There’s a technical comparison in the initial report that’s worth examining separately.
The attacker abused Ethereum’s EIP-7702 to delegate part of the hot wallet’s execution authority to a malicious contract. The authorization was recorded on-chain, and the exploit used a path outside the withdrawal channel.
So pausing withdrawals alone couldn’t block all unauthorized transfers. The attacker also submitted 50 signed transactions to change the nonce and set up the malicious delegation. Since the hot wallet uses MPC, there’s no single private key that can revoke it immediately; the team had to create a separate revocation process.
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The attacker abused Ethereum’s EIP-7702 to delegate part of the hot wallet’s execution authority to a malicious contract. The authorization was recorded on-chain, and the exploit used a path outside the withdrawal channel.
So pausing withdrawals alone couldn’t block all unauthorized transfers. The attacker also submitted 50 signed transactions to change the nonce and set up the malicious delegation. Since the hot wallet uses MPC, there’s no single private key that can revoke it immediately; the team had to create a separate revocation process.
$BNB $ETH $BTC