Can Ethereum’s EIP-7702 be “turned off forever”? A new draft says yes
Last night we talked about what EIP-7702 is. Here’s a follow-up: on the Ethereum developer forum (Ethereum Magicians), someone posted a draft, EIP-8476, in the early hours of October 31 Beijing time. Its title translates as “Permanently Opting Out of Delegation for Ordinary Addresses.”
First, to be clear: this is a Draft, and it’s still a long way from a mainnet upgrade.
Here’s what it aims to do, in a few points:
1. Let an ordinary address (EOA) send a special type-4 transaction to install an “unexecutable marker” on itself. From then on, no EIP-7702 delegation authorization can replace or remove it.
2. The address stays the same, and normal transfers and transactions still work as usual. It just can never enable EIP-7702 delegation again.
3. The proposal specifically names three types of accounts that might want this: institutional wallets, exchange hot wallets, and treasuries, which it says don’t need delegated execution.
4. The proposal also makes clear that this won’t protect against a stolen private key: whoever gets the key can still sign ordinary transactions and transfer the funds.
Two fairly practical issues were raised in the discussion:
· One reviewer pointed out that addresses with the marker might not be able to receive certain NFTs (safe transfers call code on the recipient). The author replied late on October 31 Beijing time that they plan to change the proposal so the EVM treats the marker as “empty code.”
· Someone else noted that this protection applies per chain: if you turn it off on mainnet but not on another chain, authorizations signed with the same key can still be used on that other chain.
Someone in the discussion also analyzed public on-chain data about Binance’s recent hot wallet incident. The author’s response was that disabling delegation in advance wouldn’t have prevented the theft; it would only remove the shortcut of “signing a batch of authorizations and not needing to sign again afterward.” Binance has not yet published a complete official root-cause report, so this is just an on-chain analysis from the forum.
A few plain truths:
· A feature has been live for over a year, and someone is now proposing “give me a permanent off switch”—a sign that not every address needs to be that smart.
· A draft is not the same as an approved proposal, let alone something that will make it to mainnet. Don’t see the title and assume your wallet can turn it off already.
· The real bottom line is still the old advice: don’t sign things carelessly, and make sure you understand what you’re signing before you sign.
Does your wallet need “smart” features like EIP-7702, or would you rather it be a little simpler and safer?
$ETH #EIP7702 #Ethereum Upgrade
Last night we talked about what EIP-7702 is. Here’s a follow-up: on the Ethereum developer forum (Ethereum Magicians), someone posted a draft, EIP-8476, in the early hours of October 31 Beijing time. Its title translates as “Permanently Opting Out of Delegation for Ordinary Addresses.”
First, to be clear: this is a Draft, and it’s still a long way from a mainnet upgrade.
Here’s what it aims to do, in a few points:
1. Let an ordinary address (EOA) send a special type-4 transaction to install an “unexecutable marker” on itself. From then on, no EIP-7702 delegation authorization can replace or remove it.
2. The address stays the same, and normal transfers and transactions still work as usual. It just can never enable EIP-7702 delegation again.
3. The proposal specifically names three types of accounts that might want this: institutional wallets, exchange hot wallets, and treasuries, which it says don’t need delegated execution.
4. The proposal also makes clear that this won’t protect against a stolen private key: whoever gets the key can still sign ordinary transactions and transfer the funds.
Two fairly practical issues were raised in the discussion:
· One reviewer pointed out that addresses with the marker might not be able to receive certain NFTs (safe transfers call code on the recipient). The author replied late on October 31 Beijing time that they plan to change the proposal so the EVM treats the marker as “empty code.”
· Someone else noted that this protection applies per chain: if you turn it off on mainnet but not on another chain, authorizations signed with the same key can still be used on that other chain.
Someone in the discussion also analyzed public on-chain data about Binance’s recent hot wallet incident. The author’s response was that disabling delegation in advance wouldn’t have prevented the theft; it would only remove the shortcut of “signing a batch of authorizations and not needing to sign again afterward.” Binance has not yet published a complete official root-cause report, so this is just an on-chain analysis from the forum.
A few plain truths:
· A feature has been live for over a year, and someone is now proposing “give me a permanent off switch”—a sign that not every address needs to be that smart.
· A draft is not the same as an approved proposal, let alone something that will make it to mainnet. Don’t see the title and assume your wallet can turn it off already.
· The real bottom line is still the old advice: don’t sign things carelessly, and make sure you understand what you’re signing before you sign.
Does your wallet need “smart” features like EIP-7702, or would you rather it be a little simpler and safer?
$ETH #EIP7702 #Ethereum Upgrade
