Bitcoin developers want to plant “land mines” for quantum thieves? Is this approach viable?
If quantum computers can someday derive private keys from public keys, who will protect the bitcoins in old addresses? One Bitcoin developer offered a very “game-theoretic” answer: make the thief put money down first, and if they steal the wrong coins, they lose their entire stake.
First, to be clear: this is a thought experiment Cory Fields posted to the Bitcoin developer mailing list on November 4. He explicitly said he was only introducing an idea; the details of how to implement it with a soft fork can wait until later. It’s not a proposal, and it certainly doesn’t mean Bitcoin is about to change its rules.
His assumptions:
1. Before the quantum crisis arrives (called Q-day in the article), Bitcoin already has a new, quantum-resistant address type.
2. After Q-day, spending coins from an address of the old type requires putting up an equal amount of coins as collateral, and the new outputs come with a time lock.
Three ideas:
1. Quantum land mines: The holder could beforehand hide proof, signed with the old private key, in a small quantum-resistant output. After a thief transfers the old coins, they have to wait a while (30 days is the example given in the article) before spending them again. During that time, the original owner can reveal the proof, reclaim their coins, and take the thief’s collateral as well.
2. Stake auction: The private keys for many old coins have probably already been lost, and no one planted a land mine. So others could put up stakes in advance. If a thief spends those coins, the bidders can claim the thief’s collateral, while the stolen coins themselves are destroyed.
3. Smart auction: Borrowing from the classic “dollar auction” game, even the second-highest bidder has to pay. The most rational outcome is for the thief not to participate at all.
The author himself admits he hasn’t yet worked out what the ideal outcome would be.
Let’s be realistic: no one can say how far away quantum computing is, but the question of whose public keys have already been exposed on-chain is real. Rather than being frightened by headlines claiming “Bitcoin will be cracked by quantum computers,” it’s better to understand where the discussion stands: for now, it’s still just a thought experiment on a mailing list.
$BTC
#比特币 #量子计算 #科普 #Developer
If quantum computers can someday derive private keys from public keys, who will protect the bitcoins in old addresses? One Bitcoin developer offered a very “game-theoretic” answer: make the thief put money down first, and if they steal the wrong coins, they lose their entire stake.
First, to be clear: this is a thought experiment Cory Fields posted to the Bitcoin developer mailing list on November 4. He explicitly said he was only introducing an idea; the details of how to implement it with a soft fork can wait until later. It’s not a proposal, and it certainly doesn’t mean Bitcoin is about to change its rules.
His assumptions:
1. Before the quantum crisis arrives (called Q-day in the article), Bitcoin already has a new, quantum-resistant address type.
2. After Q-day, spending coins from an address of the old type requires putting up an equal amount of coins as collateral, and the new outputs come with a time lock.
Three ideas:
1. Quantum land mines: The holder could beforehand hide proof, signed with the old private key, in a small quantum-resistant output. After a thief transfers the old coins, they have to wait a while (30 days is the example given in the article) before spending them again. During that time, the original owner can reveal the proof, reclaim their coins, and take the thief’s collateral as well.
2. Stake auction: The private keys for many old coins have probably already been lost, and no one planted a land mine. So others could put up stakes in advance. If a thief spends those coins, the bidders can claim the thief’s collateral, while the stolen coins themselves are destroyed.
3. Smart auction: Borrowing from the classic “dollar auction” game, even the second-highest bidder has to pay. The most rational outcome is for the thief not to participate at all.
The author himself admits he hasn’t yet worked out what the ideal outcome would be.
Let’s be realistic: no one can say how far away quantum computing is, but the question of whose public keys have already been exposed on-chain is real. Rather than being frightened by headlines claiming “Bitcoin will be cracked by quantum computers,” it’s better to understand where the discussion stands: for now, it’s still just a thought experiment on a mailing list.
$BTC
#比特币 #量子计算 #科普 #Developer
