Many people use Kimi to write reports and dig into long articles, but few know that its parent company has yet to go public. On October 6, Bloomberg put the news on the table: Moonshot AI reportedly completed its final round of private fundraising, at a valuation of around $50 billion—about five times its roughly $10 billion valuation a year ago. On the same day, Kuaishou also set its most valuable AI asset, Kling AI, on the path to an IPO. These are not two isolated IPO stories, but a sign that AI companies going public in Hong Kong is shifting from one-off cases to a wave: the window is real, and so is the competition to get through it.

One. What happened: two developments, one signal

Bloomberg reported that Moonshot AI has completed its final private funding round before listing at a valuation of approximately US$50 billion, and has begun preparing to sound out investor interest, with preliminary discussions potentially starting as early as this month. The company had previously reportedly submitted a confidential listing application to HKEX, with Bank of America as overall coordinator and CICC, Deutsche Bank, and Goldman Sachs as sponsors. Discussions are ongoing and the IPO timing may change, the report said. Moonshot AI did not respond to a request for comment.

Bloomberg reported on the same day that Kling AI is working with CICC, Goldman Sachs, and UBS to prepare for a Hong Kong IPO, targeting a listing as early as next year and seeking to raise at least US$1 billion. Details may still change, and Goldman Sachs and UBS declined to comment. Separately, The Information previously reported that regulators had launched data-security investigations into DeepSeek and Moonshot AI. There is no public conclusion yet on whether these will affect valuation or timing.

The two developments came on the same day, and we are inclined to think this was no coincidence: the capacity of Hong Kong’s current IPO market to absorb new listings, the Chapter 18C route, and Southbound investors’ preferences together form a window that may not remain open for long. For companies preparing to list, filing early secures not time, but pricing power.

Two. Valuation: 50x sales is not a valuation—it is a bet

First, look at the curve: based on publicly available reports, three consecutive funding rounds from January to February lifted the valuation from US$10 billion to US$18 billion. It was approximately US$20 billion after the Series D round in May, then approximately US$31.5 billion in a summer round (another report put a subsequent round at approximately US$35 billion, so figures differ). The latest round valued the company at approximately US$50 billion. That is about fivefold in a year.

The story is supported by revenue growth, not revenue scale. According to Bloomberg, ARR rose from approximately US$300 million in June to approximately US$1 billion currently, and the company expects it could reach US$2 billion in December—note that this is the company’s own forecast. The business model includes tiered Kimi subscriptions for consumers and the provision of underlying technology to businesses. Kimi Work, an agent product, launched in June, and the open-source model Kimi K3, released in July, reportedly performed comparably to leading OpenAI and Anthropic models on some evaluation metrics.

Our view: at an approximately 50x static price-to-sales multiple, investors are not buying Moonshot AI as it stands today; they are buying a bet on how quickly it can deliver on ARR. Two rough calculations: US$50 billion against US$1 billion in ARR implies a static multiple of approximately 50x. Even if ARR doubles as expected to US$2 billion, the forward price-to-sales multiple would still be 25x. The secondary-market reference point is Zhipu: using an intraday market capitalization of approximately HK$313.4 billion on October 6 and interim-report ARR of approximately US$1.8 billion, we estimate a static multiple of approximately 22x. The multiple the primary market assigns Moonshot AI is roughly more than twice what the secondary market assigns to a listed peer. That gulf can only be bridged by one of two things: ARR continuing to scale at a faster pace than it is now, or the IPO valuation falling back toward the secondary-market anchor. The substance of IPO pricing discussions is this negotiation; December ARR of approximately US$2 billion, if achieved, will be the first checkpoint for this bet.

Three. Hong Kong’s IPO market: the window is real, but it is being used up

KPMG’s third-quarter review, published on October 6, showed (as cited by media) that 116 companies had listed in the first three quarters, raising more than HK$388 billion—over twice the amount in the same period last year and a record for the period. More than 600 listing applications were active, significantly above the usual level in previous years. Full-year fundraising could reach HK$500 billion; if achieved, this would break the annual record of HK$427 billion set in 2010.

Two structural trends are worth watching: high-tech companies (AI, semiconductors, and robotics) accounted for more than half of total funds raised, and equity issuance financing in the third quarter hit a record. During the period, 19 Chapter 18C specialist technology companies listed and raised HK$36.2 billion, compared with just eight listings in total over the previous three years. Our view of the Chapter 18C route is that it has gone from a back-up entrance to the main entrance—and once the main entrance opens, scarcity goes on a countdown. Chapter 18C listing eligibility requirements mainly include criteria such as market capitalization and R&D investment; profitability is not a prerequisite, providing a listing route for specialist technology companies that are still in an investment phase. However, the greater the route’s throughput, the thinner the scarcity premium available to each individual company. Companies filing this year can benefit from the window; those filing next year may face an allocation pool that is already full.

Four. Kling AI: reloading for the arms race, not a simple exit

Launched in 2024, Kling AI focuses on generative AI video. Bloomberg reported that after OpenAI shut down Sora, Kling and other Chinese providers are seeking to capture the market space it left behind. Kling raised US$2.8 billion in July at a pre-money valuation of approximately US$15 billion, with investors including Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu. At the end of August, according to Kuaishou announcements and media reports, it completed another capital increase. The independent financing quota launched this year has been fully used.

Viewed in the context of the competitive landscape, we see Kling’s IPO as a move to reload for the arms race, rather than simply an exit for shareholders. ByteDance’s Seedance, Shengshu Technology (which is also reportedly planning a Hong Kong listing, according to Bloomberg), and PixVerse (Aishi Technology, likewise) are all betting on the same field. Video-generation computing and data costs are extremely high, so the deciding factor is unlikely to be model rankings, but cash-flow runway: whoever runs out of capital ammunition first will fall behind first. How much of the space left by Sora’s exit can be captured, and for how long, remains unclear. But the length of the competitor list itself is a clue: for now, money is being spent faster than it is being made in this sector.

The parent company’s share price is another variable worth considering carefully. According to Bloomberg and corroborating market data, Kuaishou has fallen by more than half year to date (closing at HK$66.25 on the first trading day of 2026 and HK$30.18 on October 6). This is a double-edged sword: a weak parent company could weigh on valuation expectations for Kling. Conversely, separating AI assets from Kuaishou’s “content platform valuation” and pricing them independently would give the market its first opportunity to value the AI video business on its own. Whether the spin-off commands a premium or a discount will be answered first by the offering price. We are inclined to think this may also be one factor behind Kuaishou’s consideration of a spin-off.

Five. Why Hong Kong, and why now?

Southbound funds are a key variable in the market’s ability to absorb new listings. According to Wind, cumulative net inflows from Southbound funds this year reached HK$428.203 billion (as of September 28), with holdings valued at approximately HK$6.02 trillion (as of September 29). AI-related names ranked among the top net purchases over the past three months: Zhipu led at HK$40.021 billion, followed by MINIMAX-W at HK$11.411 billion. Based on this pattern, if new listings such as Moonshot AI and Kling AI are listed and included in Stock Connect, these funds are likely to remain among their marginal buyers. Their post-listing performance will in turn shape Southbound investors’ overall attitude toward large-model companies as an asset class: the performance of the first listings will set the pricing environment for those that follow.

The scarcity premium has a shelf life, and that is the answer to “why now.” Zhipu and MINIMAX-W have continued to attract Southbound buying since listing, in large part because there are so few large-model stocks in Stock Connect. According to KPMG, 19 Chapter 18C companies listed in the first three quarters alone, while more than 600 applications are in the queue. When “scarcity” becomes “bulk supply,” early listings enjoy pricing power, while later ones are left to pick up the tail end of allocations. For companies preparing for an IPO, pricing power during the window is worth more than the window itself. This is our core interpretation of the current flurry of filings.

Six. What to watch next

  • Filing and hearing progress: the formal application proof on HKEXnews, particularly the disclosure basis for ARR composition and the breakdown between subscription and B2B revenue;

  • Feedback from initial investor meetings: preliminary discussions could begin as early as this month, providing a firsthand window into how secondary-market buyers view a 50x static price-to-sales multiple;

  • Whether December ARR can meet expectations of approximately US$2 billion: this is the key data point for determining whether the valuation story holds together;

  • Kuaishou’s share price and market conditions: the parent company’s performance, interest rates, and overall demand for new listings will all feed through to the offering price.

In closing

Three points sum up our view. First, Moonshot AI’s approximately 50x static price-to-sales multiple versus Zhipu’s approximately 22x reflects a gulf in growth expectations between the primary and secondary markets. December ARR will be an important data point to watch: meeting expectations would lend some support to the current valuation logic; falling short could increase the likelihood of the market reassessing its valuation. Second, the Chapter 18C route has gone from a back-up entrance to the main entrance, putting scarcity on a countdown. The flurry of filings is fundamentally about securing pricing power, not joining the crowd. Third, Kling AI’s IPO is a move to reload for the AI video arms race, where the deciding factor is cash-flow runway, not leaderboard rankings. Kuaishou’s weak share price could weigh on valuation, but may also be one reason for the spin-off. These views are based on currently available public information and may change if circumstances do.

Sources

Bloomberg (2026/10/6), KPMG’s 2026 Q3 review, Wind, exchange market data, and public reports.

  • Moonshot AI: valuation of approximately US$50 billion; proposed listing in 2027 Q1 and fundraising of up to US$5 billion; ARR of US$300 million → US$1 billion → US$2 billion; valuation of US$10 billion → US$18 billion → US$20 billion → US$31.5 billion (another reported figure is US$35 billion). The company has not made a formal disclosure.

  • Moonshot AI sponsors/filing: Bank of America, CICC, Deutsche Bank, and Goldman Sachs; confidential filing.

  • Kling AI: underwriters CICC, Goldman Sachs, and UBS; proposed fundraising of at least US$1 billion; raised US$2.8 billion in July at a pre-money valuation of approximately US$15 billion. Kuaishou’s announcements cite different figures, including a financing amount of approximately RMB3 billion.

  • Hong Kong IPOs: 116 listings, more than HK$388 billion raised, and over 600 applications; 19 Chapter 18C listings raising HK$36.2 billion; high-tech accounted for more than half; the 2010 record was HK$427 billion.

  • Southbound funds: cumulative net inflows of HK$428.203 billion and holdings of approximately HK$6.02 trillion; Zhipu HK$40.021 billion, MINIMAX-W HK$11.411 billion. As of September 28–29.

  • Kuaishou: closed at HK$66.25 on the first trading day of 2026 and HK$30.18 on October 6 (down approximately 54%).

  • Price-to-sales: Moonshot AI approximately 50x static; Zhipu approximately 22x (rough calculation based on an intraday market capitalization of approximately HK$313.4 billion on October 6 and interim-report ARR of approximately US$1.8 billion). This is our rough calculation, using an exchange rate of approximately HK$7.78 per US dollar, for reference only and not a valuation opinion.

Note: Moonshot AI and Kling AI have not made formal company disclosures on the matters discussed; media reports are the source. There are differences between media reports and Kuaishou’s announcements regarding Kling AI, as noted in the article.

Disclaimer:

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