Trump Media says it can repay $880 million of debt without selling crypto or issuing new shares. I read its 10-Q, and it sounds a lot easier than it is.
First, the debt itself. In May 2025, the company issued $1 billion of zero-coupon convertible notes due in 2028. But holders have a one-time right on November 30 to demand repayment in cash at par. The conversion price is about $34.72, while DJT is hovering around $4, so conversion is basically off the table. Zero interest, a worthless conversion option, and a share price near historic lows—if I were a holder, I’d definitely put the notes back to the company for cash on the 30th. So it’s reasonable to assume almost the full $883.5 million will need to be repaid; don’t count on many holders hanging on to their notes.
Now, the cash. At the end of September, the company had about $393 million in cash and short-term investments, plus $31 million in restricted cash. Since then, it spent money to repurchase $100 million in face value of notes, and borrowed another $100 million on October 7. A rough calculation using the September 30 figures still leaves a shortfall of around $400–500 million. The company holds about 15,649 BTC, worth less than $1 billion at around $63,700 per bitcoin. If it covers the entire shortfall by selling bitcoin, it would need to sell roughly 7,000–8,000 BTC, or close to half its holdings. That’s my estimate; the final figure depends on how much it can borrow.
The really interesting part is the collateral structure. The 10-Q is very clear: when calculating the collateral coverage ratio, BTC is counted at just 52.6% of its market value. At the end of September, the BTC pledged as collateral was worth $356 million. Working backward from the end-of-September holdings value reported by CoinDesk, I estimate this was about 4,250 BTC—almost exactly the 4,259 BTC that Arkham labeled as having moved from the collateral wallet to Crypto.com on November 5. Moving coins to an exchange doesn’t mean they were sold, and Crypto.com itself may simply be the custodian. But it’s a fact that these coins moved. What’s more, the first portion of the collateral won’t be released until the outstanding principal falls below $500 million. In other words, the company has to come up with at least $380 million in actual cash before it can get back the portion of its bitcoin that’s locked up.
So I don’t believe the “we won’t sell bitcoin” line. At best, it can “sell less.” The 10-Q itself says that if financing isn’t sufficient, the company may sell bitcoin or other digital assets. For the market, 7,000–8,000 BTC isn’t really that much; what really hurts is that the story of “public companies hoard bitcoin and never sell” has another counterexample. With the convertible-debt-funded bitcoin-buying strategy, when the bitcoin price falls and the share price falls, the conversion option turns into plain debt—and the maturity date becomes a major cash test. Just keep an eye on those collateral addresses around the 30th.
#比特币 #DJT
First, the debt itself. In May 2025, the company issued $1 billion of zero-coupon convertible notes due in 2028. But holders have a one-time right on November 30 to demand repayment in cash at par. The conversion price is about $34.72, while DJT is hovering around $4, so conversion is basically off the table. Zero interest, a worthless conversion option, and a share price near historic lows—if I were a holder, I’d definitely put the notes back to the company for cash on the 30th. So it’s reasonable to assume almost the full $883.5 million will need to be repaid; don’t count on many holders hanging on to their notes.
Now, the cash. At the end of September, the company had about $393 million in cash and short-term investments, plus $31 million in restricted cash. Since then, it spent money to repurchase $100 million in face value of notes, and borrowed another $100 million on October 7. A rough calculation using the September 30 figures still leaves a shortfall of around $400–500 million. The company holds about 15,649 BTC, worth less than $1 billion at around $63,700 per bitcoin. If it covers the entire shortfall by selling bitcoin, it would need to sell roughly 7,000–8,000 BTC, or close to half its holdings. That’s my estimate; the final figure depends on how much it can borrow.
The really interesting part is the collateral structure. The 10-Q is very clear: when calculating the collateral coverage ratio, BTC is counted at just 52.6% of its market value. At the end of September, the BTC pledged as collateral was worth $356 million. Working backward from the end-of-September holdings value reported by CoinDesk, I estimate this was about 4,250 BTC—almost exactly the 4,259 BTC that Arkham labeled as having moved from the collateral wallet to Crypto.com on November 5. Moving coins to an exchange doesn’t mean they were sold, and Crypto.com itself may simply be the custodian. But it’s a fact that these coins moved. What’s more, the first portion of the collateral won’t be released until the outstanding principal falls below $500 million. In other words, the company has to come up with at least $380 million in actual cash before it can get back the portion of its bitcoin that’s locked up.
So I don’t believe the “we won’t sell bitcoin” line. At best, it can “sell less.” The 10-Q itself says that if financing isn’t sufficient, the company may sell bitcoin or other digital assets. For the market, 7,000–8,000 BTC isn’t really that much; what really hurts is that the story of “public companies hoard bitcoin and never sell” has another counterexample. With the convertible-debt-funded bitcoin-buying strategy, when the bitcoin price falls and the share price falls, the conversion option turns into plain debt—and the maturity date becomes a major cash test. Just keep an eye on those collateral addresses around the 30th.
#比特币 #DJT