During the market sell-off on November 21, NEAR fell 13.6%. On the same day, a whale’s long position holding multiple tokens was liquidated. The position had a notional value of about $61.79 million and an overall loss of about $11.17 million; NEAR was included in the list of liquidated assets. The available information confirms that NEAR was caught up in this round of risk reduction.

NEAR’s appearance on the liquidation list does not mean it caused the losses

This position was held for about a year and a half and involved tokens including ETH, XRP, DOGE, CRV, BCH, WLD, NEAR, WIF, and ENA. The disclosed $61.79 million was the value of the entire group of long positions, and the $11.17 million was also the overall loss; no separate figures were provided for the size of the NEAR position, its entry cost, liquidation price, or profit and loss.

But this information still matters to the market: when leveraged long positions span multiple assets, a sharp downturn can cause liquidations to spread forced selling pressure across the different tokens in those portfolios. NEAR’s appearance on the list shows that it was not insulated from this deleveraging process; the available disclosures do not make it possible to quantify the actual impact.

A 13.6% decline amid a broad sell-off

The same round of market coverage described November 21 as a broad sell-off and reported that NEAR fell 13.6% that day, while noting that several other tokens also posted double-digit losses. The coverage also said that liquidations across the market over nearly an hour had climbed to $63.6 billion, with leveraged longs facing concentrated liquidations. That figure reflects the entire market, not NEAR alone, and cannot be treated as NEAR’s liquidation volume.

The explanation best supported by the evidence for now is that NEAR’s sharp drop occurred amid broad pressure on risk assets and the forced unwinding of leveraged positions. A single day’s decline is not enough to determine whether fundamentals have deteriorated independently of the broader market; likewise, the fact that NEAR fell in tandem with the market does not mean it faced no selling pressure of its own.

Funding signals are bearish, but NEAR-specific breakdowns are lacking

The available material offers two clues: NEAR was included in a large, multi-asset long liquidation, and market coverage reported NEAR’s one-day decline. Together, these point to short-term pressure on market funding conditions, but they do not answer the key questions: Were NEAR spot holdings actively sold or did they simply follow the broader market down? What share of the move came from futures leverage and liquidations? Did sustained net outflows or buying support emerge after the decline?

Another set of market data discusses a negative net balance of active spot buying and selling in Bitcoin, rising trading volumes, and diverging performance between technology stocks and crypto assets. This can provide context for weakening risk appetite across the market, but it is not data on NEAR’s flows. Equating macro or Bitcoin selling pressure directly with specific flows in NEAR would go beyond what the evidence supports.

The question is whether this was systemic deleveraging or whether NEAR was weaker on its own

The bearish interpretation is that NEAR came under pressure alongside other double-digit decliners and appeared on a list of leveraged liquidations across multiple assets. If NEAR-specific selling continues, liquidations increase, or rebounds prove weak, the decline may reflect more than a market-wide move in tandem and could point to stronger asset-specific selling pressure.

An alternative interpretation is that the decline was driven mainly by market-wide risk reduction and cascading leveraged liquidations. The liquidation of multi-asset positions does not prove that holders were specifically bearish on NEAR. If the broader market stabilizes and NEAR stops consistently underperforming, the systemic-selling explanation will carry more weight.

What to watch next—and what would overturn this assessment

Assessing the move requires going beyond a single day’s price action and one liquidation involving a portfolio, and looking instead at comparable follow-up data: NEAR spot trading volume and the direction of active buying and selling, changes in futures open interest and liquidations, relative performance across assets, and whether NEAR rebounds when the broader market does. In particular, it is important to distinguish whether the higher volume accompanying the price decline came from panic selling, leveraged position closures, or normal turnover. The current material does not provide these answers.

If subsequent data show that NEAR continues to weaken while the broader market stabilizes, alongside sustained selling pressure or rising liquidations attributable to NEAR, the explanation that this was “mainly market-wide deleveraging” would be weakened. Conversely, if NEAR recovers with the market, sees no sustained coin-specific liquidations or selling pressure, and its relative performance stops deteriorating, it would be more reasonable to view the decline as the result of broad risk reduction. Based on the evidence available now, we can confirm the sharp drop and the liquidation backdrop, but not NEAR-specific fund flows or the extent to which they caused the decline.