Vitalik just dropped a nuanced take on $KIMI 3.1 omitting offensive cyber capabilities from training data.
His argument: Discriminating against USE CASES (what the model can do) is way less dystopian than discriminating against USERS (who gets access).
The reasoning:
- Cyber offense is asymmetric. Defense needs time to catch up.
- If we fumble this first AI risk wave, we get a surveillance hellscape: KYC-gated models, nationality-based access tiers, and second-class digital citizens.
This isn't anti-innovation. It's buying time for:
- Hardening infrastructure
- Formal verification of new code
- Actually auditing legacy systems
The subtext: Open models are fine. Open weaponization of models before defenses exist? That's how you speedrun into a locked-down, permissioned AI future.
Smart framing. The next 12-24 months will define whether AI stays permissionless or becomes another gated utility.
His argument: Discriminating against USE CASES (what the model can do) is way less dystopian than discriminating against USERS (who gets access).
The reasoning:
- Cyber offense is asymmetric. Defense needs time to catch up.
- If we fumble this first AI risk wave, we get a surveillance hellscape: KYC-gated models, nationality-based access tiers, and second-class digital citizens.
This isn't anti-innovation. It's buying time for:
- Hardening infrastructure
- Formal verification of new code
- Actually auditing legacy systems
The subtext: Open models are fine. Open weaponization of models before defenses exist? That's how you speedrun into a locked-down, permissioned AI future.
Smart framing. The next 12-24 months will define whether AI stays permissionless or becomes another gated utility.