This Optimizely poisoning is more worth two minutes of your time than news about yet another exchange getting hacked. Because it didn't target a particular project—it targeted the default assumption that “big websites are safe.”
The incident was exposed on 11/16 by security researcher Scott Helme (Report URI). The attackers injected code into the JS on Optimizely customer projects. Optimizely is an A/B testing tool, and the scripts it provides are installed on the websites of a lot of major companies. They examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found that 188 across 178 organizations had been infected. The list includes Zoom, BBC, CNN, HSBC, Equifax, GitLab, IKEA, and the Ledger website. StepSecurity confirmed 186 affected sites.
The malicious code did something simple: whenever a valid wallet address appeared on your page, in your clipboard, or even in an outgoing request, it replaced it with the attacker's address. BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, SOL, and TON were all targeted. It first validates the address format, so the replacement address is perfectly valid and your wallet won't flag an error. StepSecurity also found that it only acts when words like wallet, deposit, or send appear nearby—in other words, it watches for the moment you're making a transfer. Report URI's account is even scarier: as long as an infected page is still open, addresses you copy elsewhere could also be swapped. It also steals card numbers, cookies, and screenshots, and loads an exploit kit on iPhones.
The key point is that this code was served directly from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate. Protections like website allowlists and CSP can't stop it, because the source is the very provider that's already trusted. At the end of October, Polymarket was tripped up by the speed-testing script DebugBear in the same way: when a third-party script is compromised, even the biggest main site is helpless.
So far, around $7,000 in on-chain transfers have been confirmed. Not a lot of money. But that only means it was caught early; it doesn't mean the method doesn't work. Hudson Rock says the earliest record of the loader dates back to 11/13, and that the same loader also appeared in scripts from other companies, including Kissmetrics and StorifyMe. Optimizely still hadn't issued a statement when I posted this.
I have just three rules of my own. Before transferring, check several characters at the beginning, end, and middle of the address—don't just look at the beginning. Only withdraw to addresses on an exchange's allowlist. If you use a hardware wallet, trust the address displayed on the device screen, and not a single character on the webpage. People have been saying this for years, and every time, someone learns the hard way at this very step.
#Security
The incident was exposed on 11/16 by security researcher Scott Helme (Report URI). The attackers injected code into the JS on Optimizely customer projects. Optimizely is an A/B testing tool, and the scripts it provides are installed on the websites of a lot of major companies. They examined 1,611 Optimizely scripts and found that 188 across 178 organizations had been infected. The list includes Zoom, BBC, CNN, HSBC, Equifax, GitLab, IKEA, and the Ledger website. StepSecurity confirmed 186 affected sites.
The malicious code did something simple: whenever a valid wallet address appeared on your page, in your clipboard, or even in an outgoing request, it replaced it with the attacker's address. BTC, ETH and EVM chains, TRON, SOL, and TON were all targeted. It first validates the address format, so the replacement address is perfectly valid and your wallet won't flag an error. StepSecurity also found that it only acts when words like wallet, deposit, or send appear nearby—in other words, it watches for the moment you're making a transfer. Report URI's account is even scarier: as long as an infected page is still open, addresses you copy elsewhere could also be swapped. It also steals card numbers, cookies, and screenshots, and loads an exploit kit on iPhones.
The key point is that this code was served directly from cdn.optimizely.com, with Optimizely's certificate. Protections like website allowlists and CSP can't stop it, because the source is the very provider that's already trusted. At the end of October, Polymarket was tripped up by the speed-testing script DebugBear in the same way: when a third-party script is compromised, even the biggest main site is helpless.
So far, around $7,000 in on-chain transfers have been confirmed. Not a lot of money. But that only means it was caught early; it doesn't mean the method doesn't work. Hudson Rock says the earliest record of the loader dates back to 11/13, and that the same loader also appeared in scripts from other companies, including Kissmetrics and StorifyMe. Optimizely still hadn't issued a statement when I posted this.
I have just three rules of my own. Before transferring, check several characters at the beginning, end, and middle of the address—don't just look at the beginning. Only withdraw to addresses on an exchange's allowlist. If you use a hardware wallet, trust the address displayed on the device screen, and not a single character on the webpage. People have been saying this for years, and every time, someone learns the hard way at this very step.
#Security