That $ENA call—I was on the wrong side.
On the afternoon of 10/24, Arthur Hayes tweeted that he had sold all his ETH, ENA, and UNI. That night, I wrote a bearish take on ENA. Post ID 380762940612450, published at 22:08 Beijing time on 10/24. My exact call:
“This isn’t narrative-driven bad news; real positions are hitting the sell side. If you want to trade ENA in the short term, first recognize that your counterparty is a fund cashing out.”
On Binance spot, the 1-hour ENAUSDT candlestick that opened at 0.1879 at 22:00 on 10/24 closed at 0.2087 72 hours later, at 22:00 on 10/27—up about 11.1%. When the price moves more than 3% against my view, I call it wrong. Over the same period, ETH was down about 1.4%, so ENA outperformed it by more than ten percentage points.
Where I went wrong: Hayes’s exact words were “I dumped it all.” He sold everything. Those tokens were cleared out, not left hanging overhead, but I treated them as supply that would keep weighing on the price. ENA’s low of 0.1839 came just two or three hours after the post.
I’d written that I’d change my mind if ETH stopped making new lows. By the 1-hour close, the ENA/ETH ratio had bottomed at 01:00 on 10/25 and kept rising from there. I never looked back.
I couldn’t find a single verifiable piece of news to explain this rally, so I won’t make up a reason. ENA is now back below the price when the post went out, but that doesn’t change my call on those 72 hours.
On the night a celebrity trader announces they’ve sold everything, do you first look at how much they sold, or whether the market can absorb it?
#ENA复盘 #Ethena $ENA
On the afternoon of 10/24, Arthur Hayes tweeted that he had sold all his ETH, ENA, and UNI. That night, I wrote a bearish take on ENA. Post ID 380762940612450, published at 22:08 Beijing time on 10/24. My exact call:
“This isn’t narrative-driven bad news; real positions are hitting the sell side. If you want to trade ENA in the short term, first recognize that your counterparty is a fund cashing out.”
On Binance spot, the 1-hour ENAUSDT candlestick that opened at 0.1879 at 22:00 on 10/24 closed at 0.2087 72 hours later, at 22:00 on 10/27—up about 11.1%. When the price moves more than 3% against my view, I call it wrong. Over the same period, ETH was down about 1.4%, so ENA outperformed it by more than ten percentage points.
Where I went wrong: Hayes’s exact words were “I dumped it all.” He sold everything. Those tokens were cleared out, not left hanging overhead, but I treated them as supply that would keep weighing on the price. ENA’s low of 0.1839 came just two or three hours after the post.
I’d written that I’d change my mind if ETH stopped making new lows. By the 1-hour close, the ENA/ETH ratio had bottomed at 01:00 on 10/25 and kept rising from there. I never looked back.
I couldn’t find a single verifiable piece of news to explain this rally, so I won’t make up a reason. ENA is now back below the price when the post went out, but that doesn’t change my call on those 72 hours.
On the night a celebrity trader announces they’ve sold everything, do you first look at how much they sold, or whether the market can absorb it?
#ENA复盘 #Ethena $ENA
