uncollateralized USDe will be sent to the insurance fund after this sharding event ends, and this income will enter the protocol. I estimate that the long-term split will be 80% of the revenue generated by the protocol goes to the staked USDe (sUSDe), and 20% of the revenue generated goes to the Ethena protocol.
Ethena protocol annual revenue = total revenue (1–80% (1 — sUSDe supply / USDe supply ))
If 100% of USDe is staked, i.e. sUSDe supply = USDe supply:
Ethena protocol annual income = total income 20%
Total yield = USDe supply * (ETH staking yield + ETH Perp swap funds)
ETH staking yield and ETH Perp Swap funds are both variable interest rates. Recent history can guide us to future possibilities.
ETH Staking Yield — I am assuming a 4% PA yield.
ETH Perp Swap Funding – I assume PA is 20%.
A key part of the model is that a fully diluted valuation (FDV) of revenue multiples should be used. This is always a guessing game, but I will suggest some future paths based on similar DeFi stablecoin projects.
Using these multiples as a guide, I created the following potential Ethena FDV.
Ethena generated a 67% return this week on $820 million in assets. Assuming a 50% supply ratio of sUSDe to USDe, extrapolated one year later, Ethena’s annualized revenue would be approximately $300 million. Using an Ondo-like valuation results in an FDV of $189 billion. Does this mean Ethena's FDV will be close to $200 billion at launch? No. But it does mean that the market will pay a high valuation for Ethena's future revenue.
Summarize
If you don’t remember anything else from this post, remember this:
Ethena For Us, By Us, aka FUBU (For Us, By Us).
Tether is For Us, By Them, also known as FUBAR (For Us, By Them).
You can decide whether to go long or short USDe or ultimately the Ethena governance token. I hope this article sheds some light on Ethena’s mission and why it is so important to the success of cryptocurrencies.
With that, I bid you farewell because I have to concentrate on not damaging my thighs while shredding all this crusty snow.
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