Qubic has halted again.
The protocol wasn’t breached; wallet seed generation failed.
The attack window was roughly late night on 10/17 to early morning on 10/18: 1,404 addresses, about 2.94T QU, worth ~$1.4M.
According to the official statement, the affected seed phrases were generated using any browser on iPhone/iPad, Safari on Mac (through 10/18), or older versions of the iOS app (before 2025/7).
The root cause is even more alarming—they used Math.random(), and only later switched to crypto.getRandomValues().
The chain is halted at tick 85,371,949.
87.1% is still frozen on-chain; 12.9% was moved to MEXC and frozen within an hour.
Computors haven’t finished voting on a recovery plan yet.
This isn’t new: Coldcard, the Trust Wallet extension, Libbitcoin… time and again, incidents come down to one question: are the random numbers strong enough?
A chain can be slow. Seed phrases can’t be sloppy.
The protocol wasn’t breached; wallet seed generation failed.
The attack window was roughly late night on 10/17 to early morning on 10/18: 1,404 addresses, about 2.94T QU, worth ~$1.4M.
According to the official statement, the affected seed phrases were generated using any browser on iPhone/iPad, Safari on Mac (through 10/18), or older versions of the iOS app (before 2025/7).
The root cause is even more alarming—they used Math.random(), and only later switched to crypto.getRandomValues().
The chain is halted at tick 85,371,949.
87.1% is still frozen on-chain; 12.9% was moved to MEXC and frozen within an hour.
Computors haven’t finished voting on a recovery plan yet.
This isn’t new: Coldcard, the Trust Wallet extension, Libbitcoin… time and again, incidents come down to one question: are the random numbers strong enough?
A chain can be slow. Seed phrases can’t be sloppy.