#Tether This year, in coordination with law enforcement agencies, about $550 million worth of USDT related to Iran was frozen: over $344 million frozen in April (linked to the Iranian central bank), and in July, more than $130 million was frozen in four additional wallets.
These numbers cut both ways for the stablecoin narrative.
The good side is that it shows the issuer of USDT has the capability and willingness to cooperate with sanctions enforcement, which would weaken regulatory claims that “stablecoins are equal to money-laundering tools.”
The other side is that the very fact that these assets can be frozen at any time is itself a risk exposure—an asset that can be locked up according to law-enforcement requirements is, in essence, a centralized liability.
Whether or not you use USDT isn’t a matter of faith; it’s whether you’re willing to accept the premise that “the asset can be disposed of by a third party.”
These numbers cut both ways for the stablecoin narrative.
The good side is that it shows the issuer of USDT has the capability and willingness to cooperate with sanctions enforcement, which would weaken regulatory claims that “stablecoins are equal to money-laundering tools.”
The other side is that the very fact that these assets can be frozen at any time is itself a risk exposure—an asset that can be locked up according to law-enforcement requirements is, in essence, a centralized liability.
Whether or not you use USDT isn’t a matter of faith; it’s whether you’re willing to accept the premise that “the asset can be disposed of by a third party.”