Two days, two incidents, and Sovryn hit the pause button twice.
On October 31, lending and margin contracts on Rootstock were hit by two rounds of attacks. The Sovryn team paused the core protocol and lending pools; a 24-hour withdrawal delay bought time to respond, with seven withdrawals held in the queue and not paid to the attacker. Well, that withdrawal delay really did become an emergency brake.
The queue held 66,134.071550 XUSD, which has not been paid to the attacker or allocated as recovery funds.
Then it happened again the next day. On November 1, an incident affected the XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool. The report records 541,455.998472 XUSD transferred to a wallet reportedly controlled by the attacker. Sovryn subsequently implemented emergency rate controls and delisted the affected pool on November 2.
Based on the valuation assumptions in the report, the first incident had a net outflow of about $914,000 after reconciliation; the second report records XUSD payments in AMM trades. The two figures use different accounting bases, and the assets remaining in the pool and the liquidity providers’ final losses are still being assessed. It’s hard to believe—two incidents back to back in two days, though Sovryn didn’t miss a day of emergency response: the second pool was delisted outright.
On October 31, lending and margin contracts on Rootstock were hit by two rounds of attacks. The Sovryn team paused the core protocol and lending pools; a 24-hour withdrawal delay bought time to respond, with seven withdrawals held in the queue and not paid to the attacker. Well, that withdrawal delay really did become an emergency brake.
The queue held 66,134.071550 XUSD, which has not been paid to the attacker or allocated as recovery funds.
Then it happened again the next day. On November 1, an incident affected the XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool. The report records 541,455.998472 XUSD transferred to a wallet reportedly controlled by the attacker. Sovryn subsequently implemented emergency rate controls and delisted the affected pool on November 2.
Based on the valuation assumptions in the report, the first incident had a net outflow of about $914,000 after reconciliation; the second report records XUSD payments in AMM trades. The two figures use different accounting bases, and the assets remaining in the pool and the liquidity providers’ final losses are still being assessed. It’s hard to believe—two incidents back to back in two days, though Sovryn didn’t miss a day of emergency response: the second pool was delisted outright.