At a conference for developers and professionals in the crypto industry, former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson again expressed skepticism about Bitcoin. The central question he raised was not how Bitcoin’s price might move in the short term, but an institutional issue that participants in the traditional financial system can hardly avoid: when a major loss occurs on a network with no central issuer, board of directors, or unified customer service channel, who is responsible for explaining what happened, who compensates those affected, and who should victims hold accountable?
Speaking at the Solana Breakpoint event in London, Johnson said he still could not see “who is in charge” of the world’s largest cryptocurrency. He also deliberately mispronounced the name of Bitcoin’s pseudonymous creator, Satoshi Nakamoto, as “Yakimoto Nakasori,” and said that if $6 billion were stolen from a cryptocurrency, he would not know whom to contact or how to get the money back. This figure was hypothetical and did not refer to any confirmed theft.
It is worth noting that Johnson did not dismiss all blockchain applications out of hand. He said he had fewer reservations about blockchain technology itself and that London should take the lead in blockchain and asset tokenization. His remarks draw a clear distinction: an open, permissionless monetary network and blockchain applications that can be governed jointly by institutions, regulators, and contractual relationships do not necessarily face the same risks.
“Who is responsible?” is part of Bitcoin’s design—and the part traditional institutions are least equipped to handle
Johnson’s criticism drew attention at the crypto industry event because it touched on the structural differences between Bitcoin and traditional finance. Commercial banks, payment institutions, and securities issuers usually have clearly identified legal entities, subject to capital requirements, audits, consumer protection rules, and judicial jurisdiction. When users run into problems with their assets, recovering funds is not necessarily easy, but at least there is an organization that can be regulated, sued, or asked to explain itself.
Bitcoin, by contrast, shifts some of the trust from institutions to public rules. The network is maintained jointly through open-source software, a consensus mechanism, nodes, and miners. Once a transaction has received sufficient confirmations, it is generally difficult to reverse. No central issuer can unilaterally alter the ledger, and no governing body can freeze or reverse a transaction without the agreement of all participants. For supporters, this is precisely Bitcoin’s value: it reduces reliance on a single intermediary and makes monetary rules more transparent.
But the same design also creates the dilemma Johnson described. The Bitcoin protocol can confirm whether a transaction complies with the rules, but it cannot judge, like a bank’s customer service team, whether a transfer resulted from fraud, theft, or user error—nor can it automatically determine who should bear the loss. Lost private keys, hacked exchanges, custodians misappropriating assets, and users falling victim to phishing attacks all involve different kinds of responsibility. And once assets reach an irreversible on-chain address, technically “recovering” them often requires the cooperation of a centralized platform, judicial intervention, or the voluntary return of the assets by whoever controls the relevant private keys.
So “who is responsible?” is not the same as saying “Bitcoin is not secure.” More precisely, it points to the question of how responsibility is allocated: the protocol maintains consensus, nodes and miners validate the rules, wallet software handles signing and user interactions, exchanges and custodians manage users’ assets, and users bear some responsibility for their private keys and transaction confirmations. This structure can function, but unlike traditional finance, it does not concentrate all responsibility in one identifiable institution.
The key to the “Ponzi scheme” debate is not how strongly people feel, but how the term is defined
Johnson’s skepticism about Bitcoin is not new. Decrypt reported that in a March 2026 column for the Daily Mail, he called Bitcoin a “giant Ponzi scheme.” The claim was subsequently challenged by people in the crypto industry, including Strategy Executive Chairman Michael Saylor.
Saylor’s response focused on the definition of the term. He argued that a Ponzi scheme requires a central operator who promises participants returns and then uses money from later participants to pay earlier ones. Bitcoin, by contrast, has no issuer, promoter, or guaranteed returns; it operates on the basis of open code and market demand. By this definition, directly classifying Bitcoin as a Ponzi scheme may overlook the differences in organizational structure between Bitcoin and a typical fraud scheme.
However, rejecting the “Ponzi scheme” label does not mean denying that Bitcoin carries speculative risks. The absence of guaranteed returns does not mean market participants cannot build highly leveraged, marketing-driven, or successive resale schemes around it. Financial products collateralized by Bitcoin or based on its price can still pass market volatility, liquidity risks, and counterparty risks on to ordinary users. Although Johnson’s criticism is debatable in terms of technical definitions, the question he raised—“how do you hold someone accountable after a loss?”—remains an important part of discussions about consumer protection.
This also explains why the debate cannot be settled with a simple “it’s decentralized” or “it’s not a Ponzi scheme.” Supporters focus mainly on how the protocol works and whether there is a central issuer; critics are more concerned with how ordinary users can obtain redress and how institutions can be held to their obligations. The former emphasize the openness of the rules, while the latter focus on whether they can be enforced after a loss. In reality, the two sides are discussing different criteria.
The UK’s practical approach: crypto can be regulated without endorsing Bitcoin
Johnson’s remarks at the event also highlighted another thread in UK crypto policy: governments and politicians do not necessarily have to choose between declaring Bitcoin “money” and calling it a “scam.” They can still take a tiered approach to different types of digital assets and blockchain activities.
Decrypt, citing Ross Kempsell, a Conservative member of the House of Lords and former aide to Johnson, reported that the UK is on the verge of establishing a substantial body of crypto regulation. The Financial Conduct Authority is advancing work on regulatory boundaries, while the Bank of England is also set to develop a stablecoin framework. In his view, the industry can still grow as long as the boundaries of risk are clearly defined. The report also cited consumer research conducted by the Financial Conduct Authority between August and September 2025, which found that 8% of UK adults held some form of crypto asset, down from 12% in 2024 but above the 2021 level.
This information shows that regulatory goals are not limited to curbing speculative activity in asset prices. They also include determining which businesses must be authorized, which entities must meet obligations around client-asset segregation and risk disclosure, and what rules apply to stablecoins, custody, trading platforms, and asset tokenization. Clearer regulatory boundaries make it easier for institutions to assess the cost of entering the market. But if the rules cover only compliant businesses and cannot effectively constrain cross-border platforms and anonymous promoters, gaps in consumer protection will remain.
Johnson’s support for blockchain and asset tokenization reflects a pragmatic stance common among financial institutions and policymakers. Mapping fund shares, bonds, real estate interests, or other assets onto a programmable ledger could enable faster settlement, automated contract execution, and finer-grained division of assets. At the same time, these applications usually retain issuers, custodians, auditors, and legal contracts, making them easier to fit into existing systems of accountability.
But tokenization does not automatically eliminate risk. Whether the underlying asset actually exists, whether the issuer has the right to dispose of it, whether its valuation is reliable, whether the smart contract is secure, and whether investors can exercise their rights across different jurisdictions are all questions that still require traditional law and regulation to answer. Blockchain can improve recordkeeping and settlement, but it cannot, on its own, provide credit, governance, or compensation mechanisms.
What the industry really needs to answer goes beyond whether the technology works
The debate at Breakpoint offers the crypto industry a lesson: it put both the benefits and the costs of “decentralization” on the table. For Bitcoin, the absence of a central authority is part of supporters’ case for censorship resistance, protection against unilateral control, and transparent rules. For ordinary consumers, however, it also means irreversible transactions, dispersed responsibility for losses, and limited channels for redress.
The industry’s participants therefore need to distinguish more clearly between several different roles. Bitcoin protocol developers are not the same as asset issuers; miners are not the same as custodians; and exchanges should not shift their responsibility for managing customer assets onto the underlying network. When users trade Bitcoin on a centralized platform, the risks they actually face come not only from the Bitcoin protocol, but also from the platform’s asset segregation, risk management, internal controls, and the quality of regulation in its jurisdiction.
For the UK, at least three things are worth watching next: which crypto businesses the FCA’s regulatory boundaries ultimately cover, and how stablecoin rules address issuance, reserves, and redemption; whether asset-tokenization projects can expand on the basis of genuine institutional demand and legally enforceable rights; and how regulators address the division of responsibility between decentralized protocols and specific service providers. If the rules emphasize only registration and disclosure, without establishing cross-border enforcement and mechanisms for redress involving customer assets, Johnson’s question will keep coming up.
Johnson may not represent the crypto industry’s technical perspective, but his criticism highlights one of the hardest barriers to overcome as digital assets become more widespread: users want to know not only whether a system can operate without a central institution, but also who has the ability—and the obligation—to act when the system fails, assets are lost, or a platform breaks down. Bitcoin’s supporters can continue to emphasize its open network and lack of an issuer; regulators and financial institutions will continue to demand clearly accountable entities. The policy contest ahead may not be about who can completely persuade the other side, but about whether an enforceable chain of responsibility can be added to the services built around Bitcoin without changing the underlying protocol.
