Putin is betting on time, but his reserves are running low
The Soviet Union spent forty years building up its outdoor tank stockpiles. In just over three years, nearly 70% of them have been depleted. Putin has staked this entire war on the idea that “if we keep grinding away, the West will eventually back down.” But that bet depends on one thing: having deep enough reserves to keep fighting indefinitely. That assumption is starting to look shaky.
First, consider his calculations. Russia has more than three times Ukraine’s population, its authoritarian system can withstand casualties, and its arms factories can run around the clock in three shifts. By contrast, governments in Europe and the US change every few years. Voters resent high prices and the money spent on aid to Ukraine; all the bickering could eventually tear the coalition apart. So his strategy comes down to one thing: grind them down. Keep the front from collapsing completely, drag the war into a long, drawn-out trench fight, and wait for the other side to lose heart. Then what he wants will fall into his hands.
The problem is that grinding it out costs money and resources. We can break down the bill.
The first cost is steel.
During the first two years of the war, Russian forces fired tens of thousands of artillery shells a day and sent a steady stream of armored vehicles to the front. Many people thought Russia had truly built an arms industry with a bottomless supply. But a look at satellite images tells a different story: most of the hulking machines sent to the battlefield were never built in new factories. They were leftovers from the Cold War, piled up at vast Soviet storage bases in Siberia and the Far East. From T-72s and T-80s to T-55s from the 1950s, tens of thousands of tanks sat across the wastelands in a sea of steel. The main job of wartime factories was to haul these rusting old hulls into workshops and strip parts from three vehicles to make one that could move and fight.
Those reserves did help Russia withstand the heavy losses of the first two years. But satellite images now show that bases that were once packed are mostly empty patches of dirt. Almost all the usable old vehicles and spare parts have been picked clean.
Once those reserves are gone, Russia has to rely on new production, and its limitations become obvious. Even running at full capacity, Russia can build only around 200 to 300 modern main battle tanks a year. Cheap FPV drones and precision strikes are everywhere along the front, and Russian forces can lose hundreds of armored vehicles in a single month. Replacing a monthly shortfall of hundreds with 200 to 300 vehicles a year is like trying to catch a burst fire hydrant with a teacup. Every extra month of war makes this trump card of mechanized forces a little weaker.
The second cost is people.
Russia has a large population, but without a full-scale nationwide mobilization, there is a limit to how many young men it can send into the trenches. Moscow fears that general mobilization could trigger social unrest, so it can only spend money across the country to “recruit” soldiers. Early in the war, volunteer enlistment bonuses were around 200,000 to 300,000 rubles. Later, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and regional governments kept raising the sums to meet their quotas, pushing signing bonuses up to 3 million or 4 million rubles—tens of thousands of dollars in cash. Some places even pay referral bonuses: bring someone in to enlist and you can pocket over a million rubles.
The price has risen more than tenfold. That shows the pool of people willing to risk their lives for money is nearly tapped out.
The trouble also spreads to the home front. Many of those lured away by huge bonuses were machine-factory workers, truck drivers, construction welders, and farmers. With hundreds of thousands pulled away to fill the front lines, the country is facing a labor shortage. Private businesses can only keep their workers by raising wages too, competing with the military and arms factories. Wages have gone up, but the supply of everyday goods has not, so prices have soared along with them.
That sets off the third cost: the slow suffocation of finance and the economy.
To bring inflation under control, Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina raised the benchmark interest rate to 21%. That means that, apart from arms companies receiving direct government funding, civilian businesses, real estate, logistics, and manufacturing plants that borrow from banks to stay afloat can see their profits eaten up by interest alone. Investment has ground to a halt.
The Russian economy as a whole is turning into a grotesque blood-extraction pump. Liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund are being drained in large amounts to cover military spending and compensation payments, while the civilian economy is bleeding on a massive scale to make way for the arms industry. In return, the front line advances just tens to hundreds of meters a day, through places left in ruins.
At this stage, a war of attrition is no longer about who can make the fiercest threats. The real test is whether society and the economy can withstand the daily bleeding. The Soviet Union’s forty-year stockpile of tanks is nearly gone, signing bonuses have risen more than tenfold and still aren’t enough to recruit people, and the central bank is pinning the civilian economy to the ground with a 21% interest rate.
Putin believes time is on his side and that, if he drags this out, he can wear down his opponents. But these calculations suggest that with every passing month, his own country—an overworked machine running beyond capacity—is being worn down too, consuming reserves it will need for years to come.
The Soviet Union spent forty years building up its outdoor tank stockpiles. In just over three years, nearly 70% of them have been depleted. Putin has staked this entire war on the idea that “if we keep grinding away, the West will eventually back down.” But that bet depends on one thing: having deep enough reserves to keep fighting indefinitely. That assumption is starting to look shaky.
First, consider his calculations. Russia has more than three times Ukraine’s population, its authoritarian system can withstand casualties, and its arms factories can run around the clock in three shifts. By contrast, governments in Europe and the US change every few years. Voters resent high prices and the money spent on aid to Ukraine; all the bickering could eventually tear the coalition apart. So his strategy comes down to one thing: grind them down. Keep the front from collapsing completely, drag the war into a long, drawn-out trench fight, and wait for the other side to lose heart. Then what he wants will fall into his hands.
The problem is that grinding it out costs money and resources. We can break down the bill.
The first cost is steel.
During the first two years of the war, Russian forces fired tens of thousands of artillery shells a day and sent a steady stream of armored vehicles to the front. Many people thought Russia had truly built an arms industry with a bottomless supply. But a look at satellite images tells a different story: most of the hulking machines sent to the battlefield were never built in new factories. They were leftovers from the Cold War, piled up at vast Soviet storage bases in Siberia and the Far East. From T-72s and T-80s to T-55s from the 1950s, tens of thousands of tanks sat across the wastelands in a sea of steel. The main job of wartime factories was to haul these rusting old hulls into workshops and strip parts from three vehicles to make one that could move and fight.
Those reserves did help Russia withstand the heavy losses of the first two years. But satellite images now show that bases that were once packed are mostly empty patches of dirt. Almost all the usable old vehicles and spare parts have been picked clean.
Once those reserves are gone, Russia has to rely on new production, and its limitations become obvious. Even running at full capacity, Russia can build only around 200 to 300 modern main battle tanks a year. Cheap FPV drones and precision strikes are everywhere along the front, and Russian forces can lose hundreds of armored vehicles in a single month. Replacing a monthly shortfall of hundreds with 200 to 300 vehicles a year is like trying to catch a burst fire hydrant with a teacup. Every extra month of war makes this trump card of mechanized forces a little weaker.
The second cost is people.
Russia has a large population, but without a full-scale nationwide mobilization, there is a limit to how many young men it can send into the trenches. Moscow fears that general mobilization could trigger social unrest, so it can only spend money across the country to “recruit” soldiers. Early in the war, volunteer enlistment bonuses were around 200,000 to 300,000 rubles. Later, Moscow, St. Petersburg, and regional governments kept raising the sums to meet their quotas, pushing signing bonuses up to 3 million or 4 million rubles—tens of thousands of dollars in cash. Some places even pay referral bonuses: bring someone in to enlist and you can pocket over a million rubles.
The price has risen more than tenfold. That shows the pool of people willing to risk their lives for money is nearly tapped out.
The trouble also spreads to the home front. Many of those lured away by huge bonuses were machine-factory workers, truck drivers, construction welders, and farmers. With hundreds of thousands pulled away to fill the front lines, the country is facing a labor shortage. Private businesses can only keep their workers by raising wages too, competing with the military and arms factories. Wages have gone up, but the supply of everyday goods has not, so prices have soared along with them.
That sets off the third cost: the slow suffocation of finance and the economy.
To bring inflation under control, Russian Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina raised the benchmark interest rate to 21%. That means that, apart from arms companies receiving direct government funding, civilian businesses, real estate, logistics, and manufacturing plants that borrow from banks to stay afloat can see their profits eaten up by interest alone. Investment has ground to a halt.
The Russian economy as a whole is turning into a grotesque blood-extraction pump. Liquid assets in the National Wealth Fund are being drained in large amounts to cover military spending and compensation payments, while the civilian economy is bleeding on a massive scale to make way for the arms industry. In return, the front line advances just tens to hundreds of meters a day, through places left in ruins.
At this stage, a war of attrition is no longer about who can make the fiercest threats. The real test is whether society and the economy can withstand the daily bleeding. The Soviet Union’s forty-year stockpile of tanks is nearly gone, signing bonuses have risen more than tenfold and still aren’t enough to recruit people, and the central bank is pinning the civilian economy to the ground with a 21% interest rate.
Putin believes time is on his side and that, if he drags this out, he can wear down his opponents. But these calculations suggest that with every passing month, his own country—an overworked machine running beyond capacity—is being worn down too, consuming reserves it will need for years to come.
