The FBI requested a block, but THORChain continued processing swaps as usual: this was not nodes “disobeying,” but a structural consequence of permissionless swapping. My view is that as long as the protocol continues to tie node upgrades to transaction validation, without introducing an address-level censorship switch, similar blocking requests will be difficult to implement on-chain. This view depends on the current rules indeed having no mechanism for selective blocking.
First, the facts. According to a THORChain announcement cited by PANews, after the 3.21.1 update, swaps resumed on 11 chains: AVAX, BASE, BCH, BTC, DOGE, ETH, LTC, RUNE, TRON, XRPL, and ZEC. Swaps on ATOM, BSC, and SOL remain paused. The project said that 14 active nodes have yet to upgrade, and that swap performance issues can only be fixed once all active nodes have upgraded. Separately, according to tracking by KOL Grey Ledger, cited by PANews, within 25 minutes of swaps reopening, all 41 swaps linked to the Binance hackers were completed, involving a total of 368.12 ETH, while 1.327 million TRX was returned to the sending wallets. None of the addresses used for these swaps directly matched the FBI list, but 25 of the recipient wallets had previously received ETH from addresses listed by the FBI. Cointelegraph reported that the attackers moved most of the stolen SOL and continued laundering funds through THORChain. On October 31, the FBI had asked THORNode operators to block the related transactions.
My observation is that the key question here is not whether blocking is possible, but at which layer the mechanism for blocking is implemented. If nodes are required to filter transactions against an address list, validators are effectively being asked to make compliance judgments. But if the protocol adheres to uniform rules and has no address-level switch, operators lack an actionable product interface even when they receive a request. Grey Ledger’s claim that “the current rules still do not allow selective blocking” points precisely to this conflict, but the claim comes from a single KOL’s tracking, and the addresses only indirectly match the FBI list. The material available here does not provide a fully verified flow of funds.
Based on this, three things are worth tracking next: when the 14 nodes that have yet to upgrade complete their upgrades, when swaps resume on ATOM/BSC/SOL, and whether the number and flows of swaps involving the related addresses change after services resume. If new filtering rules appear after the node upgrades, or the project explicitly introduces a restricted mode, this assessment will need to be revised. Until then, the tension between “compliance-based blocking” and “protocol neutrality” is likely to recur. This article does not constitute investment advice.
$BTC
#BTC #ETH #SOL #DOGE
Sources:
PANews (originally published 11-04 17:26 Beijing time)
https://www.panewslab.com/zh/articles/01a1a5e2-046b-76e5-ae9b-d69cd63746a6
Cointelegraph (originally published 11-04 17:15 Beijing time)
https://cointelegraph.com/news/binance-hackers-move-81-stolen-solana-route-thorchain?utm_source=rss_feed\u0026utm_medium=rss\u0026utm_campaign=rss_partner_inbound
First, the facts. According to a THORChain announcement cited by PANews, after the 3.21.1 update, swaps resumed on 11 chains: AVAX, BASE, BCH, BTC, DOGE, ETH, LTC, RUNE, TRON, XRPL, and ZEC. Swaps on ATOM, BSC, and SOL remain paused. The project said that 14 active nodes have yet to upgrade, and that swap performance issues can only be fixed once all active nodes have upgraded. Separately, according to tracking by KOL Grey Ledger, cited by PANews, within 25 minutes of swaps reopening, all 41 swaps linked to the Binance hackers were completed, involving a total of 368.12 ETH, while 1.327 million TRX was returned to the sending wallets. None of the addresses used for these swaps directly matched the FBI list, but 25 of the recipient wallets had previously received ETH from addresses listed by the FBI. Cointelegraph reported that the attackers moved most of the stolen SOL and continued laundering funds through THORChain. On October 31, the FBI had asked THORNode operators to block the related transactions.
My observation is that the key question here is not whether blocking is possible, but at which layer the mechanism for blocking is implemented. If nodes are required to filter transactions against an address list, validators are effectively being asked to make compliance judgments. But if the protocol adheres to uniform rules and has no address-level switch, operators lack an actionable product interface even when they receive a request. Grey Ledger’s claim that “the current rules still do not allow selective blocking” points precisely to this conflict, but the claim comes from a single KOL’s tracking, and the addresses only indirectly match the FBI list. The material available here does not provide a fully verified flow of funds.
Based on this, three things are worth tracking next: when the 14 nodes that have yet to upgrade complete their upgrades, when swaps resume on ATOM/BSC/SOL, and whether the number and flows of swaps involving the related addresses change after services resume. If new filtering rules appear after the node upgrades, or the project explicitly introduces a restricted mode, this assessment will need to be revised. Until then, the tension between “compliance-based blocking” and “protocol neutrality” is likely to recur. This article does not constitute investment advice.
$BTC
#BTC #ETH #SOL #DOGE
Sources:
PANews (originally published 11-04 17:26 Beijing time)
https://www.panewslab.com/zh/articles/01a1a5e2-046b-76e5-ae9b-d69cd63746a6
Cointelegraph (originally published 11-04 17:15 Beijing time)
https://cointelegraph.com/news/binance-hackers-move-81-stolen-solana-route-thorchain?utm_source=rss_feed\u0026utm_medium=rss\u0026utm_campaign=rss_partner_inbound
