The Binance security incident on October 29, 2026, was one of the largest exchange thefts in the history of the cryptocurrency industry. About $6.34 billion in digital assets was transferred out of Binance’s hot wallets within hours. The attackers bypassed the normal withdrawal process by exploiting permissions for an internal signing service and Ethereum’s EIP-7702 authorization mechanism. Two weeks later, Binance announced that it had fully reimbursed users for all stolen tokens, and that withdrawal services had been restored in stages.
What this attack truly tested was not whether an exchange could stop the initial outflow of funds, but whether it could make users whole after on-chain permissions had been tampered with. Binance filled the shortfall using its own reserves, the SAFU Fund, and a portion of its futures insurance fund, and processed $4.65 billion in asset withdrawals on the first day withdrawals resumed. For the industry, the incident turned “proof of reserves” from a marketing metric into a stress test for a bank run, and put hot-wallet permission governance at the forefront of exchange security architecture.
How $6.3 Billion Was Transferred—and How It Was Covered
According to Binance’s preliminary investigation, the attack began with unauthorized access to its internal wallet signing service. Between 20:05 and 20:09 UTC on October 29, 2026, five Binance hot wallets transferred 233.46 million XRP to addresses controlled by the attacker. Solana and Optimism hot wallets subsequently transferred approximately 970,500 SOL and 44.2 million OP, and a further 18,270 BTC was transferred.
More difficult was the hijacking of on-chain permissions. The attacker used the EIP-7702 mechanism to give a smart contract under their control partial execution rights over Binance hot wallets. EIP-7702 is an account-abstraction-related improvement introduced in Ethereum’s 2025 Pectra upgrade. It allows externally owned accounts to temporarily delegate execution rights to smart contracts without exposing private keys. The attacker used this mechanism to attach a malicious contract to Binance hot wallets. This authorization is recorded on-chain and operates independently of Binance’s regular withdrawal infrastructure—even if the exchange suspends withdrawals and shuts down its hot wallet services, existing malicious authorizations remain effective.
Binance said that because its hot wallets use a multi-party computation (MPC) scheme, there is no single private key that can immediately revoke on-chain authorizations. The team had to design a dedicated process to clear them one by one. The final unauthorized transfer was confirmed at 23:56 UTC and involved 2,961.9 ETH. At 00:10 the following day, Binance issued a new authorization to the zero address, clearing the EIP-7702 delegated code. During containment, Binance also suspended withdrawals, coordinated with partners to freeze affected tokens, and revoked unauthorized permissions, freezing a total of $2.85 billion in assets.
Regarding the funding shortfall, Binance said that approximately $6.34 billion in digital assets were affected. About $2.85 billion had been frozen or intercepted, though this figure requires further reconciliation and is subject to market price fluctuations. On October 30, Binance announced that it had allocated funds worth more than 100% of the losses to cover them. By October 31, 98% of the affected token assets had been replenished and could be verified on the Proof of Reserves page; BTC, ETH, USDT, BNB, SOL, USDC, XRP, USD1, RLUSD, and ZEC balances were fully covered at 100%. Withdrawal services resumed in phases on November 1, with $4.65 billion in asset withdrawals processed that day. Binance stated explicitly in its announcement: “Binance will bear the financial impact of the stolen funds; these losses will not be passed on to users.”
It is important to distinguish “coverage” from “recovery.” The $2.85 billion that was frozen came from coordination with stablecoin issuers, law enforcement agencies, and partners. Binance bought the remaining amount through secondary markets and over-the-counter channels to make up the shortfall. This means the exchange actually bears liquidity and asset price fluctuation risks, rather than waiting for the case to be solved before compensating users. For highly liquid assets like BTC and ETH, the exchange needs to buy them back on the open market to restore 1:1 reserves—a process that may itself amplify price volatility.
The Attack Chain: From the Supply Chain to On-Chain Authorization
Binance characterized the incident as a complex, multi-stage attack rather than a single, isolated vulnerability. Preparations for the attack can be traced back to June 2026, when a wallet operations engineer searched for and downloaded a tampered Homebrew installation package to install an AI coding tool, compromising the supply chain. The attacker then combined fake job interviews, malicious software downloads, the compromise of internal AI tools, and endpoint control to gradually gain access to the signing service. After the incident, Binance closed the identified entry points, rebuilt or replaced systems along the attack path, and implemented stricter device controls, enhanced risk controls for wallet services, and expanded AI-based behavioral anomaly detection.
Following the incident, security researcher Ken Huang noted in a review that this type of attack exposed several gaps in controls for hot wallet signing processes: privileged DevOps devices lacked independent credentials and secondary approval; there was no preconfigured rapid-revocation process for on-chain delegated authorizations; and there were no pre-agreed formats or labels for coordinating freezes with issuers such as Tether and Circle. His analysis recorded that the attacker completed the first wave of sweeping transfers in about 12 minutes. A single Ethereum transaction carried 50 EIP-7702 authorizations and transferred 167,000 ETH and 1.615 billion USDT in one go. These recommended controls are not new; they had already been repeatedly emphasized in the CSA’s 2021 security guidelines for crypto-asset exchanges and its 2023 comprehensive Web3 security guidelines.
Regarding attribution, Binance cited an alert issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) stating that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was responsible for the incident. This attribution is consistent with several previous large-scale thefts targeting exchanges and cross-chain bridges, but Binance also stressed that the investigation is ongoing and that some technical details will remain confidential to prevent malicious use. The U.S. Secret Service also said it was assisting with the recovery of stolen assets.
Solvency Becomes a New Measure of Exchange Creditworthiness
Binance co-CEO He Yi previously said on X that $6.3 billion represented about 2% of the company’s total assets and reserves, an amount it could absorb. Binance’s SAFU fund had been converted from stablecoins into 15,000 BTC in 2026, which, at the prices prevailing at the time, could cover only about one-fifth of the losses. As a result, the payout relied mainly on the company treasury and part of its futures insurance fund. This is the first security incident since the SAFU fund was established to exceed its capacity by such a wide margin.
The market’s first reaction was still panic. After the incident, Bitcoin fell about 5%, briefly dropping below $80,000. Shares in related public companies, including Coinbase and Robinhood, also fell significantly. The question users were most concerned about remained whether the exchange was truly capable of absorbing the loss. Unlike during the 2022 FTX incident, Binance continued to allow trading while withdrawals were suspended and announced its coverage progress within two days, using verifiable PoR snapshots rather than verbal assurances to reassure users.
From an industry perspective, this incident has changed the significance of Proof of Reserves (PoR). In the past, PoR served mainly as a compliance and marketing tool, with exchanges typically publishing snapshots monthly or quarterly. But while withdrawals are suspended, users cannot access their assets, making PoR snapshots the only publicly available basis for judging whether an exchange remains solvent. After restoring withdrawals, Binance said it would publish an updated PoR report and promised to release a post-incident report once the investigation is complete. For smaller exchanges, this kind of “stress test for a run” may be difficult to replicate: without a balance sheet of comparable size, it is hard to deliver on a promise not to pass losses on to users after a record-breaking theft.
Looking at the longer-term picture, several different approaches to covering losses after exchange hacks are taking shape. After Bitfinex was hacked in 2016, it chose to socialize the losses, distributing them proportionally among all users. In 2022, FTX entered bankruptcy proceedings after becoming insolvent, and users’ funds remain in the repayment queue to this day. In this incident, Binance chose to absorb the losses in full on its balance sheet. These three approaches offer different answers to the same set of questions: Is an exchange merely a matching intermediary, or is it the ultimate guarantor of users’ assets? When on-chain permissions can be hijacked remotely, the boundaries of “user asset security” have expanded beyond cold wallets to include signing services, DevOps endpoints, and on-chain authorization contracts.
Three factors are worth watching going forward. First, the tracking of remaining unfrozen assets and progress in law enforcement efforts: if more funds are frozen, Binance’s actual net losses may be lower than the figures on its books. Second, the findings of independent security firms reviewing Binance’s remediation measures. Third, whether regulators will respond by setting clearer requirements for hot wallet permission management and MPC signing revocation processes. The lesson for exchanges is that security architecture must not only prevent funds from being transferred out; it must also assume the worst-case scenario—that on-chain permissions have been hijacked—and have payout and recovery capabilities ready in advance.
