This time, the truly frightening part isn’t that the account was hacked—it’s that even he can’t say for sure whether the password change will actually work.

He clicked the link in the phishing email and logged into X directly; the authorization was basically given away in that one moment. The password defenses never even got a chance to show up.

Within a few minutes, the email was changed. That means the attacker didn’t just guess a weak password—they gained full session access. Changing your password at this point only protects against the next time; it can’t stop the current incident after the attacker already has the access.

Why do people whose accounts get stolen first try to clarify that they won’t distribute tokens or run presales, rather than immediately yelling at the attacker? Because yelling is useless—it can’t stop the hand that clicked the link.

After a big account is compromised, the real harvesting window is the few minutes before the fans realize whether that post is actually from the account owner. Broadcasting this always comes faster than changing the password.

Even he isn’t sure whether the hacker can still get into the account, or whether everything has been cleaned up. No one knows. Any link he has posted under his name during this period should be treated with a big question mark. $ETH