On Solana, most USDC is used for payments, transfers, and DeFi interactions—it’s “spent money.” On Hyperliquid, almost all USDC is margin for perpetual contracts—it’s “staked money.” The former is water flowing through pipes. The latter is bullets waiting in the chamber.
Think about the difference in that picture.
Why can Hyperliquid be so strong?
I checked the data: in the past 30 days, Hyperliquid’s perpetual contract trading volume was $240 billion, the highest. The second-place Arbitrum had $47.2 billion, while Solana had $46 billion. Do the math on that multiple—it’s over five times.
With trading volume stacked there, margin naturally piles up there too.
Plus, Hyperliquid’s USDC has a special feature. This past May, Circle, Coinbase, and Hyperliquid did a partnership. USDC became Hyperliquid’s only quoted asset. Coinbase manages the treasury deployments, and Circle handles minting and redemption. Even more importantly, 90% of reserve earnings are sent back to buy back HYPE.
Take a closer look at this design.
Users deposit USDC as margin. The interest generated by that USDC doesn’t go to Circle or Hyperliquid. Instead, it’s used to buy HYPE in the market and then burn it. For every additional dollar of USDC, there’s an additional amount of potential pressure to buy HYPE.
This isn’t just a stablecoin. It’s a flywheel.
But what I want to talk about today isn’t that.
I want to say that what this data truly reveals is something deeper: the “use cases” of stablecoins are splitting.
Previously, everyone looked at stablecoins in terms of total supply. How many billions of USDT, how many billions of USDC—who’s growing and who’s falling. But now, if you look at on-chain distribution, you’ll see a trend: stablecoins are starting to branch out by “function.”
On Ethereum, USDC is the vault for old money. On Solana, USDC is the payment channel. On Hyperliquid, USDC is the chips at the poker table.
These three things all get called USDC, but their “turnover rate” is completely different. Money in the payment channel moves many times a day. Money at the poker table moves more frequently too, but in a more one-directional way—it only flows in, not out, until it gets liquidated or withdrawn.
Hyperliquid’s USDC being able to outperform Solana shows that, at some point, the volume of “betting” in this market outweighed the volume of “use” #hyperliquid上usdc供应量超越solana
Think about the difference in that picture.
Why can Hyperliquid be so strong?
I checked the data: in the past 30 days, Hyperliquid’s perpetual contract trading volume was $240 billion, the highest. The second-place Arbitrum had $47.2 billion, while Solana had $46 billion. Do the math on that multiple—it’s over five times.
With trading volume stacked there, margin naturally piles up there too.
Plus, Hyperliquid’s USDC has a special feature. This past May, Circle, Coinbase, and Hyperliquid did a partnership. USDC became Hyperliquid’s only quoted asset. Coinbase manages the treasury deployments, and Circle handles minting and redemption. Even more importantly, 90% of reserve earnings are sent back to buy back HYPE.
Take a closer look at this design.
Users deposit USDC as margin. The interest generated by that USDC doesn’t go to Circle or Hyperliquid. Instead, it’s used to buy HYPE in the market and then burn it. For every additional dollar of USDC, there’s an additional amount of potential pressure to buy HYPE.
This isn’t just a stablecoin. It’s a flywheel.
But what I want to talk about today isn’t that.
I want to say that what this data truly reveals is something deeper: the “use cases” of stablecoins are splitting.
Previously, everyone looked at stablecoins in terms of total supply. How many billions of USDT, how many billions of USDC—who’s growing and who’s falling. But now, if you look at on-chain distribution, you’ll see a trend: stablecoins are starting to branch out by “function.”
On Ethereum, USDC is the vault for old money. On Solana, USDC is the payment channel. On Hyperliquid, USDC is the chips at the poker table.
These three things all get called USDC, but their “turnover rate” is completely different. Money in the payment channel moves many times a day. Money at the poker table moves more frequently too, but in a more one-directional way—it only flows in, not out, until it gets liquidated or withdrawn.
Hyperliquid’s USDC being able to outperform Solana shows that, at some point, the volume of “betting” in this market outweighed the volume of “use” #hyperliquid上usdc供应量超越solana