The U.S. government is shifting its focus in combating online fraud from “tracing funds after victims report the crime” to “identifying and blocking payments as soon as possible after they are made.” On November 18 local time, the Trump administration announced the establishment of the Threat Disruption Center, a joint initiative of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice. It will operate under the National Coordination Center, which is part of the Homeland Security Task Force.

According to the U.S. government and related reports, the center will connect more than 30 federal agencies and over 440 state and local partners to help track fraudulent activity, identify criminal networks, and work with banks, payment providers, and crypto platforms to act before funds are transferred, laundered, or used again to target another victim. Blockchain intelligence firm TRM Labs was selected as the center’s primary private-sector partner, providing its Ardence investigation platform as well as engineering and investigative support.

The core of this initiative is not to establish a new cryptocurrency regulator, but to connect the stages of scam cases—“information sharing, network identification, payment disruption, asset tracing, and victim relief.” For the crypto industry, the key point is that exchanges, wallet providers, payment companies, and blockchain analytics firms may be drawn more deeply into the U.S. government’s collaborative framework for tackling cross-border scam networks.

From tracking individual cases to disrupting networks

The U.S. government’s announcement that it was establishing a new center comes against a backdrop in which online scams are no longer isolated individual crimes. The FBI says scam syndicates increasingly rely on social media, web hosting and domain infrastructure, banks and payment systems, and cryptocurrency services to reach victims, collect funds, and launder money. Scam centers may also be intertwined with human trafficking, forced labor, and cross-border organized crime.

A related fact sheet released by the White House says the executive order directs the government to identify transnational criminal organizations that operate scam centers and engage in cybercrime, and to submit action plans to prevent, disrupt, investigate, and dismantle those organizations. One measure is to establish a dedicated operations unit within the National Coordination Center. The newly established Threat Disruption Center can be seen as putting this approach into practice: rather than dealing with a single instance of stolen funds, it seeks to bring victim reports, law enforcement data, financial transactions, and information on cyber infrastructure into a single operational chain.

This shift matters because tracking scam proceeds is highly time-sensitive. An FBI official said that every hour between a victim reporting a crime and law enforcement responding could give criminals more time to move stolen funds and find their next target. In cases involving digital assets, funds can move among multiple wallets, trading platforms, and cross-chain services. By the time a case reaches the traditional criminal investigation stage, recovering the funds has often become more difficult.

Crypto platforms occupy a key position in the payment chain

The new center does not mean that the government will directly freeze every suspicious transaction. A more realistic approach is to use interagency information sharing and private-sector compliance tools to shorten the time between identifying a risk and a platform taking action. Banks, payment companies, and crypto platforms each hold data from different parts of the process: banks may see fiat deposits and withdrawals and account activity; trading platforms can monitor deposits, withdrawals, address labels, and links between accounts; and blockchain analytics firms can aggregate transactions scattered across the chain into a map of fund flows.

TRM Labs’ selection as the primary private-sector partner shows that blockchain intelligence is intended to play more than an after-the-fact forensic role in this system. According to reports, TRM will provide its Ardence platform to map scam networks, identify victims, and offer engineering and investigative support. The value of platform-based tools lies in making the relationships among addresses, transactions, service providers, and known criminal entities visible, helping law enforcement and financial institutions determine whether a transfer is ordinary user activity or part of a larger scam network.

The U.S. Department of Justice has already adopted a similar collaborative approach through its Scam Center Strike Force. The force involves the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, the FBI, and the U.S. Secret Service. It also works with the State Department, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control, and other agencies, focusing on scam centers in Southeast Asia, crypto investment scams, cyber-enabled fraud, and money laundering.

The Justice Department’s public website says its Scam Center Strike Force has restrained a total of $1,006,460,156.82 in assets linked to these schemes. That figure is the amount of cryptocurrency listed as “restrained” on the department’s website; it does not mean the assets have been forfeited, liquidated, or returned. Their disposition remains subject to subsequent legal proceedings. In April this year, the Justice Department also announced the creation of the National Fraud Enforcement Division, dedicated to investigating and prosecuting fraud that harms Americans.

Taken together, the new center, the National Fraud Enforcement Division, and the Scam Center Strike Force have distinct roles at different levels: the Threat Disruption Center focuses more on interagency information sharing and operational coordination; the Scam Center Strike Force handles investigations, prosecutions, and asset-related actions in specific cases; the National Fraud Enforcement Division expands enforcement capacity across different types of fraud; and the Treasury Department can use sanctions, financial intelligence, and other financial tools to cut off service nodes in criminal networks.

The focus is not just on “tracing crypto,” but on cutting off a multifaceted criminal infrastructure

Understanding the new center solely as a cryptocurrency enforcement agency may underestimate its reach. The flow of funds is often just one part of a scam network’s broader criminal infrastructure. Criminals may first contact victims through social platforms, then use fake investment websites or communications tools impersonating government agencies or customer service representatives to build trust, before asking victims to pay by bank transfer, payment app, or digital asset. Some overseas scam centers also involve trafficked people being forced to carry out scams, with the proceeds laundered through layers of accounts and wallets.

Disrupting payments therefore requires action across multiple nodes: restricting accounts used to recruit victims, shutting down malicious domains and hosting services, identifying the bank accounts and crypto addresses receiving funds, manually reviewing high-risk withdrawals, and freezing or restricting related assets where legally permissible. The Justice Department’s “Disruption Week” brought in private-sector participants including Apple, Coinbase, Google, Meta, Microsoft, Silent Push, SpaceX, TRM Labs, and Zenlayer. Using data held by the government and their own data, participating organizations identified and disrupted scams that violated their terms of service, showing that U.S. law enforcement is seeking to combine platform governance with criminal enforcement.

The U.S. Treasury Department’s actions point in the same direction. Treasury has imposed sanctions targeting scam networks in Southeast Asia and stressed that it will continue using financial tools to combat overseas scam operations while preventing the digital asset industry from being exploited for illegal purposes. For trading platforms, this means compliance reviews may no longer focus only on a single address or one-off transaction, but may also extend to the organizations behind an address, sanctioned entities, sources of funds, and activity across platforms.

Policy effectiveness depends on speed, evidence, and clear limits

Whether the new center can reduce losses from scams will first depend on whether information can be shared quickly enough. Victims often realize something is wrong only after making several payments. If financial institutions and platforms can act only after receiving a complete police report or court order, the scope for prevention will be limited. Conversely, overly broad risk models could disrupt legitimate cross-border payments, freeze innocent users’ assets, or expose platforms to excessive compliance risks when clear evidence is lacking.

The second challenge is cross-border enforcement. Scam centers and related service nodes are usually located outside the United States, while suspects, servers, bank accounts, and crypto wallets may be spread across multiple jurisdictions. The U.S. government can apply pressure through sanctions, domain actions, asset restrictions, and criminal prosecutions, but the ultimate forfeiture of assets, cross-border evidence gathering, and restitution to victims still require cooperation from foreign governments. For on-chain assets, public ledgers help with tracing, but they cannot automatically resolve real-world questions of identity, jurisdiction, and asset ownership.

The third challenge is distinguishing between a technological tool and responsibility for wrongdoing. Blockchain is payment infrastructure that scam proceeds may pass through, but scams themselves typically rely on social engineering, false identities, cross-platform communications, and organized money laundering. Simply attributing risk to a particular blockchain or type of digital asset could obscure the criminal networks and service providers that actually need to be addressed. A more effective regulatory approach would take action based on specific conduct, verifiable risk indicators, and lawful procedures, rather than assigning blanket blame to an entire industry.

For the crypto industry, three developments will be worth watching: first, whether the Threat Disruption Center publishes specific case-response mechanisms, data-sharing standards, and procedures for platform participation; second, whether exchanges and wallet providers are required to identify and report addresses and fund flows linked to scam centers more quickly; and third, whether legal processes for handling restricted assets and returning them to victims can become transparent and repeatable.

The Trump administration’s establishment of this center sends a clear policy signal: cross-border scams are no longer viewed solely as a consumer protection issue, but are being brought under a shared framework encompassing cybersecurity, financial crime, digital asset regulation, and national security. The real test is not whether another agency name is added, but whether scattered information can be turned into timely, accurate, and legally grounded action. For the crypto industry, the more deeply payment infrastructure is integrated into the traditional financial system, the more platforms will need to demonstrate that they can identify risks, preserve evidence, and disrupt criminal funds within the bounds of the law.