On October 13, Coinbase published a blog post discussing how Bitcoin can address the potential threat that future quantum computing poses to existing digital signatures. The company said it holds approximately 5% of the circulating $BTC supply in custody and participates in open-source collaborations such as the Bitcoin Security Alliance. The post emphasized that reaching consensus and migrating the ecosystem often take years, so preparations should begin before cryptographically relevant quantum computers (CRQCs) emerge—not only after the threat is confirmed.
Coinbase outlined several technical approaches: output types should decouple the “container” from the signature scheme, making it easier to introduce, replace, or layer in post-quantum algorithms in the future, and it cited flexible designs such as P2MR (BIP-360) and P2TRv2. Active wallets are encouraged to adopt post-quantum or hybrid paths early—for example, allowing the same funds to be spent using either classical ECDSA/Schnorr or a post-quantum key in a 1-of-2 scheme. If stateful signature schemes are supported, stateless options should also be retained. Evaluations should prioritize deterministic verification, constant-time implementations, and MPC compatibility to enable institutional custody. The handling of dormant or lost funds, or funds whose public keys have already been exposed, should be discussed separately from adding post-quantum signature support, to avoid holding up the main upgrade effort. The post is intended as input for public discussion, not as a final specification.
#BTC #比特币 #安全 does not constitute investment advice.
Coinbase outlined several technical approaches: output types should decouple the “container” from the signature scheme, making it easier to introduce, replace, or layer in post-quantum algorithms in the future, and it cited flexible designs such as P2MR (BIP-360) and P2TRv2. Active wallets are encouraged to adopt post-quantum or hybrid paths early—for example, allowing the same funds to be spent using either classical ECDSA/Schnorr or a post-quantum key in a 1-of-2 scheme. If stateful signature schemes are supported, stateless options should also be retained. Evaluations should prioritize deterministic verification, constant-time implementations, and MPC compatibility to enable institutional custody. The handling of dormant or lost funds, or funds whose public keys have already been exposed, should be discussed separately from adding post-quantum signature support, to avoid holding up the main upgrade effort. The post is intended as input for public discussion, not as a final specification.
#BTC #比特币 #安全 does not constitute investment advice.