Bitcoin wallet signing errors can be spotted by bots within seconds: this is a self-custody risk, not a failure of the Bitcoin protocol

The bottom line: The topic currently appearing on Binance Square’s trending page—“A Bitcoin wallet signature vulnerability can be exploited by bots within seconds”—is worth paying attention to not because “Bitcoin has been hacked,” but because it points to a more specific self-custody issue: if wallet software reuses the nonce in ECDSA signatures, public transactions may help attackers recover the private key. Once an address enters the public mempool, automated programs can try to transfer the funds within seconds.

This is not a universal vulnerability affecting all BTC wallets, nor does it explain BTC’s current decline. At around 01:04 Beijing time on November 21, Binance BTC/USDT spot was about 59,222.01 USDT, down 5.165% over 24 hours. The intraday high and low were about 63,408.62 / 58,768.73, and quote volume was about 1.919 billion USDT. Spot trading:

https://www.binance.com/zh-CN/trade/BTC_USDT

What happened? University of Liège researchers Vincent Jacquot and Benoît Donnet scanned ECDSA signatures across six blockchains and found that nonce reuse can create the mathematical conditions needed to recover private keys. Across the chains, the paper recovered 3,620 private keys, including 3,278 for BTC. “Recovered” here refers to keys exposed by historical signatures; it does not mean those addresses still hold funds today, or that all associated funds were stolen.

The researchers also deployed test addresses containing only a few dollars. The paper records that once vulnerable BTC addresses entered the mempool, automated transfer attempts appeared. A November 20 CoinDesk report further describes how, after the researchers deliberately produced signature errors, bots appeared within a second or a few seconds, with different transactions even competing for the same test funds. Using November 2024 prices, the paper estimates that vulnerable addresses had a combined historical peak balance of about €101 million. This figure is an upper bound on historical exposure, not a confirmed amount stolen.

The real implication for BTC holders is that “wallet implementation details” belong on the risk checklist again. Private keys are not posted directly on-chain, but signatures disclose the information needed for verification. If the same private key mistakenly reuses the same nonce, an attacker may be able to derive the private key from multiple signatures. At that point, the question is no longer “Can someone guess the password?” Anyone can see the address, monitor the mempool, and use bots to submit a transfer first.

Now let’s look at the derivatives side. Binance BTCUSDT USDⓈ-M perpetual trading:

https://www.binance.com/zh-CN/futures/BTCUSDT

At the same snapshot, the perpetual contract was about 59,196.00 USDT, down 5.196% over 24 hours, with quote volume of about 24.021 billion USDT. The mark price was about 59,201.20, the latest funding rate was about -0.001908% per settlement period, and open interest was about 97,136.461 BTC. Perpetual volume far exceeding spot volume only indicates greater activity in leveraged markets; it cannot be interpreted as net spot outflows or selling pressure caused by a wallet incident. Nor can a negative funding rate alone prove that the decline has bottomed.

The market structure itself remains weak: the most recently closed 4-hour spot candlestick (20:00–24:00 Beijing time) closed at about 59,475.47, while the current 00:00–04:00 candle has not yet closed. The cover chart shows the downtrend in a local 4-hour chart and its automatically scaled price axis; intraday readings should not be presented as confirmed closing prices. Event analysis and price analysis should be kept separate: a wallet security incident affects control over assets, while the current decline still needs to be explained in terms of spot demand, closing-price structure, and market liquidity. The two should not be forcibly linked as cause and effect.

My assessment: this story is more valuable as a reminder about the safety of self-custody than as an indicator of BTC’s short-term price direction. Users should check their wallet software version, random-number generation and signing implementation, whether historical transactions show signs of nonce reuse, and whether any affected addresses still hold funds. They should not move all their BTC to an unknown address just because they heard that “bots spotted it within seconds.” Any migration should begin by verifying the destination address, software source, and small-amount test process.

What would overturn this assessment? If subsequent evidence shows that the issue was confined to old software, that current implementations in mainstream wallets systematically prevent nonce reuse, and that no new cases involving mainstream wallets have emerged, then the incremental risk to current holders should be downgraded. Conversely, if a new, independently verifiable vulnerability emerges, a mainstream wallet is affected, or large transfers directly linked to nonce reuse continue to appear on-chain, the risk weighting should be raised.

Risk note: This article covers a trending topic, academic research, and publicly available market data; it is not investment advice. Historical exposure amounts in the research are not equivalent to actual losses. Wallet security depends on the specific software, hardware, random-number generation, signing process, and address usage. Spot and USDⓈ-M perpetual contracts differ in liquidity, funding rates, leverage, liquidation, and settlement mechanisms. The current 4-hour candle has not yet closed.

Sources: Binance Square trends page (observed at around 01:04 on November 21, 2026); University of Liège / Montefiore Institute (Oops... I Did It Again. I Reused my Nonce.) (research paper); CoinDesk (Bitcoin bots pounced within seconds when researchers exposed their wallet keys) (November 20, 2026).

#BitcoinWalletSignatureFlawExploitableWithinSeconds #比特币安全 #SelfCustody

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